O'Rourke v. Comm'r Vehicles

156 Conn.App. 516

113 A.3d 88

Timothy O'ROURKE

v.COMMISSIONER OF MOTOR VEHICLES.

No. 36714.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Jan. 8, 2015.

Decided April 14, 2015.

Jeremiah Donovan, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Eileen M. Meskill, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were George Jepsen, attorney general, and Raul Antonio Rodriguez, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (defendant).

SHELDON, KELLER and LAVERY, Js.

Opinion

KELLER, J.

The plaintiff, Timothy O'Rourke, appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing his appeal from the decision of the defendant, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles (commissioner), ordering the six month suspension of his license to operate a motor vehicle pursuant to General Statutes § 14–227b for his refusal to submit to a chemical alcohol test. First, he claims that the determination of the hearing officer, that he refused to submit to a chemical alcohol test, was not supported by substantial evidence. Second, he claims that, even if the evidence adequately supported the hearing officer's determination that he had refused to submit to a chemical alcohol test, this court should recognize as a matter of law that he subsequently had rescinded his refusal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reflects that, following the plaintiff's arrest for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol on April 20, 2013, Trooper Martin Lane of the state police prepared an incident report in which he stated that, following the plaintiff's arrest, he refused to submit to a chemical alcohol test. After this report was forwarded to the commissioner, the commissioner duly notified the plaintiff that his license was to be suspended for a period of six months. The plaintiff availed himself of his statutory right to contest the suspension at an administrative hearing before the commissioner. On May 31, 2013, the plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared before a hearing officer designated by the commissioner to determine whether he was subject to a penalty in accordance with § 14–227b¹ for failing to submit to a chemical alcohol test following his arrest on April 20, 2013.

On June 3, 2013, the hearing officer issued a decision in which she found: (1) that the police officer involved in the plaintiff's arrest had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff for violating § 14–227b ; (2) that the plaintiff had been placed under arrest; (3) that the plaintiff refused to submit to a chemical alcohol test; and (4) that the plaintiff was the operator of the motor vehicle at issue.

In addition to setting forth these four findings of fact mandated by § 14–227b (g), the hearing officer made an additional subordinate finding, namely, that “[t]he [plaintiff] was provided a reasonable amount of time to take the [chemical alcohol test] and any acceptance cannot have any conditions on it. In addition, although the [plaintiff] eventually agreed to take a test, there was not [a] reasonable amount of time left to administer it.” The hearing officer ordered that the plaintiff's operator's license be suspended for a period of six months. The commissioner denied the plaintiff's petition for reconsideration of the hearing officer's decision.

The plaintiff appealed the commissioner's decision suspending his operator's license to the Superior Court. See General Statutes § 4–183. On March 21, 2014, the court held a hearing, following which it rendered an oral decision in which it dismissed the appeal.² In its decision, the court stated, initially, that the subordinate finding of fact made by the hearing officer, namely, that there was not enough time left to administer a chemical alcohol test when the plaintiff agreed to submit to such test, was not supported by substantial evidence in the record. The court went on to conclude, however, that the facts apparent in the record demonstrated that, following the plaintiff's arrest, the police had afforded the plaintiff more than a reasonable amount of time in which to decide whether to submit to a chemical alcohol test and that he did not so submit. Specifically, the court observed that Lane first asked the plaintiff to submit to a test at 8:11 p.m., and that, twenty-five minutes later, the plaintiff still had not stated a decision in this regard, even though Lane had advised the plaintiff that his indecision would be deemed a refusal. The court stated that the law required the police to have afforded the plaintiff a reasonable amount of time in which to submit to a test unconditionally. Applying the facts to this legal standard, the court concluded that the record revealed a substantial basis on which to uphold the commissioner's decision, and dismissed the appeal.³ This appeal followed.

Before discussing the merits of the appeal, we set forth our familiar standard of review in administrative appeals. “We review the issues raised by the plaintiff in accordance with the limited scope of judicial review afforded by the [Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), General Statutes § 4–166 et seq. ].... Judicial review of an administrative agency decision requires a court to determine whether there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the agency's findings of basic fact and whether the conclusions drawn from those facts are reasonable.... Our ultimate duty is to determine, in view of all of the evidence, whether the agency, in issuing its order, acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion....

“An administrative finding is supported by substantial evidence if the record affords a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred.... The substantial evidence rule imposes an important limitation on the power of the courts to overturn a decision of an administrative agency ... and ... provide[s] a more restrictive standard of review than standards embodying review of weight of the evidence or clearly erroneous action.... [I]t is something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding from being supported by substantial evidence....

“[A]s to questions of law, [t]he court's ultimate duty is only to decide whether, in light of the evidence, the [agency] has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally, or in abuse of its discretion.... Conclusions of law reached by the administrative agency must stand if the court determines that they resulted from a correct application of the law to the facts found and could reasonably and logically follow from such facts.” (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Spitz v. Board of Examiners of Psychologists, 127 Conn.App. 108, 114–16, 12 A.3d 1080 (2011) ; see also Winsor v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 101 Conn.App. 674, 679–80, 922 A.2d 330 (2007).

The scope of license suspension hearings following an operator's refusal to submit to chemical alcohol testing is governed by § 14–227b, commonly referred to as the implied consent statute. Such hearings are limited to a consideration of the four issues set forth in § 14–227b (g). See, e.g., Volck v. Muzio, 204 Conn. 507, 512, 529 A.2d 177 (1987) ; Buckley v. Muzio, 200 Conn. 1, 7, 509 A.2d 489 (1986) ; Santiago v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 134 Conn.App. 668, 674, 39 A.3d 1224 (2012). That enactment provides in relevant part: “The hearing shall be limited to a determination of the following issues: (1) Did the police officer have probable cause to arrest the person for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both; (2) was such person placed under arrest; (3) did such person refuse to submit to such test or analysis or did such person submit to such test or analysis, commenced within two hours of the time of operation, and the results of such test or analysis indicated that such person had an elevated blood alcohol content; and (4) was such person operating the motor vehicle.”General Statutes § 14–227b (g).

The plaintiff raises two distinct claims. We will address each claim in turn.

I

First, the plaintiff challenges the third required finding made by the hearing officer pursuant to § 14–227b (g), claiming that the determination of the hearing officer that he refused to submit to a chemical alcohol test was not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree.

Consistent with the standard of review set forth previously in this opinion, we observe that “[w]hether the plaintiff's actions constituted a refusal to submit to [a chemical alcohol] test presents a question of fact ... and, therefore, our review is limited to determining whether the hearing officer's finding was supported by substantial evidence.” (Citations omitted.) Altschul v. Salinas, 53 Conn.App. 391, 397, 730 A.2d 1171, cert. denied, 249 Conn. 931, 761 A.2d 751 (1999).

Before reviewing the evidence before the hearing officer, we first consider relevant appellate precedent concerning the issue of what constitutes a refusal to submit to a chemical alcohol test for purposes of § 14–227b. This court, rejecting a vagueness challenge to an earlier revision of General Statutes § 14–227a (e),⁴ had occasion to interpret what it means to refuse to submit to a chemical alcohol test, and that interpretation is relevant to our understanding of § 14–227b : “The legislature did not provide a definition for refused.... It is not necessary to define a word that carries an ordinary, commonly understood meaning, is commonly used and is defined in standard dictionaries.... The word refuse is defined as to show or express unwillingness to do or comply with....

“We construe the word refuse to have a sufficiently definite meaning that places an individual on adequate notice as to what conduct is prohibited.... Consequently, the dictionary definition makes it clear that ‘refusing’ to take a [chemical alcohol] test may be...