Roseman v. Linmoore Invs.

BRYAN ROSEMAN, Plaintiff, v. LINMORE INVESTMENTS, INC., Defendant.

No. 1:17-cv-826

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Western Division

August 17, 2021

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. 15)

Timothy S. Black Judge

This civil case is before the Court on Defendant Linmore Investment Inc.'s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 15) and the parties' responsive memoranda (Docs. 16, 17).

I. BACKGROUND^[1]

Plaintiff Bryan Roseman first secured his Class A Commercial Driver's License (“CDL”) in 2009. (Doc. 15-8 at ¶ 1). He also had a Hazmat endorsement. (Id. ¶ 1). To maintain his CDL, Roseman was required under Department of Transportation (“DOT”) regulations to submit to a yearly physical and meet minimum vision standards, ensuring that he maintained the necessary eyesight capability to safely operate a tractor trailer. (Id. at ¶¶ 1, 15).

Defendant Linmore Investments, Inc. (“LMI”) is a transportation company specializing in hauling liquid bulk hazardous chemicals. (Id. at ¶ 15). In December 2010, Roseman began working as a tanker truck driver/employee for LMI. (Id. at ¶¶ 2, 15). His place of employment with LMI was Terminal 870, located initially at Evendale Drive and later Crescentville Road in Cincinnati. (Id. at ¶ 2). Terminal 870 employs about 30 employees. (Id. at ¶ 23).

Roseman admits he had knowledge of the following: (1) driving for LMI required passing a physical exam, (id. at ¶ 2); (2) per LMI's employee handbook, he would require a medical release from a physician before returning to work after leave, (id. at ¶ 3); (3) any return to work was contingent on passing a medical exam, (id.); and (4) he would need to inform Operations Manager Robert “Bobby” Moore when he was medically released to return as a driver after taking leave, (id.).

There is no dispute that Roseman understood LMI's leave of absence policy, having had prior medical issues and medical leave. (Id. at ¶ 6). For example, in January 2014, Roseman supplied LMI with notice of diabetes issues and treatment, and ultimately returned to work as a truck driver. (Id. at ¶ 6).

Roseman admits that it is against DOT Regulations for a Class A CDL to drive a vehicle with 20/400 vision; instead, the requirement is 20/40. (Id. at ¶ 6). On April 3, 2015, Roseman notified LMI and Moore that he was having vision problems in his right eye. (Id. at ¶¶ 7, 16). Medical records indicate that Roseman began seeking treatment for his vision problems as early as March 18, 2015. (Id. at ¶ 7). Roseman's physician told him he could not operate a tractor trailer because the vision in his right eye was 20/400. (Id. at ¶¶ 7, 16). Because Roseman's next doctor visit was May 1, 2015, Moore placed Roseman “out of service” and on voluntary medical leave of absence until he could provide a doctor's release. (Id. at ¶¶ 7, 16). Moore told Roseman that LMI could not have him drive a truck until he was released by a doctor, and to keep the company informed on when he could return. (Id. at ¶¶ 7-8). Roseman was granted medical leave time until June 2015. (Id. at ¶ 17).

Over the next few months, Roseman and LMI had various communications. On June 3, 2015, LMI's office manager, Shannon Schroeder, emailed Roseman about paying his insurance premiums while he was on unpaid leave. (Id. at ¶ 9). Roseman replied on June 16, indicating he would come in soon. (Id. at ¶ 9).

On June 4, 2015, LMI's then-President, Jody Lindsey, emailed Roseman, indicating his voluntary leave would expire on June 12, and the company needed an update on his vision status from his doctor. (Id. at ¶ 10). Roseman contends that he did not receive the June 4 email until after his termination. (Id.) However, Roseman admits that around June 17, 2015, when Roseman paid part of his insurance premium, Lindsey and Schroeder told him he was “coming up on 12 weeks.” (Id.).

Schroeder then filled out Roseman's termination paperwork, with an effective date of June 19, 2015. (Id. at ¶ 25). The paperwork indicated he was eligible for rehire. (Id.) Roseman states that he learned of his termination from a COBRA notice. (Id. at ¶ 10).

