Romero-Rodriguez v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corrs.

1

JOHN ROMERO-RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.

No. 8:21-cv-1125-WFJ-AEP

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division

June 5, 2024

ORDER

WILLIAM F. JUNG UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

John Romero-Rodriguez, a Florida prisoner, timely filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc 1). Respondent filed a response opposing the petition. (Doc 12). Mr. Romero-Rodriguez did not file a reply. Upon consideration, the petition is DENIED.

I. Background

This case arises from Mr. Romero-Rodriguez's participation in a string of residential burglaries in central Florida. The burglaries took place from 2009 to 2011 and had several features in common. Among other similarities, all of the victims were of Indian descent, with a “large majority” having the last name “Patel,” and the burglars typically gained entry through rear sliding doors. (E.g., Doc. 12-2, Ex. 5, at 24-25; Doc. 12-2, Ex. 19, at 1540-51).

A break in the case came on March 31, 2011. That morning, John Parker was walking his dog in Palm Harbor. (Id., Ex. 12, at 643). He passed the house of his neighbor, Jayanti Patel. (Id. at 648). Mr. Parker saw three men carrying a safe out of the house and placing it in the back of a silver BMW with a missing gas cap. (Id. at 649, 653, 752). After the men drove off, Mr. Parker wrote down the license plate number and called 911. (Id. at 651-53). Law enforcement determined that the plate belonged to a silver BMW registered to Mr. Romero-Rodriguez's codefendant, Luis Rodriguez-Gomez. (Id. at 802). The discovery of this car was significant. Two weeks earlier, surveillance footage from New Tampa had captured a silver BMW with a missing gas cap in the vicinity of two burglarized houses. (Id., Ex. 5, at 26-27). Both were owned by persons of Indian descent. (Id.)

After obtaining a court order, law enforcement placed a GPS tracker on the silver BMW. (Id., Ex. 19, at 1474). On April 8, 2011, police followed the car as it traveled from Tampa to Ocala to Gainesville. (Id., Ex. 13, at 841-45, 869-72). Along the way, the car stopped at several residences owned by persons with the last name “Patel.” (E.g., id., Ex. 14, at 893-94). Ultimately, law enforcement observed the car park in front of a house in Gainesville for several minutes. (Id., Ex. 13, at 843-44). After the car drove off, an officer walked to the back of the house and saw that “one side” of a “glass French door[]” had been “shattered, leaving a hole in it big enough for someone [to] have gone through.” (Id. at 845). The house “belonged to a family [with] the last name of Patel.” (Id., Ex. 5, at 78).

Shortly after this burglary, law enforcement stopped the silver BMW and arrested its occupants-Mr. Romero-Rodriguez, Mr. Rodriguez-Gomez, and codefendant David Marin-Monroy. (Id., Ex. 14, at 874, 876-77). Inside the vehicle were two GPS units, gold jewelry, several window punches (a device used to break glass), gloves, a screwdriver, a pry bar, and a list of Gainesville and Ocala addresses of people with the last name “Patel.”

(Id. at 918, 929-46; id., Ex. 18, at 1302; id., Ex. 19, at 1587, 1596). One of the GPS units was set to the address of the Gainesville house that had just been burglarized. (Id., Ex. 14, at 932). Officers subsequently executed a search warrant at Mr. Marin-Monroy's residence. (Id., Ex. 16, at 1151-52). There, they found a list of addresses for several recent burglary victims with the surname “Patel.” (Id. at 1152-53; id., Ex. 19, at 1521-22, 1550-51, 159697).

Mr. Romero-Rodriguez was ultimately charged with racketeering, conspiracy to commit racketeering, burglary of an unoccupied dwelling, and grand theft. (Id., Ex. 7). Following a jury trial, he was found guilty of all charges except grand theft, of which he was acquitted. (Id., Ex. 24). Mr. Romero-Rodriguez received a total sentence of thirty years in prison. (Id., Ex. 25, at 67). After an unsuccessful direct appeal, Romero-Rodriguez v. State, 185 So.3d 1245 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016), he sought postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, (Doc. 12-3, Ex. 32). The postconviction court summarily denied one claim and granted an evidentiary hearing on the other. (Doc. 12-3, Ex. 36). After the hearing, the court denied the remaining claim in a written order. (Id., Exs. 37, 38). The appellate court affirmed the denial of relief without opinion. Romero-Rodriguez v. State, 311 So.3d 13 (Fla. 2d DCA 2021). This federal habeas petition followed. (Doc. 1).

II. Standards of Review

A. AEDPA

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) governs this proceeding. Carroll v. Sec'y, DOC, 574 F.3d 1354, 1364 (11th Cir. 2009). Habeas relief can be granted only if a petitioner is in custody “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Section 2254(d) provides that federal habeas relief cannot be granted on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

A decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law “if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000). A decision involves an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.” Id.

AEDPA was meant “to prevent federal habeas ‘retrials' and to ensure that statecourt convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002). Accordingly, “[t]he focus . . . is on whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law is objectively unreasonable, and . . . an unreasonable application is different from an incorrect one.” Id. at 694; see also Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011) (“As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.”).

The state appellate court affirmed Mr. Romero-Rodriguez's convictions and sentences, as well as the denial of postconviction relief, without discussion. These decisions warrant deference under § 2254(d)(1) because “the summary nature of a state court's decision does not lessen the deference that it is due.” Wright v. Moore, 278 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir. 2002). When a state appellate court issues a silent affirmance, “the federal court should ‘look through' the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale” and “presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.” Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S.Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018).

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Mr. Romero-Rodriguez alleges ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are analyzed under the test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Strickland requires a showing of deficient performance by counsel and resulting prejudice. Id. at 687. Deficient performance is established if, “in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions [of counsel] were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Id. at 690. However, “counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Id.

Mr. Romero-Rodriguez must show that counsel's alleged error prejudiced the defense because “[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.” Id. at 691. To demonstrate prejudice, Mr. Romero-Rodriguez must show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694.

Obtaining relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is difficult on federal habeas review because “[t]he standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both highly deferential, and when the two apply in tandem, review is doubly so.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 105 (internal quotation and citations omitted); see also Pooler v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 702 F.3d 1252, 1270 (11th Cir. 2012) (“Because we must view Pooler's ineffective counsel claim-which is governed by the deferential Strickland test-through the lens of AEDPA deference, the resulting standard of review is doubly deferential.”). “The question [on federal habeas review of an ineffective-assistance claim] ‘is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination' under the Strickland standard ‘was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable-a substantially higher threshold.'” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (quoting Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007)).

III. Discussion

A...