Rollins v. Hinds Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't

DELORISE ROLLINS APPELLANT v. HINDS COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENTAND MISSISSIPPI PUBLIC ENTITIES' WORKERS' COMPENSATION TRUST APPELLEES

NO. 2018-WC-01614-COA

COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

December 17, 2019

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/16/2018

TRIBUNAL FROM WHICH APPEALED: MISSISSIPPI WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: AMANDA GRACE HILL ROGEN K. CHHABRA

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES: MICHAEL D. YOUNG

NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - WORKERS' COMPENSATION

DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 12/17/2019

MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

MANDATE ISSUED:

EN BANC.

J. WILSON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Delorise Rollins was employed by Quality Choice Correctional Healthcare (Quality Choice) as a nurse at the Hinds County Detention Center in Raymond. Quality Choice had a contract with Hinds County to provide comprehensive medical care to inmates at the Detention Center. Rollins was injured on the job in 2013 and eventually pursued a workers' compensation claim against Quality Choice for that injury. She sustained a second injury at work in 2014, but Quality Choice's workers' compensation coverage had been cancelled prior to her second injury. Rollins filed a workers' compensation claim related to her second injury against the Hinds County Sheriff's Department (HCSD), alleging that HCSD was obligated to provide benefits as a "general contractor" and her "statutory employer." Miss. Code Ann. § 71-3-7(6) (Supp. 2019). The Workers' Compensation Commission ruled that HCSD was not liable for workers' compensation benefits because it was not Rollins's statutory employer. We agree with the Commission's determination and therefore affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2. As stated above, Rollins was employed by Quality Choice as a nurse at the Hinds County Detention Center in Raymond. She alleged that she sustained injuries at work in August 2013 and September 2014. For each injury, she filed a petition to controvert with the Workers' Compensation Commission. In both petitions, she alleged that HCSD was liable for workers' compensation benefits as her "statutory employer" because her actual employer, Quality Choice, was without workers' compensation coverage. It was later determined that Quality Choice did have coverage at the time of Rollins's first injury but that its insurance carrier validly and effectively cancelled the policy prior to Rollins's second injury.¹ As a result, Rollins amended her first petition to identify Quality Choice and its carrier as the employer/carrier, and HCSD was dismissed from that case.

¶3. In response to Rollins's second petition to controvert, HCSD denied that it wasRollins's "statutory employer." HCSD produced Quality Choice's contract with Hinds County to provide comprehensive medical care for inmates at detention facilities including the Detention Center at Raymond. HCSD also produced a quitclaim deed showing that Hinds County owns the property on which the Detention Center is located.

¶4. The administrative judge held that HCSD was not Rollins's statutory employer based on "a thorough review of all pertinent and current case law and the totality of circumstances surrounding this claim." The judge stated that "[a] controlling point is the fact that Hinds County . . . was the owner of the detention center/penal farm at all relevant times applicable to the alleged incidents and the claimant was an employee of Quality Choice . . . at all relevant times." The judge's order also quoted a relevant paragraph of the Mississippi Supreme Court's opinion in Thomas v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 212 So. 3d 58 (Miss. 2017):

In sum, this Court never has treated the owner of land as a prime or general contractor for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act. Here, Chevron was the owner of the plant. The fact that Chevron contracted with APS for certain maintenance and other work does not change Chevron's status as an owner. APS is the chief or prime contractor. A chief or prime contractor is defined as one who has a contract with the owner of a project or job, and has full responsibility for its completion.

Id. at 64 (¶22) (quotation marks omitted). Because the administrative judge held that HCSD was not Rollins's statutory employer, she ruled that HCSD was not liable for any workers' compensation benefits. The full Commission affirmed in a one-page order that adopted the administrative judge's ruling. Rollins then appealed.

ANALYSIS

¶5. In general, "[t]his Court's review of a decision of the Workers' CompensationCommission is limited to determining whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence, was arbitrary and capricious, was beyond the scope or power of the agency to make, or violated one's constitutional or statutory rights." Gregg v. Natchez Trace Elec. Power Ass'n, 64 So. 3d 473, 475 (¶8) (Miss. 2011). However, we review issues of law de novo. Id. at (¶9). In addition, we review issues of statutory interpretation de novo and without deference to the Commission. Miss. Mfrs. Ass'n Workers' Comp. Grp. v. Miss. Workers' Comp. Grp. Self-Insurer Guar. Ass'n, 281 So. 3d 108, 114 (¶24) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (citing King v. Miss. Military Dep't, 245 So. 3d 404, 407-08 (¶¶8-12) (Miss. 2018)). When, as in this case, the Commission adopts the decision of the administrative judge as its own, we review the decision of the administrative judge. Mabus v. Mueller Indus. Inc., 205 So. 3d 677, 682 (¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016).

