Rosado-Ciriello v. Bd. of Educ. of the Yonkers City Sch. Dist.

219 A.D.3d 839

195 N.Y.S.3d 269

In the Matter of Samantha ROSADO–CIRIELLO, etc., et al., appellants,

v.BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the YONKERS CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., respondents.

2021–01366

Index No. 60109/20

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Argued—March 28, 2023

August 23, 2023

Robert T. Reilly, New York, NY (Michael J. Del Piano and Christina M. French of counsel), for appellants.

Abrams, Fensterman, Fensterman, Eisman, Formato, Ferrara, Wolf & Carone, LLP, White Plains, NY (Robert A. Spolzino, Joanna M. Topping, Marissa Vitolo, and Mark Goreczny of counsel), for respondents.

COLLEEN D. DUFFY, J.P., ROBERT J. MILLER, PAUL WOOTEN, LILLIAN WAN, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review an alleged determination of the respondents dated August 25, 2020, and in the nature of mandamus, the petitioners appeal from an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (David S. Zuckerman, J.), entered December 14, 2020. The order and judgment granted the respondents’ cross-motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) and 7804(f) to dismiss the petition, in effect, denied the petition, and dismissed the proceeding.

ORDERED that the order and judgment is affirmed, with costs.

The petitioners commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review an alleged determination of the respondents dated August 25, 2020, and to compel the respondents to consider telework as a viable work accommodation for the petitioners’ members. The respondents cross-moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) and 7804(f) to dismiss the petition. In an order and judgment entered December 14, 2020, the Supreme Court granted the respondents’ cross-motion, in effect, denied the petition, and dismissed the proceeding. The petitioners appeal.

CPLR 7801 provides that "a proceeding under this article shall not be used to challenge a determination ... which is not final." In this context, "the concepts of finality and ripeness are ‘closely related,’ such that for an administrative determination to be final, and thus justiciable, it must be ripe ‘for judicial review’ " ( Matter of Village of Kiryas Joel v. County of Orange, 181 A.D.3d 681, 685, 121 N.Y.S.3d 102, quoting Matter of Ranco Sand & Stone Corp. v. Vecchio, 27 N.Y.3d 92, 98, 29 N.Y.S.3d 873, 49 N.E.3d 1165 ). "Ripeness is a justiciability doctrine designed to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties" ( Matter of Village of Kiryas Joel v. County of Orange, 181 A.D.3d at 685, 121 N.Y.S.3d 102 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

"For a challenge to administrative action to be ripe, the administrative action sought to be reviewed must be final, and the anticipated harm caused by the action must be direct and immediate" ( Matter of Boyajian v. Village of Ardsley, Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 210 A.D.3d 1079, 1081, 179 N.Y.S.3d 701 [internal quotation marks omitted]). " ‘An administrative determination becomes ‘final and binding’ when two requirements are met: completeness (finality) of the determination and exhaustion of administrative remedies’ " ( Matter of Village of Kiryas Joel v. County of Orange, 181 A.D.3d at 685, 121 N.Y.S.3d 102, quoting Walton v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 8 N.Y.3d 186, 194, 831 N.Y.S.2d 749, 863 N.E.2d 1001 ). " ‘First, the agency must have reached a definitive position on the issue that inflicts actual, concrete injury and second, the injury inflicted may not be ... significantly ameliorated by further administrative action or by steps available to the complaining party’ " ( Matter of Village of Kiryas Joel v. County of Orange, 181 A.D.3d at 685, 121 N.Y.S.3d 102, quoting Matter of Best Payphones, Inc. v. Department of Info. Tech. & Telecom. of City of N.Y., 5 N.Y.3d 30, 34, 799 N.Y.S.2d 182, 832 N.E.2d 38 ).

Here, the alleged determination of the respondents challenged by the petitioners was an email dated August 25, 2020. Contrary to the petitioners’ contention, the alleged determination was not final and binding because it did not inflict concrete harm (see Matter of Boyajian v. Village of Ardsley, Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 210 A.D.3d at 1081, 179 N.Y.S.3d 701 ). Instead, further steps, including the submission of applications with supporting documents, were available to the petitioners’ members who were seeking telework accommodations (see id. ; Matter of Village of Kiryas Joel v. County of Orange, 181 A.D.3d at 685, 121 N.Y.S.3d 102 ).

To the extent that the...