Ross v. Estate of Roberts

1

BARBARA ROSS Appellant v. ESTATE OF HELEN F. ROBERTS, DECEASED

No. 393 MDA 2023

No. J-S29033-23

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

September 15, 2023

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the Order Entered February 8, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Civil Division at No(s) 17-13294

BEFORE: MURRAY, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J. ^[*]

MEMORANDUM

COLINS, J.

Appellant Barbara Ross (Plaintiff), appeals from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County (the trial court) that granted summary judgment against her and in favor of the defendant in an action that Plaintiff brought against Helen F. Roberts (Decedent) for breach of an implied contract and unjust enrichment. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff's implied contract claim and her unjust enrichment claim for services provided before June 5, 2013 and reverse its grant of summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim for payment for services provided on or after June 5, 2013.

Plaintiff commenced this action against Decedent by writ of summons on June 5, 2017 and filed a complaint on September 18, 2017. Docket Entries at 1. Because Decedent suffered from severe dementia, appointment of a guardian ad litem for Decedent was sought and the trial court appointed the agent under Decedent's financial power of attorney as guardian ad litem for Decedent in this action. Petition for Declaration of Incapacity and Appointment of Guardian ad Litem ¶¶5-6 & Exs. B & C; Koch Dep. at 96; Plaintiff Dep. at 28; Trial Court Order, 6/27/18. Following preliminary objections that the trial court sustained in part, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint that asserted that Decedent owed her $684,217 for home healthcare services that she provided Decedent from November 2005 to 2017 on the ground that there was a contract implied in fact between her and Decedent or, alternatively, on the theory of unjust enrichment. Docket Entries at 1-2; Amended Complaint ¶¶46-55.

In her amended complaint, Plaintiff alleged that she worked as a paid home healthcare aide for Decedent's close friend, Marjory Perfect, from 2000 until Ms. Perfect's death in 2005 and that she developed a relationship with Decedent while she was working for Ms. Perfect. Amended Complaint ¶¶10-12, 14. Plaintiff alleged that after Ms. Perfect's death, Decedent asked Plaintiff to assist her and Plaintiff began assisting Decedent. Id. ¶¶15-16. Plaintiff alleged that she showed Decedent a document listing payments that she received from Ms. Perfect, but admitted that she and Decedent never agreed on any amount or hourly rate that she would be paid for assisting Decedent. Id. ¶¶17-18. Plaintiff alleged that she provided home healthcare services for Decedent from November 2005 to May 2017, working approximately 30 hours per week from 2006 through 2008 and 40 hours a week or more from 2009 through May 2017, but admitted that she kept no records of the amount of time that she spent assisting Decedent prior to 2016. Id. ¶¶20, 23-24, 26-28; Plaintiff Dep. at 19-29, 112-13.

Plaintiff alleged that the only payments that Decedent made to her prior to March 2017 were checks in the following amounts: one check for $100 in 2010, three checks totaling $700 in 2011, eight checks totaling $5,100 in 2012, five checks totaling $2,300 in 2013, a check for $20,000 and two other checks of $500 each in 2014, one check for $5,000 in 2016, and two checks totaling $14,000 in January 2017. Amended Complaint ¶¶30, 35, 39-40 & Exs. C, D, E, & F thereto. With the exception of one $500 check in May 2013 that has the notation "Services," none of these payments referred to any compensation for services, and most of the checks bore notations such as "Thank you," "Merry Christmas," or references to "kindness." Id. Exs. C, D, E, & F. Plaintiff admitted in discovery that she did not report any of the checks that she received prior to March 2017 as income on her taxes and that she viewed these payments as gifts. Plaintiff Dep. at 53-77, 118. Plaintiff alleged that Decedent's financial power of attorney agent paid her in March 2017 and May 2017 for home healthcare services that she provided to Decedent in 2017, and Plaintiff reported those payments as income. Amended Complaint ¶¶41-43 & Exs. G & H thereto; Plaintiff Dep. at 67-69, 112; Koch Dep. at 33-34, 66-67, 91-93.

Decedent's guardian ad litem filed an answer and new matter to Plaintiff's amended complaint denying that Decedent agreed to pay Plaintiff for assisting her or had any obligation to pay Plaintiff for any assistance provided by Plaintiff prior to 2017 and raising the defense of the statute of limitations. Defendant's Amended Answer and New Matter ¶¶17, 20, 28, 44, 46, 51, 65. Decedent died on May 5, 2020, and her estate (Decedent's Estate) was substituted as the defendant. Suggestion of Death; Trial Court Order, 6/8/22.

