Rollins v. Berryhill

LONNIE R. ROLLINS, Plaintiff, v. NANCY A. BERRYHILL,Deputy Commissioner for Operations, Social Security Administration, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 7:17-cv-00136-BP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS WICHITA FALLS DIVISION

May 2, 2018

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION

Plaintiff Lonnie R. Rollins ("Rollins") filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the denial by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner") of his applications for disability insurance benefits under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act ("SSA"). ECF No. 1. After considering the pleadings, briefs, and the administrative record, the Court REVERSES the Commissioner's decision and REMANDS this action for further proceedings.

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Rollins filed his applications for disability benefits on July 30, 2014. Tr. 15. He alleged a disability onset date of July 25, 2014. Id. Rollins alleged limiting conditions of hypertension, COPD, hepatitis C, depression, chest pain, stroke, anxiety, bipolar disorder, and insomnia. Tr. 280. The Commissioner initially denied him benefits on November 24, 2014. Tr. 129-30. The Commissioner denied him benefits upon reconsideration on April 21, 2015. Tr. 145-46. Rollins requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), and a hearing was held before ALJ Angelita Hamilton on April 27, 2016. Tr. 15. Rollins appeared in Wichita Falls, Texas, and the ALJ presided over the hearing from Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Id. A non-attorney representative, Jeffrey L. Owen, represented Rollins at the hearing. Id. Vocational Expert ("VE") David D. Couch testified at the hearing. Id. The ALJ issued her decision on May 26, 2016, finding that Rollins was not entitled to disability benefits. Tr. 30-31.

In her decision, the ALJ employed the statutory five-step analysis. At step one, she found that Rollins had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since July 25, 2014, the amended alleged disability onset date. Tr. 17, Finding 2. At step two, the ALJ found that Rollins had the severe impairments of COPD, diabetes, affective disorder, and substance addiction disorder. Tr. 17, Finding 3. At step three, the ALJ found that Rollins's impairments did not meet or medically equal the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. § 404(P)(1). Tr. 24, Finding 4. The ALJ therefore determined that Rollins had the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), except that he should be limited to occasional exposure to environmental irritants such as fumes, odors, dusts, and gases; and his work must be limited to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks. Tr. 25, Finding 5.

At step four, the ALJ found that Rollins was unable to perform any past relevant work. Tr. 29, Finding 6. At step five, the ALJ found that there existed a significant number of jobs in the national economy that Rollins could perform. Tr. 29, Finding 10. In particular, the ALJ noted the jobs of mail sorter, collator operator, and hand packer, based on the testimony of the VE. Tr. 30. The ALJ found that Rollins was not under a disability at any time from July 25, 2014, through the date of her decision on May 26, 2016. Tr. 30-31, Finding 11.

The Appeals Council denied Rollins's request for review on July 24, 2017. Tr. 1-6. Therefore the ALJ's decision became the Commissioner's final decision and is properly before the Court for review. See Higginbotham v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 332, 336 (5th Cir. 2005) ("[T]heCommissioner's final decision includes the Appeals Council's denial of a request for review.").

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Rollins was born on December 2, 1963, and he was fifty years old at the time of the hearing. Tr. 42. The highest grade of schooling he completed was the seventh grade. Tr. 78. The VE testified that Rollins had past work as a derrick worker. Tr. 87.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Title II, 42 U.S.C. § 404 et seq. of the SSA controls the disability insurance program as well as numerous regulatory provisions concerning disability insurance. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404. The SSA defines a disability as an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment . . . which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d); McQueen v. Apfel, 168 F.3d 152, 154 (5th Cir. 1999).

