Roman v. Mem'l

127 A.3d 26

40 IER Cases 1469

2015 PA Super 232

Brandy L. ROMAN, Appellee

v.McGUIRE MEMORIAL, Appellant.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted Aug. 17, 2015.

Filed Nov. 9, 2015.

Daniel W. Cooper, Carnegie, for appellant.

Samuel J. Cordes, Pittsburgh, for appellee.

Opinion

OPINION BY BENDER, P.J.E.:

McGuire Memorial (McGuire), a health care facility, appeals from the judgment entered on February 9, 2015, in favor of Brandy L. Roman (Ms. Roman) in the amount of $121,869.93 and reinstating her to her former position as a direct care worker in this wrongful termination action filed by Ms. Roman against McGuire, wherein Ms. Roman sought back wages, lost benefits and future lost wages or reinstatement. We affirm.

The trial court set forth the following summary of the facts in its memorandum and order issued after a bench trial was held:

McGuire Memorial Home is an intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded[, licensed by the Department of Public Welfare]. It provides “round-the-clock nursing care with an on-staff RN and LPN as well as physician availability 24 hours a day.” (Plaintiff's Exhibit 16).

Ms. Roman was employed by McGuire Memorial as a direct care worker from August 3, 2009 until June 24, 2011, when she was terminated for refusing to work mandatory overtime. As a “direct care worker,” Ms. Roman cared for the residents' day-to-day needs, including feeding, bathing, changing, and providing care related to breathing treatments, vents and tracheotomies. She attended training to administer medication to the residents.

During the time of Ms. Roman's employment, McGuire had a mandatory overtime policy (“mandation”) in place, which required its direct care workers to work mandatory overtime. After four refusals of mandation, an employee would be terminated. McGuire claims that Ms. Roman refused mandatory overtime on March 14, March 19, June 19 and June 20, 2011. Ms. Roman disputes that she was actually mandated to work overtime on those dates. Nonetheless, Ms. Roman was fired after what McGuire considered to be her fourth refusal of mandation on June 20, 2011. Ms. Roman had informed McGuire on several occasions that she was not required to work overtime as a direct care healthcare worker pursuant to Act 102.^[1]

At the time of her employment with McGuire, Ms. Roman was the mother of three young children. She resided with her boyfriend. Together, they worked opposite shifts, so they did not have to pay for daycare for their children. Her boyfriend worked a 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. shift, and Ms. Roman worked a 3:30 p.m. to 11:30 p.m. shift. When Ms. Roman was mandated to work overtime, McGuire required her to stay on from approximately 11:30 p.m. to 8:00 a.m. Ms. Roman informed McGuire that she was unable to work the mandatory overtime, as she had no one to care for her young children.

Following her termination, Ms. Roman actively sought employment and submitted over 100 job applications. Despite her efforts, she was unable to find a new job, until shortly before the non-jury trial in this matter.

Trial Court Memorandum Opinion and Non–Jury Decision, 1/9/15, at 2–3.

On September 9, 2011, Ms. Roman filed a complaint in the trial court, alleging that McGuire fired her “in retaliation for her refusal to accept overtime work” and that the discharge “offends the public policy of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as embodied in Act 102 generally, and in 43 Pa. Stat. § 932.3(b) specifically.” Ms. Roman's Complaint, ¶ 17, ¶ 18.² McGuire filed preliminary objections, contending that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that it was not an entity covered by Act 102. The trial court denied McGuire's preliminary objections. See Order, 2/1/12. The court also denied McGuire's subsequently filed motion for summary judgment, in which it likewise alleged “it is not a health care facility subject to Act 102's prohibitions” and that the trial court “does not have jurisdiction over [Ms. Roman's] claims.” Trial Court Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2/11/14, at 1. Thereafter, McGuire filed a motion to amend the February 11, 2014 order, requesting a stay and permission to appeal in that the order “involves [a] controlling question of law with regard to the jurisdiction of th[e] [c]ourt and whether or not [McGuire] is a covered entity under the provisions of [Act 102].” See McGuire's Motion to Amend Interlocutory Order, 3/13/14, ¶ 3. The trial court denied this request by order dated April 2, 2014. On September 15, 2014, a non-jury trial was held and resulted in the award of damages to Ms. Roman and her reinstatement.³ Judgment was entered on February 9, 2015.

On February 6, 2015, McGuire filed an appeal with this Court and a timely Pa.R.A.P.1925(b) statement in response to the trial court's order requesting same. In this appeal, McGuire raises the following two issues for our review:

I. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law by exercising subject matter jurisdiction and adjudicating a claim under the Prohibition of Excessive Overtime in Health Care Act, 43 Pa.C.S. §§ 932.1–932.6?

