Rouse v. Fader

1

LATASHA ROUSE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MATTHEW FADER, et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. JKB-22-0129

United States District Court, D. Maryland

November 26, 2024

MEMORANDUM

James K. Bredar, United States District Judge

Now before the Court are Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (“Motion for Leave to Amend”), (ECF No. 72), and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 73). The motions are fully briefed, and no hearing is required. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2023).

For the reasons below, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted and Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave to Amend will be denied. A separate order will issue to effectuate this decision.

I. BACKGROUND

From its inception, this case has focused largely on allegations that Defendants, a rotating cast of Maryland state officials failed adequately to protect the interests of Plaintiffs-three married couples, each with one spouse who at all relevant times, was on active-duty military service-by allowing judicial process to run against them, contrary to various legal safeguards for active-duty servicemembers. Among these safeguards is the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (“SCRA”), which “provide[s] for the temporary suspension of judicial and administrative proceedings and transactions that may adversely affect the civil rights of servicemembers during their military service.” 50 U.S.C. § 3902(2); see generally id. §§ 3901-4043. After nearly three years of litigation in this Court, Plaintiffs' case is substantially narrowed, such that the SCRA is the only remaining source of rights Plaintiffs allege to have been violated.

The prelitigation facts and early procedural history are set out at length in the Court's Memorandum dated March 20, 2024. See (ECF No. 58 at 3-8), reproduced as Rouse v. Moore, Civ. No. JKB-22-0129, 2024 WL 1216475, at *2-4 (D. Md. Mar. 20, 2024). An abridged version follows below, along with a brief account of the most recent developments in this litigation.

A. Prelitigation Facts

Plaintiffs are three married couples: Latasha and Exabia Rouse, Daniel and Jessica Riley, and Oscar and Sherryl Davines. (ECF No. 58 at 1, 3.) At separate times, each couple entered a “purported contract for consumer goods” with one George LeMay. See (id. at 3 (citation omitted)). LeMay later sued in various state courts to enforce these agreements, winning money judgments on each. See (id. at 3-4). There was serious reason to doubt the judgments' validity. See (id.). Nevertheless, between June 2020 and June 2021, LeMay registered all three judgments in the state courts of Maryland, a State with which Plaintiffs had no prior connection. See (id. at 3-4).

After registering the foreign judgments, LeMay repeatedly petitioned the Maryland courts for writs of garnishment against the three couples. (ECF No. 58 at 4.) Most of these petitions succeeded. See (id. at 4-5). The initial garnishment proceedings were ex parte, with the couples unaware of what was happening until after the first writs had issued. (Id. at 4-5.) LeMay did not file, and the presiding courts did not require, affidavits addressing whether the couples included any active-duty servicemembers. (Id. at 5.) Nor did the courts appoint counsel for the couples, leaving them instead to obtain counsel at their own expense-again, only after they learned of the proceedings. (Id.) As alleged, these acts violated the SCRA. See (id. at 8-10, 15, 20, 34).

Each couple faced significant collections activity as a result. Before July 19, 2021, when the Garrett County district court vacated the foreign judgment against the Rouses, the couple was “subjected to at least 28 days of improper collection conduct,” including the freezing of their accounts. (ECF No. 58 at 5 (citation omitted).) For over a year until October 2021, when the Anne Arundel County district court dismissed LeMay's case against the Rileys, LeMay won four writs of garnishment and two subpoenas, causing certain of the Rileys' accounts to be frozen as well. (Id.) And before January 31, 2023, when that same court vacated the foreign judgment against the Davineses, LeMay won at least two of the five writs he sought. (Id.)

B. Procedural History

Plaintiffs commenced this action on January 18, 2022. (ECF No. 1.) They named LeMay as the primary defendant, alleging violations of the SCRA and various state consumer protection laws. (ECF No. 58 at 5-6.) In January 2023, Plaintiffs settled with LeMay, e.g., (ECF No. 37 at 1), shortly after which the Court dismissed LeMay from the case with prejudice, (ECF No. 41).

