Roman Catholic Diocese of Jackson v. Morrison

905 So.2d 1213

ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF JACKSON, Mississippi, and Bishop William R. Houck v. Kenneth MORRISON, Francis Morrison, Thomas Morrison, and Dorothy Morrison.

Nos. 2003-IA-00743-SCT, 2003-IA-00744-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

May 5, 2005.

Rehearing Denied June 30, 2005.

John Jeffrey Trotter, Janet McMurtray, Jackson, L. Martin Nussbaum, Eric V. Hall, Colorado Springs, CO, attorneys for appellants.

John F. Hawkins, Christina Carroll, David Wayne Baria, Orlando Rodriquez Richmond, Anthony Renard Simon, Jackson, Mary Marvel Fyke, attorneys for appellees.

EN BANC.

DICKINSON, Justice, for the Court:

¶ 1. This is a suit brought by a mother and her three children against the Roman Catholic Diocese of Jackson,¹ arising out of alleged sexual abuse of the children by George Broussard, then a priest of the Diocese. The merits are not before us today.² Rather, the questions presented are whether the First Amendment to the United States Constitution deprives our civil courts of subject matter jurisdiction and whether the trial court erred in ordering the Diocese to answer the plaintiffs' interrogatories and produce documents requests by the plaintiffs.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

¶ 2. For the limited purpose of deciding the matter before us today, we accept the complaint's factual allegations not in conflict with affidavits (discussed infra) submitted by the Diocese.

¶ 3. After moving from Boston to Jackson in 1969, Dr. Francis Morrison, his wife, Dorothy, and their three sons became active parishioners at the Cathedral of St. Peter the Apostle Catholic Church. Then five-year-old Kenneth, seven-year-old Thomas, and ten-year-old Francis, Jr., served as altar boys and were involved in youth activities, including choir. The family developed a friendship with the priests in the parish, one of whom was Father George Broussard. Over time, Broussard became a close, trusted family friend, who spent much time in the Morrison family's home and at their lakehouse. ¶ 4. Shortly after the family started attending St. Peter's, Broussard began to sexually molest the three children at various locations, including the Morrisons' home, their lakehouse, and the church.

¶ 5. In 1973, after learning from another parishioner of Broussard's possible sexual molestation of another child at St. Peter's, Dr. Morrison confronted his two oldest children,³ Thomas and Francis, Jr., both of whom confirmed that they, too, had been sexually molested by Broussard. Dr. Morrison then confronted officials in the Jackson Diocese, including Vicar General Bernard Law, with the allegations of sexual molestation of children by Broussard. When the Diocese officials assured Dr. Morrison that Broussard was receiving treatment for his illness, he "left the matter in the church's hands to determine the best course of action." Other St. Peter's parishioners were not informed by the Diocese of the allegations, and the Diocese allowed Broussard to remain at St. Peter's for over a year, with unrestricted access to the children, during which time Broussard continued to abuse the Morrison boys, although not as frequently.

¶ 6. Broussard was then moved to a parish in Waveland, Mississippi, where it is alleged he continued to abuse children. Approximately a year later, he left the priesthood.

¶ 7. Dorothy and the three children (the "Morrisons") filed suit in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, seeking monetary damages for civil conspiracy; breach of fiduciary duty; intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress; fraud and fraudulent concealment; negligent hiring, assignment and retention; negligent misrepresentation; and negligent supervision. Dorothy asserted a claim for loss of consortium.

¶ 8. During discovery, the Morrisons propounded certain interrogatories and requests for documents, files and information, regarding other claims and incidents of sexual molestation of children by priests. The Diocese filed written objections to these requests, claiming, inter alia, various privileges. Additionally, the Diocese filed a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking dismissal of the lawsuit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Diocese asserted that allowing the Morrisons to pursue their claims in civil court would excessively entangle the court in a thicket of ecclesiastical matters and church policy, thus violate the First Amendment.

¶ 9. When the Morrisons persisted in demanding the requested discovery, the circuit judge directed the Diocese to produce all requested documents and interrogatory responses to the court for an in-camera inspection. The trial court later denied the motion to dismiss and ordered all documents and interrogatory responses produced to the Morrisons. The Diocese filed petitions seeking interlocutory appeals of both orders. We granted the petitions, see M.R.A.P. 5, and consolidated the appeals.