¶6. Under Mississippi Code subsection 71-3-7(6), if a "subcontractor" fails to secure workers' compensation coverage for its employees, then "the contractor shall be liable for and shall secure payment of such compensation to employees of the subcontractor." Miss. Code Ann. § 71-3-7(6). The "contractor" is considered the "statutory employer of the subcontractor's employees." Thomas, 212 So. 3d at 61 (¶8).

¶7. HCSD argues that it is not Rollins's statutory employer because it is not a "contractor," and Quality Choice is not a "subcontractor." Rather, HCSD is simply the owner of the property, and Quality Choice is an independent contractor hired to provide comprehensive medical care for inmates.²

¶8. Rollins, in contrast, argues that the administrative judge conducted an incomplete analysis and misinterpreted "a single line, from a single case" (Thomas, supra) to mean that a property owner can never be a contractor. Rollins argues that HCSD is a "contractor" because it has an obligation under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution to provide medical care to inmates. At oral argument in this Court, Rollins's counsel posited that this constitutional obligation gives rise to an implied contract between "the People" or "the taxpayers" and HCSD, with Quality Choice then acting as a "subcontractor."

¶9. We affirm the judgment of the Commission because it correctly determined that HCSD was not a contractor and that Quality Choice was not a subcontractor. In Thomas, 212 So. 3d at 62-64 (¶¶13-21), the Supreme Court discussed all the significant precedents applying subsection 71-3-7(6), and there is no need for us to cover all of that ground again today. The key point of these decisions is that a party is considered a "contractor" and a "statutory employer" only if it is within "the common understanding of such terms as 'prime contractor' or 'general contractor.'" Id. at 63 (¶15) (quoting Nash v. Damson Oil Corp., 480 So. 2d 1095, 1100 (Miss. 1985)). The Supreme Court further explained that a property owner does not become a "contractor" just because it contracts with another entity to do work on its premises. Id. at 64 (¶22). Rather, a "chief or prime contractor is defined as one who has a contract with the owner of a project or job, and has full responsibility for its completion." Id. (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted). In this case, Hinds Countycontracted directly with Quality Choice to provide comprehensive medical care for inmates. That is the only contract in the record in this case. Neither Hinds County nor HCSD had a "contract" with anyone else. There was only a single contract between Hinds County and Quality Choice. By definition, that is not a "subcontract." Therefore, Quality Choice was not a "subcontractor," and HCSD was not a "contractor" or Rollins's statutory employer.

¶10. We acknowledge Rollins's argument that the administrative judge overstated the significance of Hinds County's ownership of the subject property. Perhaps that singular fact is not "controlling," as the judge put it. However, there are no disputed material facts, and we review issues of law and statutory interpretation de novo. Under a de novo "standard of review it does not matter why the [Commission] reached the result it did"; even if the Commission "reached the right result for the wrong reason, its judgment [must] be affirmed." Trigg v. Farese, 266 So. 3d 611, 619 (¶17) (Miss. 2018). On this record, as a matter of law, HCSD simply is not a "contractor." HCSD has no "contract with" any other entity, Thomas, 212 So. 3d at 64 (¶22), and Rollins's novel theory of a contract between "the People" and the county lies far outside "the common understanding of such terms as 'prime contractor' or 'general contractor.'" Id. at 63 (¶15) (quoting Nash, 480 So. 2d at 1100). Therefore, HCSD is not a statutory employer, and the judgment of the Commission must be affirmed.

¶11. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., GREENLEE, McDONALD AND C. WILSON, JJ., CONCUR. McCARTY, J., DISSENTS WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. CARLTON, P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED BY WESTBROOKS, TINDELL, LAWRENCE AND McCARTY, JJ.

CARLTON, P.J., DISSENTING:

¶12. I respectfully disagree with the majority's opinion. I would reverse and remand this case to the Commission to conduct the appropriate analysis, determine the employment relationship between the parties, and then make a finding as to whether HCSD is the statutory employer. The order of the administrative judge (AJ) determining that HSCD is not the statutory employer, which the Commission...