Rose v. Doe

JENNIFER KATHRYN ANNE ROSE, Plaintiff, v. MARTIN LUTHER HOME and JOHN DOES 1-3, Defendants.

No. 17-CV-1006-LRR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA EASTERN DIVISION

April 24, 2018

ORDER

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION ....................................... 2

II. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY ........................ 2

III. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND ........................ 2

A. Parties .......................................... 2

B. Overview of the Dispute ............................... 3

IV. ANALYSIS ............................................ 3

A. Untimely Service of Process ............................ 3

1. Parties' arguments .............................. 4

2. Applicable law ................................. 4

3. Application ................................... 6

B. Failure to State a Claim ............................... 7

1. Denial of visitation rights ......................... 8

a. Parties' arguments ......................... 8

b. Applicable law ............................ 9

c. Application .............................. 9

2. Injurious falsehood ............................ 12

a. Parties' arguments ........................ 12

b. Applicable law ........................... 13

c. Application ............................. 14

C. Service Costs ..................................... 15

V. CONCLUSION ....................................... 16

I. INTRODUCTION

The matter before the court is Defendant Martin Luther Home's ("Martin Luther") "Motion to Dismiss" ("Motion") (docket no. 5).

II. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 17, 2017, Plaintiff Jennifer Kathryn Anne Rose filed a pro se Complaint (docket no. 1) asserting that Defendants John Does 1-3 and Martin Luther (collectively, "Defendants") generally restricted and denied her right to visit her grandfather, who was a resident of Martin Luther, in violation of 42 C.F.R. § 483 pt. B. See generally Complaint at 1-4. Rose also asserts that Defendants "portrayed [her] in a false light and publicly damaged her reputation" when they "filed an abuse claim [against her] with the Iowa Department of Inspection and Appeals." Id. at 3. On September 5, 2017, Martin Luther filed the Motion. On September 26, 2017, Rose filed a Resistance (docket no. 7).¹ On October 2, 2017, Martin Luther filed a Reply (docket no. 9). No party has requested oral argument, and the court finds that oral argument is unnecessary. The Motion is fully submitted and ready for decision.

III. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Accepting all factual allegations in the Complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Rose, the relevant facts are as follows:

A. Parties

Rose is a resident of Hamilton County, Indiana. Complaint at 1. Martin Luther is an Iowa Corporation doing business in Dubuque County, Iowa. Id. at 2. John Does 1-3 are employees of Martin Luther who, at all material times, were acting within the scopeof their employment and agency. Id.

B. Overview of the Dispute

On or about April 10, 2015, Rose's grandfather was admitted into hospice care at Martin Luther's skilled nursing facility. Id. On April 14, 2015, Rose found her grandfather unresponsive and squeezed the tip of his finger after she failed "to arouse him by voice or agitation." Id. at 2-3. On April 15, 2015, employees of Martin Luther filed an abuse claim with the Iowa Department of Inspection and Appeals based on Rose squeezing her grandfather's finger. Id. at 3. The Iowa Department of Inspection and Appeals "denied the abuse charge against [Rose]." Id. Rose contends that Defendants impeded her ability to visit her grandfather by filing the abuse claim, requiring her to call Martin Luther "fifteen minutes . . . prior to any visit" and "insist[ing] [that she] had to sign in and out when visiting the facility." Id. Rose also claims that the Defendants required her to be accompanied by a chaperone when visiting, refused to let her stay overnight and eventually contacted law enforcement to have her arrested for trespassing. Id. at 3-4.

IV. ANALYSIS

In the Motion, Martin Luther seeks dismissal pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(4) and 12(b)(5) due to "untimely service of process." Motion at 1. Martin Luther also seeks dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) due to Rose's alleged "failure to state a claim." Id. The court shall address each basis for dismissal in turn.

A. Untimely Service of Process

Rose filed her Complaint on April 17, 2017. On that same date, the Clerk of Court filed a Civil Case Packet (docket no. 2-1) which included a copy of what was, at that time, the current version of Local Rule 41. See Civil Case Packet at 24. That version of Local Rule 41 stated in relevant part that, "[w]here service has not been made on any defendant within 120 days after the filing of the complaint, and the plaintiff has failed to file astatement in writing within 127 days after the filing of the complaint setting forth good cause for why service has not been made," the Clerk of Court shall dismiss the action without prejudice. Id.² In May 2017, Martin Luther "received a Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of Service of Summons by mail." Declaration of Janet Warren (docket no. 5-2) at 1. Martin Luther did not "respond to the request to waive service of process." Id. Martin Luther was ultimately served on August 14, 2017, exactly 119 days from the date that the Complaint was filed. See id. at 2; see also Proof of Service (docket no. 4) at 1.

