Roswick v. Mid Dakota Clinic, P.C.

Dr. Robert J. Roswick, Plaintiff, v. Mid Dakota Clinic, P.C., Defendant.

Civil No. 17-44 ADM/ARS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA

November 13, 2019

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

J. Ashwin Madia, Esq., Madia Law LLC,, Minneapolis, MN on behalf of Plaintiff.

Scott K. Porsborg, Esq., and Sarah E. Wall, Esq., Smith Porsborg Schweigert Armstrong Moldenhauer & Smith, Bismarck, ND, on behalf of Defendant.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the undersigned United States District Judge for rulings on Plaintiff Dr. Robert J. Roswick's ("Dr. Roswick") Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs [Docket No. 227], Motion to Amend Judgment to Award Equitable Relief [Docket No. 247], Motion to Alter Judgment to Award Interest [Docket No. 251], and Motion for Partial New Trial on Punitive Damages [Docket No. 254]. Also before the Court are Defendant Mid Dakota Clinic, P.C.'s ("MDC") Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law [Docket No. 244] and Motion for New Trial, or in the Alternative, Motion for Remittitur [Docket No. 246]. For the reasons set forth below, Dr. Roswick's motions for attorney fees, equitable relief, and interest are granted in part, his motion for a partial new trial is denied, and MDC's motions are denied.

II. BACKGROUND

On March 7, 2017, Dr. Roswick filed this Title VII retaliation case against his former employer, MDC. Dr. Roswick alleged he was suspended by MDC's Board of Directors ("Board") and subsequently terminated by MDC's physician shareholders in retaliation for opposing MDC's "racially discriminatory actions" allegedly taken against Dr. Jayaram Bharadwaj ("Dr. Bharadwaj"), an Indian-American physician. Compl. [Docket No. 1] ¶¶ 23, 34. Dr. Roswick's suspension and termination was prompted by a January 21, 2015 email he sent to 26 shareholder physicians at MDC. In the email, Dr. Roswick expressed concern that the Board did not follow MDC's bylaws when it suspended Dr. Bharadwaj and stated that "[n]o suspension has ever been handled this way with a white American born doctor." Trial Ex. P-278 [Docket No. 250, Attach. 3]. In addition to the Title VII retaliation claim, Dr. Roswick asserted a claim against MDC and its Board members for breach of fiduciary duty under North Dakota law. Compl. ¶¶ 37-41.

MDC denied the allegations in the Complaint and argued Dr. Roswick was suspended and terminated for filing a false complaint of discrimination, not for engaging in protected conduct. MDC contended Dr. Roswick's false allegation was the proverbial last straw in a history of disruptive behavior by Dr. Roswick after his removal as president of the Board in 2012.

On February 13, 2019, the Court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment on the breach of fiduciary duty claim, and denied MDC's motion for summary judgment on the Title VII claim. See Summ. J. Order [Docket No. 117]. Regarding the Title VII claim, the Court held that whether MDC discharged Dr. Roswick because he engaged in protected conduct, as Dr. Roswick argued, or because MDC believed in good faith that Dr. Roswick made a knowingly false allegation of discrimination, as MDC argued, raised a genuine issue of fact. The Courtexplained:

As the Eighth Circuit has repeatedly recognized, an employer cannot legitimately fire every "employee who files a Title VII claim and is disbelieved," yet on the other hand a plaintiff cannot "file false charges, lie to an investigator, and possibly defame co-employees, without suffering repercussions simply because the investigation was about [discrimination]." Richey, 540 F.3d at 784 (quoting Gilooly v. Missouri Dep't of Health & Senior Servs., 421 F.3d 734, 740 (8th Cir. 2005)). "Differentiating individual cases between the two extremes . . . is a difficult endeavor at the summary judgment stage." Id. (quoting Gilooly, 421 F.3d at 740). The evidence here raises a genuine issue of fact for a jury as to where in the spectrum this case falls.

Id. at 18.

Dr. Roswick's retaliation claim was tried to a jury beginning August 5, 2019. The trial spanned five days, and concluded with a verdict on August 9, 2019. The twelve person jury considered the testimony of 23 witnesses and 31 exhibits. During trial, MDC moved for a directed verdict at the close of Dr. Roswick's case, and Dr. Roswick moved for judgment as a matter of law after the close of MDC's case. The Court denied both motions. Over Dr. Roswick's objection, the issue of punitive damages was not submitted to the jury because the Court determined that the record lacked sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that the standard for awarding punitive damages had been met. The jury verdict found in favor of Dr. Roswick, and awarded $1,211,851.00 in lost wages and benefits through the date of trial. Verdict [Docket No. 222].

