Rovin v. State

488 Md. 144

321 A.3d 201

Valerie ROVIN

v.STATE of Maryland

No. 19, Sept. Term, 2023

Supreme Court of Maryland.

August 15, 2024

Circuit Court for Wicomico County, Case No.: C-22-CV-17-000326, Mary M. Kramer, Judge

Argued by Peter C. Hershey (Jeffrey F. Hershey of Rich & Henderson, P.C., Annapolis, MD), on brief for Petitioner.

Argued by Kirstin Lustila, Assistant Attorney General (Anthony G. Brown, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, Annapolis, MD), on brief for Respondent.

Argued before: Fader, C.J.; Watts, ^*Hotten, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, JJ.

Booth, J.

This is the second appearance of this case before this Court. In this instance, we are asked to determine whether the State may be subject to civil liability for an arrest under circumstances in which, after interviewing a victim, a deputy obtained legal advice from the State’s Attorney’s Office that there was probable cause to believe that an individual had committed a statutory criminal offense, a judicial officer found probable cause to issue a warrant, and thereafter a trial judge acquitted the individual of the charge based upon the trial judge’s interpretation of the statute in question.

The issues presented in this case arise in the context of Petitioner, Valerie Rovin’s, arrest and prosecution for violating the juror intimidation statute, Md. Code Ann., Criminal Law Article ("CR") § 9-305 (2021 Repl. Vol.). Ms. Rovin, upset by a jury’s verdict rendered against her daughter in a criminal trial, went to the jury foreperson’s workplace on the same day to confront him about the verdict. According to the foreperson, Ms. Rovin yelled at him, acted in an aggressive and threatening manner, and told him, among other things, that she was going to have an individual from Nicaragua "take care of him." The foreperson immediately reported this exchange to the Sheriff’s Office. The deputy sheriff who investigated the matter consulted with prosecutors in the State’s Attorney’s Office, who advised the deputy that Ms. Rovin’s conduct violated the juror intimidation statute. Thereafter, the deputy applied for a statement of charges. A District Court Commissioner determined that there was probable cause to issue a warrant for Ms. Rovin’s arrest.

At the close of the State’s case at Ms. Rovin’s bench trial, her counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that her conduct did not constitute juror intimidation under the statute because Ms. Rovin’s daughter’s criminal trial had concluded, and thus the foreperson was no longer serving on a jury and his service had concluded. The State disagreed with Ms. Rovin’s narrow interpretation of the statute and argued that the foreperson’s jury service was for the period of his summons, and that as a result of Ms. Rovin’s actions, the foreperson was dismissed from his jury service early. The circuit court determined that although Ms. Rovin’s actions were "very improper" and may have been evidence of juror "retaliation," her actions did not fit within the conduct prohibited by the juror intimidation statute, and it therefore entered a judgment of acquittal.

Ms. Rovin then filed a civil suit against, among others, the State’s Attorney and Assistant State’s Attorney who advised the deputy and subsequently prosecuted her, and the deputy who applied for the charges and sought a warrant for her arrest. She asserted that the defendants, through their conduct in causing her arrest and prosecution, committed common law torts and violated her rights under various articles of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. After the circuit court entered judgment in favor of the defendants and the matter was appealed to the Appellate Court of Maryland, this Court granted certiorari to determine, among other things, whether absolute immunity barred the claims.

With respect to the claims against the prosecutors, we held that the circuit court was correct in entering summary judgment in their favor because they were entitled to absolute immunity. State v. Rovin, 472 Md. 317, 246 A.3d 1190 (2021). We determined that the immunity extended not only to the prosecutors’ decision to prosecute, but also to their conduct in advising the deputy prior to the filing of the application for statement of charges. Id. at 355–56, 246 A.3d 1190. Although we held that the State could not be civilly liable for the actions of the prosecutors (and after declining to extend prosecutorial immunity to the deputy’s conduct), for the reasons discussed more fully herein, we declined to decide whether the State could be civilly liable for the deputy’s conduct in applying for charges and obtaining an arrest warrant under these circumstances. We remanded the case to the circuit court. On remand, the circuit court entered summary judgment in the State’s favor, ruling that "neither the [deputy nor the sheriff] can be civilly liable for [Ms. Rovin’s] arrest pursuant to a warrant based upon a judicial officer’s determination that probable cause existed for said arrest even though that determination was later held by a trial court to be based upon an error of law. After the Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed the judgment in the State’s favor, Ms. Rovin filed a petition for writ of certiorari. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

