Roman-Mercado v. Haynnis Air Servs.

ERASTO ROMAN-MERCADO, Plaintiff, v. HYANNIS AIR SERVICES, d/b/a CAPE AIR/NANTUCKET AIRLINES, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL No. 20-1228 (ADC)

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico

March 31, 2022

OPINION AND ORDER

AIDA M. DELGADO-COLON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is Hyannis Air Services's (“Defendant”) motion to dismiss. ECF No. 23. Erasto Roman-Mercado (“Plaintiff”) opposed, and Defendant replied. ECF Nos. 32; 40-1. For the reasons that follow, Defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. Background

Plaintiff filed an amended complaint against Defendant on June 17 2021. ECF No. 21. He raised claims of disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). ECF No. 21. See also 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. He also filed suit under multiple Puerto Rico state laws: Law 44 of July 2, 1985 (“Law 44”), Law 45 of April 18, 1935 (“Law 45”), Law 80 of May 30 1976 (“Law 80”), Law 115 of December 20, 1991 (“Law 115”), and Articles 1802 & 1803 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code (“Article 1802”). ECF No. 21. See also P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 1, § 507 et seq; P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 11, § 7; P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 185; P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 194; P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, §§ 5141, 5142.

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's ADA, Law 44, Law 45, Law 115, and Article 1802 claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF No. 23.

II. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes the dismissal of a complaint that fails to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). “To avoid dismissal, a complaint must provide ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Garda-Catalan v. United States, 734 F.3d 100, 102 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). When ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court must “ask whether the complaint states a claim to relief that is plausible on its face, accepting the plaintiff's factual allegations and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Cooper v. Charter Commc'n Entertainments I, LLC, 760 F.3d 103, 106 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing Maloy v. Ballori-Lage, 744 F.3d 250, 252 (1st Cir. 2014)) (internal quotations marks omitted).

“To cross the plausibility threshold, the plaintiff must ‘plead factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Cooper, 760 F.3d at 106 (citing Maloy, 744 F.3d at 252). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). That is, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, ..., on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact) ...." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted).

“Non-conclusory factual allegations in the complaint must then be treated as true, even if seemingly incredible.” Ocasio-Hernandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011).

At the motion to dismiss stage, the Court may ordinarily only consider facts alleged in the complaint and its attached exhibits. See Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993). Otherwise, the Court must convert the motion into one for summary judgment. See id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d)). However, under certain narrow exceptions, some extrinsic documents may be considered without converting the motion. See Freeman v. Town of Hudson, 714 F.3d 29, 35-36 (1st Cir. 2013). These exceptions are: (1) documents the authenticity of which are not disputed by the parties, (2) official public records, (3) documents central to plaintiff's claim, and (4) documents sufficiently referred to in the complaint. See id. (quoting Watterson, 987 F.2d at 3). “When a complaint's factual allegations are expressly linked to-and admittedly dependent upon-a document (the authenticity of which is not challenged), that document effectively merges into the pleadings, thereby giving the Court the discretion to consider such additional material.” Newman v. Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., 901 F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 2018) (citing Trans-Spec Truck Serv., Inc. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 524 F.3d 315, 321 (1st Cir. 2008)).

III. Factual Allegations in the Complaint^[1]

Plaintiff started working for Defendant, a corporation engaged in commercial aviation, in 2005. He was employed as a “cross train agent” at the Eugenio Mana de Hostos Airport in Mayaguez, Puerto Rico. On April 8, 2017, Plaintiff suffered an incident while working whereby a faulty airplane door struck his head (“the incident”).^[2] That same day, he sought treatment at a local hospital, where he was diagnosed-as a result of the incident-with dizziness, hematoma, contusion of the forehead, and acute post-traumatic headache.

Plaintiff's supervisor instructed him to draft an OSHA report but did not instruct him to draft a workman's compensation report. Plaintiff later requested paperwork from Defendant in order to file a claim with the Puerto Rico State Insurance Fund Corporation (“the Fund”), but Defendant refused to provide the paperwork on more than one occasion. Plaintiff was under the impression that he needed documentation from Defendant to file a claim with the Fund.

