Ronald B. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin.

RONALD B. v. COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION^[1]

Civ. No. 3:21CV000381(SALM)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

April 25, 2022

RULING ON CROSS MOTIONS

HON SARAH A. L. MERRIAM UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Plaintiff Ronald B. (“plaintiff”) brings this appeal under §205(g) of the Social Security Act (the “Act”), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §405(g) seeking review of a final decision by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the “Commissioner” or “defendant”) denying his application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). Plaintiff has moved to reverse the Commissioner's decision or, in the alternative, to remand for further administrative proceedings. [Doc. #15]. Defendant has moved for an order affirming the decision of the Commissioner. [Doc. #19].

For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff's Motion for Order Reversing the Decision of the Commissioner or in the alternative Motion for Remand for a Hearing [Doc. #15] is GRANTED, to the extent he seeks a remand for further administrative proceedings, and defendant's Motion for Order Affirming the Decision of the Commissioner [Doc. #19] is DENIED.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY^[2]

Plaintiff filed an application for DIB on October 26, 2018. See Certified Transcript of the Administrative Record, Doc. #12, compiled on June 9, 2021, (hereinafter “Tr.”) at 215-16. Plaintiff alleged disability beginning April 10, 2013. See id.^[3]Plaintiff's application was denied initially on March 25, 2019, see Tr. 108-10, and upon reconsideration on January 14, 2020. See Tr. 117-24.

On June 11, 2020, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Alexander Borre held a hearing, at which plaintiff appeared by telephone with his former counsel, Attorney Mark Wawer. See generally Tr. 31-64. Vocational Expert Margaret Heck appeared and testified by telephone. See Tr. 64-77. On July 15, 2020, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. See Tr. 12-29. On January 19, 2021, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review of the ALJ's decision, thereby making the ALJ's July 15, 2020, decision the final decision of the Commissioner. See Tr. 1-6. This case is now ripe for review under 42 U.S.C. §405(g).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The review of a Social Security disability determination involves two levels of inquiry. “First, the Court reviews the Commissioner's decision to determine whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standard. Next, the Court examines the record to determine if the Commissioner's conclusions are supported by substantial evidence.” Tejada v. Apfel, 167 F.3d 770, 773 (2d Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). Substantial evidence is evidence that “‘a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion[;]'” it is “‘more than a mere scintilla.'” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. of New York v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). The reviewing court's “responsibility is always to ensure that a claim has been fairly evaluated[.]” Grey v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1983).

“The Court does not reach the second stage of review - evaluating whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's conclusion -- if the Court determines that the ALJ failed to apply the law correctly.” Poole v. Saul, 462 F.Supp.3d 137, 146 (D. Conn. 2020).

Where there is a reasonable basis for doubt whether the ALJ applied correct legal principles, application of the substantial evidence standard to uphold a finding of no disability creates an unacceptable risk that a claimant will be deprived of the right to have her disability determination made according to the correct legal principles.

Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir. 1987) .

“[T]he crucial factors in any determination must be set forth with sufficient specificity” by the ALJ to enable a reviewing court “to decide whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence.” Ferraris v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 582, 587 (2d Cir. 1984). The “ALJ is free to accept or reject” the testimony of any witness, but “[a] finding that the witness is not credible must nevertheless be set forth with sufficient specificity to permit intelligible plenary review of the record.” Williams ex rel. Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 260-61 (2d Cir. 1988). “Moreover, when a finding is potentially dispositive on the issue of disability, there must be enough discussion to enable a reviewing court to determine whether substantial evidence exists to support that finding.” Leslie H. L. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 3:21CV00150(SALM), 2021 WL 5937649, at *2 (D. Conn. Dec. 16, 2021) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

It is important to note that in reviewing the ALJ's decision, this Court's role is not to start from scratch. “In reviewing a final decision of the SSA, this Court is limited to determining whether the SSA's conclusions were supported by substantial evidence in the record and were based on a correct legal standard.” Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Lamay v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 562 F.3d 503, 507 (2d Cir. 2009)).

III. SSA LEGAL STANDARD

Under the Social Security Act, every individual meeting certain requirements who is under a disability is entitled to disability insurance benefits. See 42 U.S.C. §423(a)(1).

For the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) to consider a claimant disabled under the Act and therefore entitled to benefits, plaintiff must demonstrate that he is unable to work after a date specified “by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months[.]” 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A). Such impairment or impairments must be “of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy[.]” 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(A); see also 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(c) (requiring that an “impairment or combination of impairments ... significantly limit[] ... physical or mental ability to do basic work activities[]” to be considered “severe”).

There is a familiar five-step analysis used to determine whether a person is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §404.1520(a)(4). In the Second Circuit, the test is described as follows:

First, the Secretary considers whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. If he is not, the Secretary next considers whether the claimant has a “severe impairment” which significantly limits his physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. If the claimant suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry is whether, based solely on medical evidence, the claimant has an impairment which is listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. If the claimant has such an impairment, the Secretary will consider him disabled without considering vocational factors such as age, education, and work experience; the Secretary presumes that a claimant who is afflicted with a “listed” impairment is unable to perform substantial gainful activity.

Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982) (per curiam). If and only if the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the Commissioner engages in the fourth and fifth steps:

Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the fourth inquiry is whether, despite the claimant's severe impairment, he has the residual functional capacity to perform his past work. Finally, if the claimant is unable to perform his past work, the Secretary then determines whether there is other work which the claimant could perform. Under the cases previously discussed, the claimant bears the burden of proof as to the first four steps, while the Secretary must prove the final one.

Id.

Through the fourth step, the claimant carries the burdens of production and persuasion, but if the analysis proceeds to the fifth step, there is a limited shift in the burden of proof and the Commissioner is obligated to demonstrate that jobs exist in the national or local economies that the claimant can perform given his residual functional capacity.

Gonzalez ex rel. Guzman v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 360 Fed.Appx. 240, 243 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Poupore v. Astrue, 566 F.3d 303, 306 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam). The residual functional capacity (“RFC”) is “the most” a person is still capable of doing despite limitations resulting from her or his physical and mental impairments. 20 C.F.R. §404.1545(a)(1).

“In assessing disability, factors to be considered are (1) the objective medical facts; (2) diagnoses or medical opinions based on such facts; (3) subjective evidence of pain or disability testified to by the claimant or others; and (4) the claimant's educational background, age, and work experience.” Bastien v. Califano, 572 F.2d 908, 912 (2d Cir. 1978). “[E]ligibility for benefits is to be determined in light of the fact that the Social Security Act is a remedial statute to be broadly construed and liberally applied.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).

IV. THE ALJ'S DECISION

Following the above-described evaluation process, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff “was not under a disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act from August 18, 2016, through the date last insured[, ]” June 30, 2018. Tr. 16.

At step one, the ALJ found: “The claimant did not engage in substantial gainful activity during the period from his alleged onset date of August 18, 2016, through his date last insured of June 30, 2018[.]” Tr. 18.^[4]

At step two, the ALJ found: “Through the date last insured [plaintiff] had the following severe impairment: depressive...