ANALYSIS

¶ 10. The first question presented is whether the First Amendment deprives our civil courts of subject matter jurisdiction over the causes of action alleged by the Morrisons against a religious institution. Attacks on jurisdiction pursuant to Miss. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) are either facial or factual. A facial attack alleges the court lacks jurisdiction as a matter of law, regardless of the determination of factual disputes. A factual attack requires resolution by the trial court of one or more factual disputes in order to determine subject matter jurisdiction.⁴ After deciding disputed issues of material fact,⁵ the trial court then must accept as true all undisputed well-pled factual allegations of the plaintiff's complaint and proceed to decide the jurisdictional question.

¶ 11. The language selected by the Diocese for its motion, interlocutory appeal, and brief to the trial court and this Court suggests a facial attack. The Diocese does not advance a detailed factual argument, that is to say, under the facts of this case, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Rather, the Diocese says simply that our courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over such causes of action against religious institutions.

¶ 12. However, in support of its motion, the Diocese submitted the affidavits (the "Affidavits") of Most Reverend (Bishop) William Russell Houck and Most Reverend (Bishop) Joseph Latino. This suggests a factual attack. To fully address the question presented, we shall first analyze the Diocese's motion as a facial attack. We shall then review the Morrisons' causes of action, taking into consideration the Affidavits. We emphasize that this interlocutory appeal does not require us to analyze the merits of the Morrisons' claims. Instead, we address only the jurisdictional issue raised by the Diocese in its motion, which is:

Does the First Amendment Doctrine of Church Autonomy preclude the Circuit Court from asserting jurisdiction over claims arising from the manner in which the Catholic Diocese selected, appointed, disciplined, and supervised its clergy?

¶ 13. Thereafter, we shall address the discovery issue raised by the Diocese in its motion, which is:

Is discovery of certain documents and the identities of non-party victims/accusers and/or non-party priests precluded by: (a) the First Amendment Doctrine of Church Autonomy, canon law and common law privacy rights of victims and priests, and/or (b) clergy, medical, mental health, attorney, work product, and self-critical analysis privileges?

Diocese Amici

¶ 14. We were presented and have carefully reviewed an amicus curiae brief filed by The General Council on Finance and Administration of the United Methodist Church, the National Association of Evangelicals, The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, The International Church of the Foursquare Gospel, The Worldwide Church of God, The Mississippi District of the Church of the Nazarene, The Mississippi District of the United Pentecostal Church International, Rev. Barbara E. Jones, Executive Regional Minister, and Rev. Larry Metzger, Regional Moderator, of the Great River Region of the Christian Church (Disciples of Christ), and Southeastern Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America ("Diocese Amici").

¶ 15. These venerable organizations and individuals urge us to reject the Morrisons' negligence claims which they say seek to make the Diocese liable for all actions of the priest, "wherever and whenever those acts occurred." We disagree with the premise. It is the alleged negligence of the Diocese, not the priest, that the Morrisons complain of here. Furthermore, we are not in a position today to accept or reject the Morrisons' claims. We will only decide whether they may pursue them.

¶ 16. Diocese Amici further argue that the Morrisons' breach of fiduciary duty claim must fail because it is "based entirely on Defendants' ecclesiastical status or office." However, the Morrisons' complaint alleges much more. It claims that the Diocese promoted a safe atmosphere and gained the trust of the Morrisons with respect to the care of the Morrison children. It further alleges that the resulting relationship of trust was breached by the Diocese when it failed to disclose information concerning sexual abuse by Catholic priests, including Broussard, or otherwise take appropriate steps to protect the children.

¶ 17. Additionally, Diocese Amici argue that liability of the Diocese cannot, consistent with the First Amendment, be based on ordination of priests, or on religious speech about a person's fitness to be a minister. This assertion misses the point of the Morrisons' complaint. The Diocese may ordain whomever it concludes is worthy, and it may engage in whatever religious speech it desires. But if it has specific knowledge that children within its care are in danger of sexual molestation, and if it has the authority, power and ability to protect those children from that known danger of abuse and molestation, it is for a jury...