Rose v. Balt. Cnty.

1

JACOB LEE ROSE,Plaintiff, v. BALTIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL No. 1:23-cv-02078-JRR

United States District Court, D. Maryland

August 23, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JULIE R. RUBIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Plaintiff Jacob Lee Rose, as Guardian of Person for Shane Radomski filed this action against Defendants Baltimore County Maryland (“the County”), Officer G. Depew Officer R. Johnson, Officer B. Lange, and Officer J. Trenary (collectively, “Officer Defendants”). (ECF No. 1; the “Complaint”). Pending now before the court are two motions: Officer Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or for Summary Judgment^[1](ECF No. 14; “Officer Defendants' Motion”) and the County's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 15; “the County's Motion”). The court has reviewed all papers; no hearing is necessary. Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2023). For the reasons that follow, by accompanying order, the Officer Defendants' Motion and the County's Motion, construed as motions for judgment on the pleadings, will be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. BACKGROUND^[2]

Plaintiff Jacob Lee Rose is the appointed legal guardian of Shane Radomski. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 6.) Plaintiff initiated this action as Mr. Radomski's guardian based on an incident involving Officer Defendants that left Mr. Radomski with permanent physical and mental disabilities. Id. ¶ 5.

On April 14, 2022, Officer Defendants were attempting to serve an arrest warrant upon a suspect, Brian Rodriguez, for his alleged involvement in a 2021 murder. Id. ¶ 15. Officer Defendants, law enforcement officers involved in the County's Criminal Apprehension Support Team, attempted to serve the arrest warrant in a parking lot located at Avon Road and Maryland Avenue in Dundalk, Maryland. Id. ¶¶ 13, 16, 38. Mr. Radomski was not the subject of the arrest warrant but was merely in the parking lot when Officer Defendants attempted to serve the arrest warrant. Id. ¶¶ 14, 17-18.

Shortly after 12:40 p.m., Mr. Radomski, Mr. Rodriguez, and another man were in the parking lot when four unmarked vehicles rushed to surround them from the front ends of their parked vehicles. Id. ¶¶ 17-18. No vehicles had emergency lights, but a siren was audible. Id. ¶ 18. As Officer Defendants' vehicles approached, Mr. Rodriguez and the other man (both of whom were standing in the lot) raised their hands over their heads and began lowering themselves to the ground. (Ex. C, “Wyze Footage,” ECF No. 14-4 at 1:09-1:14; ECF No. 1 at fig. 1, ¶ 20.)^[3]Officer Defendants, in plain clothes with tactical vests, exited their vehicles with their guns drawn. (Wyze Footage, ECF No. 14-4 at 1:12; ECF No. 1 ¶ 19.) Officer Defendants knew that the driver of Mr. Radomski's vehicle (a Nissan) “was not the target of their warrant, but they took no steps to identify the driver” of Mr. Radomski's vehicle. (ECF No. 1 ¶ 29.) Mr. Radomski then attempted to flee in his vehicle by heading toward an open pathway in the lot. (Wyze Footage, ECF No. 144 at 1:12-1:15; ECF No. 1 at fig. 1, ¶ 20.) As he attempted to flee, Mr. Radomski's vehicle came close to hitting one of the two men lowering to the ground. (Wyze Footage, ECF No. 14-4 at 1:12 1:15; ECF No. 1 at fig. 1.)

As Mr. Radomski drove toward “an open area of egress, another nondescript police vehicle, a large SUV driven by [Officer Defendant Trenary],^[4] entered [the] oncoming lane of traffic where Mr. Radomski had the right of way, and caused a collision,” contrary to the County's policy and Maryland traffic laws and regulations. (Wyze Footage, ECF No. 14-4 at 1:12-1:15; ECF No. 1 at fig. 2, ¶¶ 20-23.) Mr. Radomski's vehicle collided with the SUV. (Wyze Footage, ECF No. 14-4 at 1:12-1:15; ECF No. 1 at fig. 2, ¶ 22.) Then, with no persons in his direct path, Mr. Radomski reversed his vehicle a short distance. (Wyze Footage, ECF No. 14-4 at 1:15-1:20; ECF No. 1 at fig. 3, ¶¶ 23-24.) He again attempted to “navigate toward a clear area of egress” and to avoid the SUV. (Wyze Footage, ECF No. 14-4 at 1:20-1:23; ECF No. 1 at fig. 4, ¶ 23.) The video shows no person in front of Mr. Radomski's vehicle at this time. (Wyze Footage, ECF No. 14-4 at 1:20-1:23; ECF No. 1 at fig. 4, ¶ 25.) As Mr. Radomski moved forward through a space between the Officer Defendants' vehicles, and after Mr. Radomski's vehicle had already partially passed Officer Defendant Trenary's person, Officer Defendant Trenary shot at Mr. Radomski through Mr. Radomski's front windshield, contrary to the County's Use of Force Policy. (Wyze Footage, ECF No. 14-4 at 1:20-1:23; ECF No. 1 at fig. 4, ¶¶ 25, 27, 32.) Mr. Radomski's vehicle stopped again with no apparent exit available. (Wyze Footage, ECF No. 14-4 at 1:24; ECF No. 1 at fig. 6.) Officer Defendant Trenary then fired additional shots at Mr. Radomski's vehicle. (Wyze Footage, ECF No. 14-4 at 1:23-1:27; ECF No. 1 ¶ 27.) Mr. Radomski reversed again into one of the Officer Defendants' vehicles while they began shooting into his vehicle contrary to the County's Use of Force Policy. (Wyze Footage, ECF No. 14-4 at 1:24-1:32; ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 28, 31-32.) No persons appear to be in Mr. Radomski's projected path while he reversed, with two of the officers behind another vehicle. (Wyze Footage, ECF No. 14-4 at 1:24-1:32; ECF No. 1 ¶ 28.) Officer Defendants appear to keep shooting at Mr. Radomski's vehicle even after it comes to a stop.^[5](Wyze Footage, ECF No. 14-4 at 1:28-1:31.)

