Romaniak v. Esurance Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.

MARIE ROMANIAK, Plaintiff, v. ESURANCE PROPERTY AN CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.

No. 1:20-cv-02773

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio

September 14, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

PAMELA A. BARKER U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.

Currently pending is Defendant Esurance Property & Casualty Insurance Company's (“Esurance”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 10.) Plaintiff Marie Romaniak (“Romaniak”) filed a Memorandum in Opposition on May 12, 2021, to which Esurance replied on May 26, 2021. (Doc. Nos. 12, 14.) Romaniak also filed three notices of supplemental authority. (Doc. Nos. 13 17, 19.) Esurance responded to Romaniak's latter two notices. (Doc. Nos. 18, 20.) For the following reasons Esurance's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.

I. Background

A. Policy PAOH-005272058 Provisions

Romaniak purchased a car insurance policy numbered PAOH-005272058 (“the Policy”) for her vehicle, a 2007 Pontiac G6 GT, issued by Esurance. (Doc. No. 7, ¶¶ 9, 16.) Part IV of the Policy, “Coverage for Physical Damage to an Auto, ” contains several provisions that are relevant to the instant matter, including the “Insuring Agreement: Collision Coverage, ” “Limit of Liability, ” and “Payment of Loss” provisions. (Doc. No. 7-1, PageID# 199, 206-07.)

The “Insuring Agreement: Collision Coverage” provision reads in relevant part as follows:

1. Subject to the limits of liability, if “you” pay the premium for Collision Coverage, “we” will pay for a sudden, direct, and accidental “loss” to:

A. “Your” “covered auto” for which Collision Coverage has been purchased, as stated in “your” Declarations page;

B. A “non-owned auto”; or

C. A “trailer” titled to “you”;

if it overturns or is in a “collision” with another object.

(Id. at PageID# 199.) The Policy defines “loss” to mean “A. Sudden, direct, and unintended physical damage; or B. Theft.” (Id. at PageID# 182.)

The “Limit of Liability” provision reads in relevant part as follows:

1. “Our” limit of liability for “loss” will be the lesser of the:

A. Actual cash value of the stolen or damaged property;

B. Amount necessary to repair the property to its pre-loss physical condition; or

C. Amount necessary to replace the property with other property of like kind and quality.

(Id. at PageID# 205-06, emphasis added.) The term “actual cash value” is not defined in the Policy.

Finally, the “Payment of Loss” provision reads in relevant part as follows:

“We” may, at “our” expense, return any stolen property to:

1. “You”; or

2. The address shown on the Declarations page.

If “we” return stolen property, “we” will pay for any damage resulting from the theft. “We” may keep all or part of the property at an agreed or appraised value. “We” may pay for a “loss” in money or repair or replace the damaged or stolen property. If “we” pay for “loss” in money, “our” payment will include the applicable sales tax for the damaged or stolen property.

(Id. at PageID# 206, emphasis added.)

B. Romaniak's Car Accident

On November 7, 2017, Romaniak's insured vehicle was involved in a collision. (Doc. No. 7, ¶ 17.) Romaniak filed a claim for property damage with Esurance. (Id.) Esurance, through a third-party vendor, determined that Romaniak's vehicle “was a total loss . . . .” (Id. at ¶ 18.) The third-party vendor calculated the base value of Romaniak's vehicle to be $5, 750.00 and the adjusted vehicle value to be $5, 835.00. (Id.) The vendor also calculated the sales tax on the adjusted vehicle value to be $466.80. (Id. at ¶ 20.) Romaniak alleges that Esurance paid for her loss “in money, ” but only paid her $5, 835.00 minus her deductible of $500.00, or $5, 335.00 in total, for her loss. (Id. at ¶ 21.) Romaniak alleges that Esurance failed to pay her any sales tax for her totaled vehicle, “despite paying for the loss ‘in money' . . . .” (Id.)