In their initial complaint, Plaintiffs also named, in his official capacity, then-Maryland Governor Lawrence Hogan. See (ECF No. 1). They alleged violations of the SCRA, the Supremacy Clause, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See (id. at ¶¶ 181- 202). In late January 2023, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Hogan was replaced by current Governor Wes Moore. (ECF No. 58 at 6 n.4 (citing ECF No. 36).)

In March 2023, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint. See (ECF No. 42). They continued to name Moore as a defendant in his official capacity. (Id.) Additionally, they named the justices of the Supreme Court of Maryland, also in their official capacities: Chief Justice Matthew Fader and Justices Steven Gould, Brynja Booth, Shirley Watts, Michele Hotten, Jonathan Biran, and Angela Eaves (collectively, “Justices”). (Id.) Against each of these governmental defendants, Plaintiffs reasserted their prior allegations regarding the SCRA, the Supremacy Clause, and the Due Process Clause. See (ECF No. 42 at ¶¶ 162-87); see also (ECF No. 58 at 6 & n.5).

In early April 2023, Defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint. See (ECF No. 46). Plaintiffs then opposed Defendants' motion and sought partial summary judgment on certain questions of law. See (ECF No. 49 at 1, 17-18).

The Court addressed both motions in a Memorandum and Order dated March 20, 2024. See (ECF Nos. 58-59). The Court concluded Plaintiffs satisfactorily alleged their SCRA rights were violated when the Maryland courts issued writs of garnishment and subpoenas without following the procedures of 50 U.S.C. § 3931. See (ECF No. 58 at 20, 36-37). But the Court also dismissed Plaintiffs' claims to the extent they (1) were brought against Mary land Governor Wes Moore; (2) sought injunctive or declaratory relief; (3) sought to expunge state judicial records; (4) alleged violations of the Supremacy or Due Process Clauses by the state Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. §§ 11 -801 to -807; or (5) were brought against the Justices based on decisions made in their legislative capacities as drafters of the Maryland Court Rules. See (ECF No. 58 at 36-37; ECF No. 59 at 1).

What remained was a single official-capacity claim against the Justices, brought under the SCRA, seeking actual damages based on the Justices' alleged violations of the same-but only to the extent those violations were caused by acts outside the Justices' legislative (and judicial) roles. See (ECF No. 58 at 31-37). The Court directed the parties to determine whether Plaintiffs' much-narrowed case would require additional discovery or invite further dispositive motions. See (id. at 37; ECF No. 59 at 1-2). Based on their responses, see (ECF No. 62), the Court set a handful of additional deadlines: one for Plaintiffs to seek leave to amend their complaint a second time, and three more for briefing on an expected dispositive motion by Defendants. See (ECF Nos. 63-64, 71). From these came the two motions before the Court today. See (ECF Nos. 72-73).

Notwithstanding Plaintiffs' pending request to amend a second time, see (ECF No. 72), the Amended Complaint remains the operative pleading. And apart from the substitution of Justice Peter K. Killough for Justice Michele Hotten, see (ECF No. 76), the parties to this matter remain the same as when the Court addressed the last dispositive motions. See (ECF No. 58).

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion for Summary Judgment

To earn summary judgment, the moving party must articulate a legally valid claim for relief and show “no genuine dispute as to any material fact” in support of that claim. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The nonmoving party must then respond by “setting] forth specific facts showing that there [remains] a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); see also Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 525 (4th Cir. 2003). At each stage, the Court views the facts and draws reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). If the Court determines that a reasonable jury could find in that party's favor, summary judgment will be denied. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. But the nonmoving party cannot rest on mere denials. It must set out its own specific facts showing a genuine dispute. Bouchat, 346 F.3d at 525 (citation omitted). This requires more than a “scintilla of evidence.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

B. Motion for Leave to Amend

At this juncture, Plaintiffs “may amend [their] pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2).^[1] Even where, as here, the opposing party does not consent, see generally (ECF No. 73 at 23-27), the Court must still “freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). This is a relatively generous standard:

If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits. In the absence of any apparent or declared reason-such as undue delay,

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