Despite Officer Defendants being “easily able to maintain a position of safety while” Mr. Radomski “attempted to escape the scene,” they fired “dozens of bullets” and shot Mr. Radomski approximately twelve (12) times, including in his wrists, shoulders, back, arms, and head. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 31, 33, 35.) Officer Defendants “did not begin shooting until it was patently obvious that the unknown driver was attempting to leave the scene, not use his car ‘against'” them. Id. ¶ 35. (emphasis in original). As a result of the gunshots, Mr. Radomski “suffered acute respiratory failure, hypoxia, pneumonia, pleural effusion, acute [deep vein thrombosis], traumatic brain injury, seizures,” as well as “other severe mental and physical injuries.” Id. ¶ 47.

No Officer Defendant operated a body-worn camera during the incident. Id. ¶ 36. In fact, the County has excluded the Criminal Apprehension Support Team from its dashboard and body-worn camera programs that, at least in part, require “that the camera be activated during pursuits, arrests, field interviews, traffic stops, execution of all warrants, emergency vehicle operations, and any ‘other activities of a potentially confrontational nature.'” Id. ¶ 41. The Chief of Police for the County has discretion over which County police department units are outfitted with dashboard and body-worn cameras. Id. ¶ 46. Plaintiff further alleges that the County has “instituted and maintained formal and informal customs, policies, and practices that foster, promote, and encourage officers to use excessive force and otherwise violate citizens' constitutional rights.” (ECF No. 1 ¶ 78.) In support thereof, Plaintiff notes, inter alia, that the County lacks an internal affairs procedure for controlling and monitoring excessive force by officers, and that the County fails to report incidents of excessive force to any person with supervisory authority. Id. ¶¶ 81, 93.

Plaintiff further identifies other incidents of purported excessive force exercised by County law enforcement officers, including an incident in which Officer Defendant Trenary shot a driver while attempting to serve a warrant. Id. ¶¶ 44, 79.

On August 2, 2023, Plaintiff initiated this action against the County and Officer Defendants, asserting the following counts:

Count I: Common Law Battery against Officer Defendants;

Count II: Excessive Force in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer Defendants;

Count III: A Monell^[6]Claim Based on Excessive Force in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the County;

Count IV: Excessive Force in Violation of Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights against all Defendants;

Count V: A Longtin^[7] Claim Based on Excessive Force in Violation of Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights against the County;

Count VI: Common Law Gross Negligence against Officer Defendants; and

Count VII: Common Law Negligence against all Defendants.

(ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 54-136.) The County filed its answer on October 19, 2023 (ECF No. 11), and Officer Defendants filed their answer on October 27, 2023 (ECF No. 12). On November 11, 2013, the County and Officer Defendants filed their Motions, seeking judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims. (ECF Nos. 14, 15.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

All Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) or, alternatively, for summary judgment under Rule 56. Although Defendants do not explain why the court should or might construe the Motions as ones for summary judgment versus judgment on the pleadings the court construes the Motions to seek conversion under Rule 12(d). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d) provides, “[i]f, on a motion under [Rule 12(c)], matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d). “Pursuant to Rule 12(d), the Court has discretion to determine whether to accept evidence outside the pleadings, and thus convert a [Rule 12(c)] motion to a Rule 56 motion.” Coleman v. Calvert Cnty., No. GJH-15-920, 2016 WL 5335477, at *3 (D. Md. Sept. 22, 2016) (citations omitted). “There are two requirements for a proper Rule 12(d) conversion.” Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns. Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Balt., 721 F.3d 264, 281 (4th...