1. Parties' arguments

Martin Luther argues that the Complaint "should be dismissed for untimely service of process." Brief in Support of the Motion (docket no. 5-1) at 4. Martin Luther contends that Rose's failure to serve it within the 90-day period prescribed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) requires the court to dismiss the cause of action because neither good cause nor excusable neglect warrant an extension. Rose asserts that she relied on the information that she received from the Clerk of Court, which provided "that she had 120 days to formally serve" Defendants. Resistance at 2. She argues that "the court should accept the service made in good faith within the 120 days." Id.

2. Applicable law

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) requires a plaintiff to serve each defendant "within 90 days after the complaint is filed." Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). "[T]he core function of service is to supply notice of the pendency of a legal action, in a manner and at a timethat affords the defendant a fair opportunity to answer the complaint and present defenses and objections." Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 672 (1996). Extensions of the 90-day deadline are not granted as a matter of course. "[U]nder Rule 4(m), if the district court concludes there is good cause for [the] plaintiff's failure to serve within [90] days, it shall extend the time for service." Kurka v. Iowa Cty., Iowa, 628 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 2010) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Adams v. AlliedSignal Gen. Aviation Avionics, 74 F.3d 882, 887 (8th Cir. 1996)). "If good cause is not shown, the district court may grant an extension if the plaintiff demonstrates excusable neglect." Peer v. Vilsak, 563 F. App'x 504, 505 (8th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). The district court retains substantial discretion at each step of the analysis. See Colasante v. Wells Fargo Corp., 81 F. App'x 611, 612-13 (8th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). The plaintiff bears the burden of showing "good cause" or "excusable neglect." See Peer, 563 F. App'x at 505 (stating that "the plaintiff must demonstrate good cause for failure to serve" and that it is the plaintiff's burden to "demonstrate[] excusable neglect").

"Rule 4(m) does not define good cause, and courts have not given conclusive meaning to the phrase." Kurka, 628 F.3d at 957; see also Colasante, 81 F. App'x at 613 ("[T]he standard of good cause, like many others in the law, is necessarily amorphous."). "A showing of good cause requires at least . . . good faith and some reasonable basis for noncompliance with the rules." Kurka, 628 F.3d at 957 (quoting Adams, 74 F.3d at 887). "Whether or not [good cause] has been satisfied is largely dependent upon the facts of each individual case." Colasante, 81 F. App'x at 613. "Good cause is likely shown when the plaintiff's failure to complete service in a timely fashion is a result of the conduct of a third person (typically the process server), the defendant has evaded service or engaged in misleading conduct, the plaintiff has diligently tried to effect service or there are understandable mitigating circumstances, or the plaintiff is proceeding pro se or in forma pauperis." Peer, 563 F. App'x at 505.

3. Application

The court finds that Rose has shown good cause sufficient to warrant an extension under Rule 4(m). Although "pro se litigants are not excused from compliance with relevant rules of the procedural and substantive law," Schooley, 712 F.2d at 373, the court is mindful that Rose relied on the version of the Local Rules that she was provided by the Clerk of Court in concluding that she had 120 days to serve Defendants. Such reliance on Clerk of Court staff would be insufficient to establish good cause in most cases. See Gabriel v. United States, 30 F.3d 75, 77 (7th Cir. 1994) (concluding that "reliance on the advice of an employee of the District Court Clerk . . . does not constitute 'good cause'" and noting that "reliance on the advice of a Clerk's office employee cannot excuse plaintiff's counsel's failure to do basic research"); Kurka v. Iowa Cty., Iowa, No. 08-CV-95-LRR, 2009 WL 906037, at *5 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 30, 2009) ("Ensuring that service is completed is not a ministerial task for staff members, as counsel for [the plaintiff] claims, but rather an important responsibility for the lawyer."). As a pro se litigant, however, Rose's error, borne by reasonable reliance on the Civil Case Packet that she received, is more understandable. See Maxwell v. Golden, 490 F. App'x 845, 846 (8th Cir. 2012) (reversing dismissal for failure to...