I Background

A. The Criminal Case Against Ms. Rovin’s Daughter

The proceedings in this case arose after Ms. Rovin’s daughter was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol and related traffic offenses in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County in June 2015.¹ Ms. Rovin’s daughter received a sentence that included jail time. Ms. Rovin attended a portion of her daughter’s trial. On the same day the jury convicted Ms. Rovin’s daughter, Ms. Rovin located the jury foreperson at his workplace and confronted him about the verdict.

According to Ms. Rovin’s complaint, she had met the foreperson approximately one year prior to the trial. They discussed the fact that they had the same last name, as well as the possibility that they shared a common relative, Bill Rovin, who had moved to Nicaragua. Ms. Rovin indicated, however, that to her knowledge, she and the foreperson were not related. The complaint also alleges that the foreperson and one of Ms. Rovin’s daughters were Facebook friends.²

After Ms. Rovin left the foreperson’s workplace, he reported the incident to the Wicomico County Sheriff’s Office. Deputy Sheriff Matthew Cook responded to the call. Ms. Rovin disputes what was said during her conversation with the foreperson. She does not, however, appear to dispute what the foreperson told the deputy. The foreperson reported that Ms. Rovin behaved erratically and aggressively, caused a commotion, and appeared to be outraged by the foreperson’s decision to convict Ms. Rovin’s daughter. The foreperson told Deputy Cook that Ms. Rovin invaded his personal space to the point that he felt very "uncomfortable and threatened." The fore- person also stated that Ms. Rovin told him that she would have "Bill Rovin" "take care of him[.]" The foreperson did not know Bill Rovin, and when he asked who Bill Rovin was, Ms. Rovin told him that Bill Rovin worked in Nicaragua and had people who could "take care of" him. The foreperson interpreted this as a threat and alerted the police.

B. The Criminal Case Against Ms. Rovin

Officers of the Wicomico County Sheriff’s Office consulted with the Wicomico County State’s Attorney’s Office and were advised that Ms. Rovin’s conduct constituted juror intimidation under CR § 9-305 and that she should be charged accordingly. Under that statute, "[a] person may not, by threat, force, or corrupt means, try to influence, intimidate, or impede a juror, a witness, or an officer of a court of the State or of the United States in the performance of the person’s official duties." CR § 9-305(a).

Around the same time, the foreperson applied for a peace order against Ms. Rovin and gave sworn testimony in the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Wicomico County. He stated that he was a member of a jury that convicted Ms. Rovin’s daughter and that Ms. Rovin came to his workplace and threatened to harm to him. Specifically, he testified that Ms. Rovin threatened that she would have "somebody come in from out of town" to harm him and that "she told [him] she was going to contact somebody who was going to send people ... to take care of [him] … people from Nicaragua where Bill Rovin lives." The judge explained to the foreperson that he was unable to obtain a peace order because the statutory requirements were not satisfied.³ The foreperson testified that the State’s Attorney’s Office had advised him to apply for the peace order. The judge informed the foreperson that "there’s a statute, it’s a criminal offense to intimidate a juror[,]" and "if [Ms. Rovin] has done what you say she has done, that may very well be a criminal offense."

After that hearing, Deputy Cook applied for a statement of charges against Ms. Rovin. Among other things, the application recited the information provided by the foreperson. It also stated that the Wicomico County Sheriff’s Office had consulted with the State’s Attorney’s Office, and that office "believed" that this was a case of juror intimidation under CR § 9-305(a) "and should be charged accordingly." The application further stated that the foreperson "was assigned as a [j]uror for the [Circuit Court for] Wicomico County for the month of June 2015 and had to be discharged from further duty as a result of this incident."

A District Court Commissioner agreed that there was probable cause that Ms. Rovin violated CR § 9-305 and, consequently, issued a warrant for her arrest. Ms. Rovin was arrested on June 18, 2015. She was held for one day, after which she was placed under house arrest. In July 2015, the State’s Attorney’s Office filed a criminal information charging Ms. Rovin with intimidating a juror in violation of CR § 9-305(a) and second-degree assault. Thereafter, Ms. Rovin remained on...