Roller-Dick v. Centracare Health Sys.

916 N.W.2d 373

Laurie A. ROLLER-DICK, Respondent,

v.CENTRACARE HEALTH SYSTEM and SFM Mutual Companies, Relators.

A17-1816

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Filed: August 8, 2018

Raymond R. Peterson, Scott A. Wilson, McCoy Peterson, Ltd., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent.

Kristen Ohlsen, Jacob R. Colling, Aafedt, Forde, Gray, Monson & Hagar, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for relators.

OPINION

MCKEIG, Justice.

This workers' compensation case concerns an employee who fell down a set of stairs on her employer’s premises and was injured as a result. The facts related to how and why she fell are undisputed. Thus, this case presents the purely legal question of whether her injury "arose out of" her employment. In answering that question, the workers' compensation judge and the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) took opposing views of the "increased-risk" test we applied in Dykhoff v. Xcel Energy , 840 N.W.2d 821 (Minn. 2013).

Because we agree with the WCCA that Roller-Dick’s injury arose out of employment under the increased-risk test, we affirm.

FACTS

Respondent Laurie Roller-Dick is an employee of Relator CentraCare Health System. One day, as she was leaving work, Roller-Dick fell down a set of stairs, fracturing her left ankle as a result.

Roller-Dick accessed the stairway from the second-floor administrative area where she worked. The stairs are not usually accessible to the general public. The stairway has railings on both sides as well as nonslip treads on the steps. Immediately before Roller-Dick fell, she was not using the handrails. She was holding a plant from her desk in both hands and her handbag was hanging from the crook of her elbow. As she was falling, she dropped her plant and caught herself on the handrail, resulting in the ankle injury.

Before the workers' compensation judge, Roller-Dick testified that the rubber sole of her shoe "stuck" to the treads of the stairs. But the workers' compensation judge found that "the non-skid surface of the stairs [neither] contributed to [nor] increased the risk of her fall." Further, the compensation judge found that the stairs were "a reasonable and consistent height" and that they were "free of debris, moisture, and defects" at the time of Roller-Dick’s fall.

The only issue before the compensation judge was whether Roller-Dick’s injury "arose out of" her employment. Relying on Dykhoff v. Xcel Energy , 840 N.W.2d 821 (Minn. 2013), and Kirchner v. County of Anoka , 339 N.W.2d 908 (Minn. 1983), the compensation judge held that the injury did not arise out of employment because Roller-Dick failed to establish that the stairs were "more hazardous than stairs she might encounter in everyday life or that her work duties in some way increased her risk of falling as she descended them." The compensation judge commented that it was "undoubtedly true" that the fact that Roller-Dick was not holding onto the handrails increased her risk of falling. But because Roller-Dick could not identify a "work-related reason" why she was not using the handrails, the compensation judge rejected the argument that her injury arose out of her employment on the basis of that fact.

The WCCA reversed. The WCCA determined that the compensation judge applied the incorrect test by requiring the employee to demonstrate some defect or additional hazard on the stairs. Roller-Dick v. CentraCare Health Sys. & SFM Mut. Co , No. WC17-6057, 2017 WL 5504738, at *2 (Minn. WCCA Oct. 19, 2017). The correct test, the WCCA said, is whether the stairs posed an "increased" as opposed to a "neutral" risk. Id. at *3. The WCCA determined that stairs in the workplace are inherently hazardous, and thus they are not a "neutral condition" like the floor at issue in Dykhoff . Id. Because the stairs alone increased Roller-Dick’s risk of injury, the WCCA held that her injury arose out of her employment. Id.

Relators sought certiorari review.

ANALYSIS

Under our workers' compensation system, employees give up their rights "to sue for damages over and above medical and health care benefits and wage loss benefits" and employers, in return, give up "rights to raise common law defenses such as lack of negligence, contributory negligence on the part of the employee, and others." Minn. Stat. § 176.001 (2016) ; see also Breimhorst v. Beckman , 227 Minn. 409, 35 N.W.2d 719, 732 (1949) ("The law contemplates a reciprocal yielding and giving up of rights existing at common law for the new and enlarged rights and remedies given by the compensation act."). Thus, employers are "liable for compensation ... in every case of personal injury or death of an employee arising out of and in the course of employment without regard to the question of negligence." Minn. Stat. § 176.021, subd. 1 (2016) (emphasis added).