Romaniak filed her Amended Complaint on March 13, 2021. (Doc. No. 7.) Romaniak, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, alleges a single breach of contract claim against Esurance. (Id. at ¶¶ 35-41.) Romaniak alleges that Esurance breached its contract with her and other putative class members by failing to include sales tax in its loss claim payments. (Doc. No. 7.) Esurance filed a Motion to Dismiss on April 12, 2021. (Doc. No. 10.) On May 12, 2021, Romaniak filed her Opposition to Esurance's Motion, to which Esurance replied on May 26, 2021. (Doc. Nos. 12, 14.) Romaniak also filed several notices of supplemental authority. (Doc. Nos. 13, 17, 19.) Esurance replied to Romaniak's latter two notices. (Doc. Nos. 18, 20.)

II. Standard of Review

A. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)

Esurance moves to dismiss Romaniak's Complaint for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the Court accepts the plaintiff's factual allegations as true and construes the Complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Gunasekara v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009). In order to survive a motion to dismiss under this Rule, “a complaint must contain (1) ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible,' (2) more than ‘a formulaic recitation of a cause of action's elements,' and (3) allegations that suggest a ‘right to relief above a speculative level.'” Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting in part Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).

The measure of a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge-whether the Complaint raises a right to relief above the speculative level-“does not ‘require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Bassett v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n., 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting in part Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56, 127 S.Ct. 1955). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Deciding whether a complaint states a claim for relief that is plausible is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.

Consequently, examination of a complaint for a plausible claim for relief is undertaken in conjunction with the “well-established principle that ‘Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.' Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Gunasekera, 551 F.3d at 466 (quoting in part Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007)) (quoting Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1964). Nonetheless, while “Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era . . . it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

B. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1)

Esurance also moves to dismiss Romaniak's Complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). The standard of review of a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction depends on whether the defendant makes a facial or factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction. Wayside Church v. Van Buren County, 847 F.3d 812, 816-17 (6th Cir. 2017). A facial attack “questions merely the sufficiency of the pleading” and requires the district court to “take[] the allegations in the complaint as true.” Gentek Bldg Prods., Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 491 F.3d 320, 330 (6th Cir. 2007). To survive a facial attack, the complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the grounds for jurisdiction. See Rote v. Zel Custom Mfg. LLC, 816 F.3d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 2016); Ogle v. Ohio Civil Service Employees Ass'n, AFSCME, Local 11, 397 F.Supp.3d 1076, 1081-1082 (S.D. Ohio 2019).

A factual attack, on the other hand, “raises a factual controversy requiring the district court ‘to weigh the conflicting evidence to arrive at the factual predicate that subject-matter does or does not exist.'” Wayside Church, 847 F.3d at 817 (quoting Gentek Bldg. Prods., Inc., 491 F.3d at 330). The plaintiff has the burden of proving jurisdiction when subject matter jurisdiction is challenged. Rogers v. Stratton Indus., 798 F.2d 913, 915 (6th Cir. 1986). The court may allow “affidavits, documents and even a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed jurisdictional facts.” Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 922 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1990).

III. Analysis

In Ohio, “[t]he elements for a breach of contract claim are that a plaintiff must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that a contract existed, (2) that the plaintiff fulfilled his obligations, (3) that the defendant failed to fulfill his obligations, and (4) that damages resulted from this failure.” Williams v. Richland County Children Servs., 861 F.Supp.2d 874, 885 (N.D. Ohio 2011) (citing Telxon Corp. v. Smart Media of Delaware, Inc., Case Nos. 22098, 22099, 2005 WL 2292800, at *20 (Ohio App. 9th Dist. 2005)).

Under Ohio law, “[a]n insurance policy is a contract whose interpretation is a matter of law.” Sharonville v. Am. Employers Ins. Co., 846 N.E.2d 833, 836 (Ohio 2006) (citing Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 374 N.E.2d 146, 150 (Ohio 1978)). A court “examine[s] the insurance contract as a whole and presume[s] that the intent of the parties is reflected in the language used in the policy.” Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 797 N.E.2d 1256, 1261 (Ohio 2003).

“‘If...