Plaintiff, in alleged compliance with Defendant's orders, continued to report to work for several months while suffering from headaches, neck pain, hand numbness, and tingling sensations. During this time, he took over-the-counter medication to deal with his ailments. He complained to Defendant, but it did not direct him to go to the Fund for treatment. Plaintiff was also denied access to internal employee assistance programs administered by Defendant and funded by its employees.

Plaintiff was unable to continue working and, in October of 2017, again asked Defendant to provide him with the necessary paperwork to file a claim with the Fund, but his request was denied. Defendant told Plaintiff that since he had a medical plan, he should use it. Plaintiff visited a chiropractor, who ordered an MRI that showed damage to his spinal canal and recommended that he go to the Fund.

Over a year later, on November 29, 2018, Plaintiff visited the Fund for the first time. Due to the spinal injuries sustained in the incident, he received medical treatment at the Fund until July 23, 2020. In February of 2019, he underwent an anterior cervical discectomy and fusion with inter body graft and anterior plating. Plaintiff and Defendant where in contact during this time. To date, he continues to receive medical treatment because of the injuries sustained due to the incident.

In June 2019, Defendant discharged Plaintiff retroactive to May 2019.

IV. Discussion

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's ADA, Law 44, Law 45, Law 115, and Article 1802 claims. ECF No. 23.

a. ADA

i. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Failure to Accommodate

Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot assert a failure-to-accommodate claim under the ADA because he failed to exhaust administrative remedies. ECF No. 23 at 4-7. While Defendant concedes Plaintiff did file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), it posits that there are no allegations or references in the charge formulating a failure-to-accommodate claim. ECF No. 28-1. Instead, Defendant claims that Plaintiff made these allegations for the first time in the amended complaint. ECF No. 23 at 5. As such, it advances that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff's failure-to-accommodate claim. ECF No. 23 at 6. Plaintiff counters by proclaiming that his allegations in the administrative charge are closely related to the allegations of a failure-to-accommodate claim in the amended complaint. ECF No. 32 at 5-8.

The ADA mandates that plaintiffs exhaust administrative remedies. See Rivera-Diaz v. Humana Ins. of P.R., 748 F.3d 387, 389 (1st Cir. 2014). Failure to do so bars the courthouse door. See Velazquez-Ortiz v. Vilsack, 657 F.3d 64, 71 (1st Cir. 2011). However, the filing of an administrative charge does not open the courthouse door to all claims of discrimination. See id. The complaint in federal court must “bear some close relation” to the allegations made in the administrative complaint. See id. (citing Jorge v. Rumsfeld, 404 F.3d 556, 565 (1st Cir. 2005)).

The “scope of the investigation rule” allows an employee to include in the complaint claims related to acts of discrimination that the EEOC investigation could have been reasonably expected to uncover, regardless of whether they were investigated. See Gonzalez-Nieves v. Nieves-Miranda, 264 F.Supp.3d 357, 362 (D.P.R. 2017) (citing Thornton v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 587 F.3d 27, 31-32 (1st Cir. 2009)). The scope of a civil action is thus not determined by the specific language of the charge filed with the agency. See Thornton, 587 F.3d at 31-32.

This rule allows the Court to “look beyond the four corners of the underlying administrative charge” to determine whether the employee exhausted the required administrative remedies. Id. at 33. Still, plaintiff may not “extend his claim endlessly beyond the bounds and parameters encompassed by the administrative charge.” Id. at 32.

After a careful reading of the EEOC charge, the Court finds that it is reasonably related to the failure-to-accommodate allegations in the amended complaint. Plaintiff alleges in the EEOC charge:

After suffering an accident at work in which an airplane door fell on my head, I underwent surgery due to damages to my cervical area. Ever since the time of the accident, the employer has refused to fill out forms for my treatment. After the surgery, my employer

...