To determine whether a claimant is disabled and thus entitled to disability benefits, the Commissioner employs a five-step sequential evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). For step one, the claimant must not be presently working at any substantial gainful activity to gain disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). "Substantial gainful activity" means work activity involving the use of significant physical or mental abilities for pay or profit. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572; Masterson v. Barnhart, 309 F.3d 267, 271 n.2 (5th Cir. 2002). For step two, the claimant must have an impairment or combination of impairments that is severe. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c); see also Stone v. Heckler, 752 F.2d 1099, 1100-03 (5th Cir. 1985). For step three, disability exists if the impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals an impairment listed in the Listing of Impairments ("Listing") found in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). Before proceeding to step four, the Commissioner must assess theclaimant's RFC—"the most the claimant can still do despite his physical and mental limitations." Perez v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 457, 461 (5th Cir. 2005); 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1). For step four, if the claimant's medical status alone does not constitute a disability, the impairment must prevent the claimant from returning to his past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). For step five, the impairment must prevent the claimant from doing any work, considering the claimant's RFC, age, education, and past work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f); Crowley v. Apfel, 197 F.3d 194, 197-98 (5th Cir. 1999). "The claimant bears the burden of showing that [he] is disabled through the first four steps of the analysis; on the fifth, the Commissioner must show that there is other substantial work in the national economy that the claimant can perform." Audler v. Astrue, 501 F.3d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 2007). "If the Commissioner meets this burden, the claimant must then prove he in fact cannot perform the alternate work." Carey v. Apfel, 230 F.3d 131, 135 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Crowley, 197 F.3d at 198.)

The Court's decision is limited to a determination of whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards and whether substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports the decision. Audler, 501 F.3d at 447; Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 564 (5th Cir. 1995). "Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a responsible mind might accept to support a conclusion. It is more than a mere scintilla and less than a preponderance. A finding of no substantial evidence is appropriate only if no credible evidentiary choices or medical findings support the decision." Boyd v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 698, 704 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Harris v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 413, 417 (5th Cir. 2000)). The Court may neither reweigh the evidence in the record nor substitute its judgment for the Commissioner's, but it will carefully scrutinize the record to determine if evidence is present. Hollis v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1378, 1383 (5th Cir. 1988); Harris, 209 F.3d at 417. "Conflictsin the evidence are for the [Commissioner] and not the courts to resolve." Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Brown v. Apfel, 192 F.3d 492, 496 (5th Cir. 1999)).

IV. ANALYSIS

The Court identified five separate issues on appeal: (A) whether the ALJ erred in evaluating Rollins's subjective complaints; (B) whether the ALJ applied an erroneous severity standard; (C) whether the ALJ erred in not considering Rollins's hypertension as an impairment or its effects on his RFC; (D) whether the ALJ erred by according substantial weight to the state agency medical consultants' ("SAMCs") opinions; and (E) whether the ALJ failed to account for Rollins's moderate difficulties in concentration, persistence, or pace, in her question to the VE or her RFC determination.

A. The ALJ did not err in evaluating Rollins's subjective complaints, as the evidence did not clearly favor Rollins.

In Rollins's first argument, he challenges the ALJ's finding in her RFC determination that his "statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not consistent with the objective medical evidence and other evidence." Tr. 28; ECF No. 19 at 12. Rollins argues that the ALJ erred by not detailing her reasons for this finding, and he additionally argues that the record does not support the finding. ECF No. 19 at 12-15.

In support of this position, Rollins first cites Social Security Regulation ("Regulation") 16-3p, which states that the "determination or decision must contain specific reasons for the weight given to the individual's symptoms, be consistent with and supported by the evidence, and be clearly articulated so the individual and any subsequent reviewer can assess how the adjudicator evaluated the individual's symptoms." 2016 WL 1119029 (Mar. 16, 2016). The Social Security Administration's rulings are not binding on this Court, though they may be consulted if the statute at issue provides little guidance. Myers v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 617, 620 (5th Cir. 2001).

"[T]he law requires the ALJ to make affirmative findings regarding a claimant's subjective complaints." Falco v. Shalala, 27 F.3d 160, 163 (5th Cir. 1994). The ALJ fulfilled this requirement by clearly stating that she found Rollins's subjective complaints inconsistent with the evidence. See Tr. 28. Rollins also argues, based on Falco, that an ALJ "must articulate reasons for...