Roodhof v. Roodhof (In re Roodhof)

491 B.R. 679

In re Sheri L. ROODHOF aka Sheri Lynn Giliam, Debtor.Joseph Roodhof, Plaintiff

v.Sheri L. Roodhof, Defendant.

Bankruptcy No. 5:12–bk–01316–RNO.

Adversary No. 5:12–ap–00153–RNO.

United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

May 13, 2013.

Tullio DeLuca, Scranton, PA, for Plaintiff.

Philip W. Stock, Stroudsburg, PA, for Defendant.

OPINION¹

ROBERT N. OPEL, II, Bankruptcy Judge.

The instant Adversary Proceeding commenced by way of Plaintiff, Joseph Roodhof's, (“Plaintiff” or “Creditor”) Complaint filed on May 29, 2012. The Complaint contains five counts: one count praying for the denial of dischargeability for a particular debt, and four counts objecting to the Debtor/Defendant, Sheri L. Roodhof's, (“Defendant” or “Debtor”) Chapter 7 discharge. A trial on the merits was held on December 13, 2012. Plaintiff filed his post-trial brief on February 14, 2013, and Defendant followed with her own post-trial brief on March 16, 2013. This case is now ripe for decision.

The crux of the issue is two-fold: (1) whether Defendant's actions constitute grounds to deny discharge of a particular debt to her husband, and (2) if they are grounds to deny her a Chapter 7 discharge outright. For the reasons stated below, I find Plaintiff's debt to be excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).² In contrast, I find that the Plaintiff has not proven any of the counts that would deny the Debtor's Chapter 7 discharge entirely.

I. JURISDICTION

The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334. This is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I) and (J).

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

Sheri L. Roodhof commenced her voluntary Chapter 7 case on March 7, 2012. For thirteen years she has been, and continues to be, an employee of the Monroe County Commissioners, where she is a Monroe County Domestic Relations Conference Officer. Trial Tr. 38:3–8. She presently has a pension through her employer. Trial Tr. 24:2–10; 38:10. This pension is not listed on her Schedule B. Trial Tr. 39:8–12.

The Defendant and Joseph Roodhof were married on June 10, 2000. Trial Tr. 4:18. They have two children together and during the marriage lived in the Plaintiff's house. Trial Tr. 5. After eleven years of marriage, the couple separated in July 2011. Trial Tr. 4; 35.

Before the couple officially separated, a series of events took place at the Plaintiff's home which led to this litigation. The Debtor left the Plaintiff's house, with her children, sometime in the early spring of 2011. Trial Tr. 35:15–20. Her husband began moving items out of the house, to an undisclosed location, sometime in April or May of 2011. Trial Tr. 35–36. Soon thereafter, the Debtor filed for child support, in June 2011. Trial Tr. 36:10–13. Child support payments did not commence, however, until September 2011. Trial Tr. 36:14–16.

On July 5, 2011, Joseph Roodhof came home to find many items missing from the home. Trial Tr. 5–11. Fixtures and personal items were removed, he observed damage in the areas where certain items were removed. See generally Trial Tr. 5–19. For example, where a dishwasher was taken, the wires connecting the appliance to the wall had been cut and the surrounding floor tiles were smashed. Trial Tr. 10–11; 13. Photographic evidence showing the extent of the damage was admitted into evidence at trial.

On July 11, 2011, the Monday after the first discovery by the Plaintiff, he again came home to find more items missing. Trial Tr. 21–22. This time, he found that “lights” and ceiling fans were removed from the home. Trial Tr. 20–22. Many wires were exposed after the lights were taken. Id. As a result of these events, the Plaintiff was compelled to purchase replacement items and make numerous repairs in order to make the home livable. Trial Tr. 22–23. At no time were any of the taken items listed on the Debtor's bankruptcy schedules.

III. DISCUSSIONA. Count One, Dischargeability Under § 523(a)(6)

In examining a discharge-exception claim under § 523, it is important to note that all § 523 exceptions are construed strictly against creditors and liberally in favor of debtors. In re Cohn, 54 F.3d 1108, 1113 (3d Cir.1995); In re Gotwald, 488 B.R. 854, 865 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.2013); Jou v. Adalian (In re Adalian), 481 B.R. 290, 297 (Bankr.M.D.Pa.2012) [hereinafter Adalian II ]. For that reason, the burden of proof lies squarely on the creditor. Cohn, 54 F.3d at 1113;Gotwald, 488 B.R. at 865. The creditor must prove the elements under § 523 by a preponderance of the evidence. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 291, 111 S.Ct. 654, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991); Adalian II, 481 B.R. at 297.