On October 17, 2022, following discovery, Decedent's Estate filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that all of Plaintiff's claims for payment for services prior to June 5, 2013 were barred by the applicable four-year statute of limitations, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5525, and that Plaintiff's admissions, deposition testimony, and discovery responses established that Plaintiff could not prove her claims. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ¶¶10-39. Plaintiff filed a response to the motion for summary judgment submitting an affidavit concerning her claims and arguing that her deposition testimony and affidavit were sufficient to support her implied contract and unjust enrichment claims. Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ¶¶37, 39; Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Summary Judgment at 14-18.

Plaintiff also argued that her pre-June 5, 2013 claims were not barred by the statute of limitations because her alleged contract with Decedent was a continuing contract and because the January 2017 payments of a total of $14,000 allegedly tolled the statute of limitations. Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Summary Judgment at 18-20.^[1]

On February 8, 2023, the trial court entered an order granting Decedent's Estate's motion for summary judgment and dismissing Plaintiff's action with prejudice. Trial Court Order, 2/8/23. This timely appeal followed. Plaintiff raises the following issue in this appeal:

Did the Trial Court err by entering summary judgment and dismissing the case where [Plaintiff]'s testimony about the existence of an agreement between [Plaintiff] and [Decedent] created a genuine issue of material fact, and the weight of [Plaintiff]'s testimony and her credibility are for the factfinder to determine?

Appellant's Amended Brief at 4.

Our standard of review of the trial court's grant of summary judgment is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Pyeritz v. Commonwealth, 32 A.3d 687, 692 (Pa. 2011); American Southern Insurance Co. v. Halbert, 203 A.3d 223, 226 (Pa. Super. 2019).

Summary judgment is properly granted in favor of a defendant where the material facts are undisputed and the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on those facts or where, after discovery, the plaintiff has failed to produce evidence sufficient to prove all elements of her cause of action. Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2; Criswell v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 115 A.3d 906, 909 (Pa. Super. 2015); Krauss v. Trane U.S. Inc., 104 A.3d 556, 563 (Pa. Super. 2014). In determining whether there is a genuine dispute of material fact that precludes summary judgment or whether the plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence to support a cause of action, we must view the record in the light most favorable to the non-movant plaintiff and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the defendant. Criswell, 115 A.3d at 908-09; Krauss, 104 A.3d at 563; Petrina v. Allied Glove Corp., 46 A.3d 795, 798 (Pa. Super. 2012). An inference of fact that amounts merely to a guess or conjecture, however, is insufficient to defeat summary judgment. Kornfiend v. New Werner Holding Co., 241 A.3d 1212, 1217-18 (Pa. Super. 2020), aff'd, 280 A.3d 918 (Pa. 2022); Krauss, 104 A.3d at 568.

The trial court granted summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiff failed to produce evidence sufficient to prove the elements of her implied contract and unjust enrichment causes of action. Trial Court Opinion at 7-9. We agree that Plaintiff's admissions established that summary judgment on Plaintiff's implied contract claim was proper on this ground, but conclude that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on this basis on Plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim.

To prove a cause of action for breach of a contract implied in fact, the plaintiff must show an agreement by the parties to the terms of the contract that she seeks to enforce. Liss & Marion, P.C. v. Recordex Acquisition Corp., 983 A.2d 652, 659 (Pa. 2009); AmeriPro Search, Inc. v Fleming Steel Co., 787 A.2d 988, 991 (Pa. Super. 2001). "A contract implied in fact is an actual contract which arises where the parties agree upon the obligations to be incurred, but their intention, instead of being expressed in words, is inferred from acts in the light of the surrounding circumstances." Liss & Marion, P.C., 983 A.2d at 659 (quoting Elias v. Elias, 237 A.2d 215 (Pa. 1968)). Agreement on the price to be paid for products or services can be inferred from a history of payment of bills that the other party has submitted. Liss & Marion, P.C., 983 A.2d at 659. No cause of action for breach of a contract implied in fact exists, however, where there is no agreement to the fee for the services that are to be provided and there is no evidence of conduct from which such an...