MDC now renews its motion for judgment as a matter of law. Alternatively, MDC moves for a new trial or remittitur. Dr. Roswick moves for attorney's fees and costs, front pay, pre- and post-judgment interest, and a partial new trial on the issue of punitive damages.

III. DISCUSSION

A. MDC's Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

MDC renews its motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 50 authorizes the court to allow judgment on the verdict, order a new trial, or direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b)(1-3). The standard of review for granting a Rule 50(b) motion is whether sufficient evidence exists to support the jury verdict. "Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate only when all of the evidence points one way and is susceptible of no reasonable inference sustaining the position of the nonmoving party." Allstate Indem. Co. v. Dixon, 932 F.3d 696, 702 (8th Cir. 2019). In deciding a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the court must:

(1) consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, (2) assume that all conflicts in the evidence were resolved in favor of the prevailing party, (3) assume as proved all facts that the prevailing party's evidence tended to prove, and (4) give the prevailing party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the facts proved. That done, the court must then deny the motion if reasonable persons could differ as to the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence.

Washington v. Denney, 900 F.3d 549, 558-59 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Haynes v. Bee-Line Trucking Co., 80 F.3d 1235, 1238 (8th Cir. 1996)).

To prevail on his Title VII retaliation claim at trial, Dr. Roswick was required to show (1) he engaged in protected conduct; (2) he suffered a materially adverse employment action; and (3) the materially adverse action was causally connected to Dr. Roswick's protected conduct. Wright v. St. Vincent Health Sys., 730 F.3d 732, 737 (8th Cir. 2013).

MDC argues that the evidence at trial failed to demonstrate that Dr. Roswick engaged in protected conduct or that the protected conduct was the cause of Dr. Roswick's suspension andtermination.

1. Protected Conduct

An employee engages in protected conduct under Title VII if the employee opposes an employment practice and acts with a good faith, objectively reasonable belief that the opposed practices are unlawful. Bonn v. City of Omaha, 623 F.3d 587, 591 (8th Cir. 2010).

MDC argues Dr. Roswick admitted he did not engage in protected conduct because he believed only that the Board's actions toward Dr. Bharadwaj could be interpreted as discriminatory, not that the Board's actions actually were discriminatory. However, Dr. Roswick testified that he sent the January 2015 email for both reasons: he believed discrimination was occurring, and he also wanted to protect the clinic from liability because the Board's actions could be perceived as discriminatory.¹ Additionally, the jury could have reasonably found Dr. Roswick was asserting and opposing discrimination in his January 15, 2015 email, because the Board itself stated in a letter to Dr. Roswick that the Board "determined . . . [Dr. Roswick] actually was asserting discrimination and racism." Trial Ex. P-327 [Docket No. 250, Attach. 8].

MDC also argues the evidence shows Dr. Roswick did not engage in protected conduct because he did not have a good faith, objectively reasonable belief that MDC discriminated against Dr. Bharadwaj. To support this argument, MDC relies on the following evidence: Dr. Roswick declined to meet with MDC's legal counsel to inform her of the facts supporting his discrimination claim; Dr. Roswick sent MDC a letter stating that he was merely suggesting theBoard's actions in suspending Dr. Bharadwaj could be interpreted as discriminatory; Dr. Roswick admitted that physicians frequently have an alternative version of events after being disciplined than what actually occurred and that he was not privy to the circumstances surrounding Dr. Bharadwaj's suspension beyond what he had been told by Dr. Bharadwaj; and Dr. Roswick referred to the widespread dissemination of his January 15 email as an "OOOOpsie," which MDC argues is not consistent with the actions of an individual submitting a complaint of race discrimination in good faith. MDC contends this evidence shows Dr. Roswick did not and could not have submitted a good faith complaint of discrimination, as he did not have a reasonable basis of information to make such a claim.

Each of these arguments was presented to and rejected by the jury. The evidence, when construed in the light most favorable to Dr. Roswick, was sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that Dr. Roswick's complaint was reasonable and made in good faith. Although Dr. Roswick admitted he was not privy to the reasons for Dr. Bharadwaj's suspension, Dr. Roswick testified that he believed MDC was discriminating against Dr. Bharadwaj by failing to provide him the same due process that MDC previously afforded its physician shareholders. Dr. Roswick further testified that he thought the information told to him by...