Count One seeks to deny dischargeability of the Plaintiff's debt “for willful and malicious injury by the debtor ... to the property of another entity.” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). “Willful” and “malicious” have their own special meanings in the bankruptcy context. “Willful” refers to a deliberate or intentional injury, not just a deliberate or intentional act that may lead to injury. Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61, 118 S.Ct. 974, 140 L.Ed.2d 90 (1998); In re Kates, 485 B.R. 86, 100 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.2012); Adalian II, 481 B.R. at 297. Thus, actions taken either for the purpose of causing injury or that have a substantial certainty of producing injury are deemed “willful” under § 523(a)(6). In re Conte, 33 F.3d 303, 307–09 (3d Cir.1994).

Similarly, “malice” has a unique meaning in the § 523(a)(6) context: “wrongful and without just cause or excuse, even in the absence of personal hatred, spite, or ill-will.” Jou v. Adalian (In re Adalian), 474 B.R. 150, 163 (Bankr.M.D.Pa.2012) [hereinafter Adalian I ]; In re Vidal, No. 10–14071, 2012 WL 3907847, at *28 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. Sept. 7, 2012); In re Coley, 433 B.R. 476, 498 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.2010). In this Circuit, a subjective standard is used to determine the intent of the debtor, in that the debtor must have “actual knowledge” that harm to the creditor was substantially certain to occur. See, e.g., In re Conte, 33 F.3d at 307–09;Adalian II, 481 B.R. at 297;In re Glenn, 470 B.R. 731, 736 (Bankr.M.D.Pa.2012). One can prove “malicious” intent through evidence of the “debtor's knowledge of the creditor's right and the debtor's knowledge that the conduct will cause particularized harm.” In re Glenn, 470 B.R. at 736 (citing In re Paul, 266 B.R. 686, 696 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.2001)).

At trial, the Plaintiff provided ample evidence of destruction caused to his home and personal property via testimony and authenticated pictures of the damage. This destruction includes the following:

• Two garage door keypads were taken and the wires cut. Trial Tr. 7:9–21.

• A washing machine and dryer were taken. Trial Tr. 8:5–14.

• An oven range, a microwave, and a dishwasher were taken, resulting in damage to the surrounding floor. Trial Tr. 10:19–25; 11:3–17.

• A television was taken from its mounting on the wall, creating holes in the drywall. Trial Tr. 16:15–20; 17:12–18.

• Ceiling fans and lamps were taken from multiple rooms. Trial Tr. 20:22–25.

Any question over who might have caused the damage was removed when the Defendant admitted taking the property with the help of at least four people. See Trial Tr. 46:19–25; 47:1–4 (Defendant testified that her grandfather, mother, boyfriend, and “other friends” helped her remove the property from the Plaintiff's house). She testified that her assistants did not intentionally cause harm to the home and that they “tried to work together” during the removal of items. Trial Tr. 47:5–11. However, the Defendant did not guarantee that she watched everyone at all times, keeping the assumption alive that the others might have caused some damage. Id.

At trial and in her brief, the Defendant does not deny her actions, but instead asks this Court to excuse them due to the contentious divorce entangling both parties. Trial Tr. 16:22–25; Pl.'s Post-trial Br. 4–6. The question for me, then, is whether there exists a “divorce exception,” or something similar, to a § 523(a)(6) claim.

While this is a question of first impression for this Court, other bankruptcy courts have not found a pending divorce as an excuse for, or relevant to, a § 523(a)(6) analysis. See Shteysel v. Shteysel (In re Shteysel), 221 B.R. 486, 489–91 (Bankr.E.D.Wis.1998) (holding “stormy marriage” was not an excuse for debtor's egregious § 523(a)(6) conduct); Sielschott v. Reimer (In re Reimer), 182 B.R. 816, 818–19 (Bankr.E.D.Mo.1995) (violation of court order to pay child support during contentious divorce was grounds for willful and malicious injury); Straub v. Straub (In re Straub), 192 B.R. 522, 526–27 (Bankr.D.N.D.1996) (conversion by one spouse of other spouse's property during pending divorce sufficient for § 523(a)(6) finding). I follow this line of cases and hold that a pending separation or divorce is not an excuse for conduct that otherwise would satisfy § 523(a)(6).

When a couple separates, it is normal for the ex-spouses to have ill-will towards one another, especially when there are children involved. No matter how difficult the situation becomes, though, the parties are not given a free pass to cause physical harm to the person or property of each other. Although the bankruptcy court is not the forum for these disputes to be aired out, it cannot turn a blind-eye if one of the spouses, as a debtor, violates a section of the Bankruptcy Code.

Here, the Defendant surreptitiously entered the Plaintiff's house with a group of friends and family with the intent to take property. I find that the removal of items which were necessary for the Plaintiff's everyday use of the house as a residence (e.g. dishwasher, ceiling fans, etc.), the Debtor/Defendant evinced the requisite intent to willfully and maliciously injure the Plaintiff and his property. Whether the personal property removed belongs to the Plaintiff or Defendant is a matter to be resolved in state court; yet, the house itself was damaged by the Debtor's willful and malicious...