The "in the course of" and "arising out of" requirements are distinct. Dykhoff , 840 N.W.2d at 826. The " ‘in the course of’ requirement ‘refers to the time, place, and circumstances of the incident causing the injury.’ " Id. (quoting Gibberd v. Control Data Corp. , 424 N.W.2d 776, 780 (Minn. 1988) ). It is undisputed that Roller-Dick’s injury occurred in the course of her employment. Thus, the only issue before us is whether Roller-Dick’s injury arose out of her employment. In cases involving undisputed facts,¹ the question of whether an injury arises out of employment is a question of law that we review de novo. Hohlt v. Univ. of Minn. , 897 N.W.2d 777, 780 (Minn. 2017).²

I.

For an injury to "arise out of employment," there must be some "causal connection" between the injury and the employment. Dykhoff , 840 N.W.2d at 826.

"This causal connection ‘is supplied if the employment exposes the employee to a hazard which originates on the premises as a part of the working environment, or ... peculiarly exposes the employee to an external hazard whereby he is subjected to a different and greater risk than if he had been pursuing his ordinary personal affairs.’ " Id. (quoting Nelson v. City of St. Paul , 249 Minn. 53, 81 N.W.2d 272, 275 (Minn. 1957) ). Here, Roller-Dick has not argued that she faced an "external hazard" to which she was peculiarly exposed by her employment. Therefore, this case turns on whether she faced a hazard that originated on the premises as a part of the working environment.

In Dykhoff , we identified two categories of hazards from our previous cases. The first category involved "special hazards" created by employment. Id. at 826–27. These included obvious or easily understood risks such as "unsafe conditions" in an employer-owned parking ramp, Foley v. Honeywell, Inc. , 488 N.W.2d 268, 272 (Minn. 1992), an employee’s required presence in a high crime area, Hanson v. Robitshek–Schneider Co. , 209 Minn. 596, 297 N.W. 19, 21 (1941), and being struck by a ball on a playground in the case of an employee who was a teacher, Nelson , 81 N.W.2d at 275–76.

The second category involved hazards created by "neutral condition[s]" which are not "inherently dangerous or risky" but "something about [them] ... increases the employee’s exposure to injury." Dykhoff , 840 N.W.2d at 827. To illustrate the concept, we referred to Kirchner v. County of Anoka , which concerned an employee who was injured after falling down a set of stairs in the county courthouse where he worked. 339 N.W.2d at 910. The employee had to descend the stairs without using the handrail because "[p]ersons ascending the staircase occupied the only side with a handrail." Id. We held that, because the circumstances "required Kirchner to negotiate the steps without [the] benefit of [the only handrail,] ... the requisite causal connection between the employment and the injury existed." Id. at 911. Thus, although the stairs were not obviously hazardous, the employee encountered a set of circumstances—the need to descend the stairs, the absence of a second handrail, the presence of other persons on the stairs—that increased the employee’s risk of injury.

Dykhoff was a "neutral condition" case. 840 N.W.2d at 827. The facts concerned an employee who inexplicably fell while walking on her employer’s floor and was injured as a result. Id. at 824. Unlike in Kirchner , Dykhoff encountered no circumstances originating on the premises as part of the working environment that increased the employee’s risk of injury—the floor was clean, dry, and flat. Id. at 827. In other words, there was no explanation for the employee’s fall and resulting injury, and thus no causal connection existed between the employee’s work environment and her injury. Accordingly, we held that the employee’s injury did not arise out of her employment. Id. at 828.

We have called this inquiry the "increased-risk test." Hohlt , 897 N.W.2d at 781 ; Kubis v. Cmty. Mem'l Hosp. Ass'n , 897 N.W.2d 254, 259 (Minn. 2017). We have considered the test in two precedential decisions since Dykhoff — Hohlt and Kubis .³

Kubis concerned an employee who fell as she was ascending stairs on her employer’s premises. 897 N.W.2d at 257. Before the compensation judge, the employee asserted that she had been "rushing" to get up the stairs because she was concerned about clocking out in time. Id. at 258. Therefore, the primary issue before both the compensation judge and the WCCA was whether the employee rushing up the stairs—specifically because she had work-related concerns about the time—increased her risk of injury. Id. Because the compensation judge did not find her reasons for "rushing" to be credible, the judge determined that her injury did not arise out of employment and denied her claim. Id. The WCCA reversed, again focusing on the "rushing" aspect. Id. The WCCA concluded that the employee had two possible motives for hurrying, but the compensation judge had only considered one of them. Id. Because the WCCA determined that the employee’s second motivation for rushing was supported by the evidence, it held that the injury arose out of employment. Id. at 258–59.

On appeal, we held that the WCCA exceeded the proper scope of...