Through July 2015, Roseman supplied LMI with doctor's notes. (Id. at ¶ 11). As of July 1, 2015, Roseman was still unable to return to work as a driver. (Id.) When Roseman supplied his July doctor's note to Schroeder, he told her he could not return to work even through early August, and “didn't seem like [he] was getting back anytime soon.” (Id. at ¶ 11).

On July 9, 2015, Schroeder emailed Roseman, based on Lindsey's instructions, attaching all portions of LMI's employee handbook related to any kind of leave. (Id. at ¶ 26). This handbook was already in Roseman's possession, since the start of his employment. (Id. at ¶ 3). Portions of the handbook included a description of FMLA leave, and also described eligibility requirements for FMLA to apply, including that the employee must be a covered employee, i.e., work at a location where the employer, within 75 miles, employs at least 50 employees. (Id. at ¶ 26). The handbook also described LMI's voluntary leave provisions, including 12 weeks discretionary leave, the required medical release, and that the employees are subject to termination if they do not return at the end of leave. (Id.)

Roseman's next communication with LMI about his vision issues was with Moore in December 2015. (Id. at ¶ 13). At that time, Roseman informed Moore he was cleared to return as a driver. (Id.) Moore told Roseman that the company had no available trucks at that time. (Id.) Roseman found new employment as a driver in January 2016. (Id.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion for summary judgment should be granted if the evidence submitted to the Court demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The moving party has the burden of showing the absence of genuine disputes over facts which, under the substantive law governing the issue, might affect the outcome of the action. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. All facts and inferences must be construed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

A party opposing a motion for summary judgment “may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

III. ANALYSIS

Roseman asserts eight claims against LMI: (1) failure to accommodate in violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.; (2) failure to accommodate under Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.02(A); (3) disability discrimination under the ADA; (4) disability discrimination under Ohio law; (5) Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2615, interference; (6) FMLA retaliation; (7) Employee Retirement Income Security Act interference, 29 U.S.C. 1001, et seq.; and (8) ERISA retaliation. LMI moves for summary judgment on all claims.

A. Counts I and II -Failure to Accommodate

Counts I and II are Roseman's failure to accommodate claims under state and federal law. Both parties acknowledge that disability claims under state and federal law are analyzed on the same basis. (Doc. 15 at 15; Doc. 16 at 4). Johnson v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 922 F.Supp.2d 658, 666 n.6 (S.D. Ohio 2013); Esparza v. Pierre Foods, 923 F.Supp.2d 1099, 1104 (S.D. Ohio 2013). Thus, it is appropriate for the Court to analyze these claims together.

The ADA prohibits “discriminat[ion] against a qualified individual on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The Act's broad definition of discrimination includes “not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity.” Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A); see also Fisher v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 951 F.3d 409, 415-16 (6th Cir. 2020); Kleiber v. Honda of Am. Mfg., 485 F.3d 862, 868 (6th Cir. 2007).

“Because the record reflects that [Roseman]'s claim was based on [LMI]'s failure to offer a reasonable accommodation, it involves direct evidence of discrimination under the ADA.” Fisher, 951 F.3d 409, 417 (6th Cir. 2020). Under the direct-evidence framework, Roseman bears the burden of establishing (1) that he is disabled, and (2) that he is “‘otherwise qualified' for the position despite his [] disability: (a) without accommodation from the employer; (b) with an alleged ‘essential' job requirement eliminated; or (c) with a proposed reasonable accommodation.” Kleiber, 485 F.3d at 869 (quoting Hedrick v. W. Reserve Care Sys., 355 F.3d 444, 452 (6th Cir. 2004)). LMI then bears the burden of “proving that a challenged job criterion is essential, and therefore a business necessity, or that a proposed accommodation will impose an undue hardship upon” LMI. Id. (citation omitted). “[A]lthough a defendant may use a legitimate, nondiscriminatory rationale as a shield against indirect or circumstantial evidence of discrimination, such a neutral policy is of no moment under the direct test.” Fisher, 951 F.3d at 417 (quotation omitted). “In other words, an employer may not illegitimately deny an employee a reasonable accommodation pursuant to a general policy and use that same policy as a so-called neutral basis for firing him.” Id.

1. Otherwise Qualified

LMI does not dispute that Roseman is disabled.^[2] LMI instead argues that Roseman is not an otherwise...