II. Is it required that the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, a non-waivable principle of substantive law, be presented as a post[-]trial motion under Pa.R.C.P. 227.1 to prevent waiver on appeal?

McGuire's brief at 4.

Upon receipt of McGuire's appeal, this Court directed a rule to show cause order to McGuire, questioning why the appeal should not be quashed in that no post-trial motions were filed. Thereafter, Ms. Roman filed a petition to dismiss, requesting that this Court dismiss McGuire's appeal because McGuire had not filed a post-trial motion and, thus, had waived all issues. Despite McGuire's response to the rule to show cause, claiming that the only issue was whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction, this Court quashed the appeal sua sponte on March 20, 2015. This Court also dismissed Ms. Roman's petition to dismiss McGuire's appeal as moot. McGuire then filed an application for reconsideration of the quashal, which this Court granted by order dated April 8, 2015. The April 8, 2015 order further vacated the March 20, 2015 order quashing the appeal. It also discharged the rule to show cause and deferred Ms. Roman's petition to dismiss the appeal for disposition by the merits panel. Accordingly, we must first consider Ms. Roman's petition to dismiss.

We begin by setting forth Ms. Roman's assertion that McGuire's appeal should be dismissed in that post-trial motions must be filed to preserve any issues for appeal. Thus, Ms. Roman claims that because McGuire failed to file any post-trial motion, no issue has been preserved in this appeal. As support, Ms. Roman cites Pa.R.C.P. 227.1(c)(2), which states in pertinent part that “[p]ost-trial motions shall be filed within ten days after ... the filing of the decision in the case of a trial without jury.” Pa.R.C.P. 227.1(c)(2) (emphasis added). Ms. Roman also relies on Liparota v. State Workmen's Insurance Fund, 722 A.2d 253 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999), a case in which the Commonwealth Court affirmed a trial court's non-jury verdict in favor of the State Workmen's Insurance Fund (Fund). The Fund was the plaintiff in the matter and was seeking recovery of the overpayment of benefits that occurred because Liparota deliberately concealed his receipt of wages while he was collecting workers' compensation benefits. Following the entry of the verdict, Liparota failed to file for post-trial relief.⁴ Rather, he “filed a petition for review ... in conformity with Pa.R.A.P. 1511, which governs appeals from governmental determinations, not courts of common pleas.” Liparota, 722 A.2d at 255. Essentially, Liparota was contending that the court of common pleas lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the workers' compensation system has exclusive jurisdiction over a claim of overpayment. Thereafter, the Fund filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, asserting that Liparota failed to file post-trial motions as required by Pa.R.C.P. 227.1, and, therefore, he waived all issues on appeal. In response to the Fund's motion to dismiss, the Commonwealth Court stated:

Where a party fails to file timely post-trial motions after a bench trial, no issues are preserved for this Court to review. Siegfried v. Borough of Wilson, 695 A.2d 892 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997).

In the present case, the Fund filed a complaint in equity against [c]laimant, and, after conducting a bench trial, Common Pleas found in favor of the Fund. Claimant admits that he declined to file post-trial motions. Considering the plain language of Pa.R.C.P. [ ] 227.1(c), post-trial motions were necessary to preserve issues for appeal. And, because this action originated in Common Pleas and was not an appeal from an order of a local or Commonwealth agency, it cannot be deemed a statutory appeal, regardless of the fact that the Fund filed suit to recover workers' compensation monies that [c]laimant wrongfully received. Hence, we must conclude that [c]laimant failed to preserve any issues for our review, and we will grant the Fund's motion to dismiss this matter.

Id. at 256 (footnotes omitted). Based upon Liparota, Ms. Roman makes the point that even if a party can raise subject matter jurisdiction at any time, “the appeal still must be properly before the Court in the first instance.” Ms. Roman's brief at 12. She then claims that neither Rule 277.1 nor any other rule or statute “provides an exception to the requirement of post-trial motions when subject matter jurisdiction is at issue.” Id.

McGuire counters Ms. Roman's position by asserting that “[t]here is no logic or rational analysis to conclude that a procedural rule (Pa.R.C.P.227.1) completely voids a non-waivable issue of substantive law (subject matter jurisdiction) that is, in reality, the sole basis for any court to entertain any case in our legal system.” McGuire's brief at 14. McGuire then cites Silver v. Pinskey, 981 A.2d 284 (Pa.Super.2009), and numerous other cases in which the non-waivable nature of...