Rovira Rivera v. Puerto Rico Elec. Power Authority

364 F.Supp.2d 154

Juan ROVIRA RIVERA, et al., Plaintiff v. PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC POWER AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants.

No. CIV. 03-1519JP.

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

April 5, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

John Nevares, Esq., John F. Nevares & Assoc. PSC, San Juan, for Plaintiff.

Fracisco J. Ortiz-García, Esq., Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority, María Judith Surillo, Esq., Department of Justice, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, San Juan, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

PIERAS, Senior District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is Defendant Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority, Héctor Rosario, Wilfredo Pantojas and Abraham Rodríguez-Guisao's Motion for Summary Judgment (docket No. 93) and Plaintiff Juan Rovira Rivera and María Zayas Martínez' opposition thereto (docket No. 100).

Plaintiff Rovira brings this claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, pursuant to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, alleging that Defendants discriminated against him based on his political affiliation when, as a result of the change in administration in 2000, Defendant Pantojas Reyes initiated a pattern of conduct of closely supervising Plaintiff Rovira. As part thereof, Plaintiff alleges Defendants prohibited him from visiting the Ground Transportation offices and workshops around the Island, severely limiting Plaintiff's ability to properly supervise the offices and workshops he was directly responsible for overseeing, and depriving him of his duties and responsibilities as chief of the division when he was effectively "by-passed" and his duties were assigned to his subordinate, co-Defendant Rodríguez-Guisao. Plaintiff, a member of the New Progressive Party ("NPP"), has been a career employee of the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (hereinafter "PREPA"), working in several capacities for nearly twelve (12) years, and was appointed as interim head of the Ground Transportation Division in 1997, an appointment which became permanent in 2000.

Defendants now move for summary judgment on three grounds: 1) that Plaintiff's position was a trust position; 2) that Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of political discrimination or political harassment, and 3) that they are protected by the qualified immunity doctrine. According to Defendants, Plaintiff's position, while classified as a career position, carries with it all the duties and responsibilities of a trust position, and therefore, they argue, the position duties permitted Defendants to change Plaintiff's functions at will and validly on the basis of political affiliation.

The Court clarifies that Defendants raise summary judgment arguments only against the allegations of co-Plaintiff Juan Rovira Rivera, not against the allegations of co-Plaintiff María Zayas Martínez. As a matter of fact, Defendants in their motion specifically stated that they were requesting summary judgment only against Plaintiff Rovira, not against Plaintiff Zayas. Therefore, the Court shall only consider the arguments relating to co-Plaintiff Rovira in this Opinion. For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby DENIES Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on all grounds.

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

At the outset, the Court must emphasize that its findings of fact only pertain to the limited question of the type of position which Plaintiff occupied. The initial question to be determined in this instance is whether Plaintiff occupied a trust position, which permitted his functions to be changed at the whim of the executive under which he served and which carried with it permissible political actions, or whether he occupied a career position, which did not allow for a change of functions or demotion absent just cause. Regarding Defendants' remaining claims of harassment, the Court finds that there are genuine issues of material fact which preclude it from deciding this case on the basis of summary judgment, and therefore, the Court will not delve into facts regarding the remaining issues.

After thoroughly evaluating the facts presented by the parties and the record as a whole, the Court makes the following findings of fact:

1. Plaintiff Rovira was named temporarily to the position of Head of the Ground Transportation Division on or about March 1997 and permanently in the year 2000.

2. This division provides to all the divisions of PREPA the services of conservation and repair of the ground transportation fleet, technical counseling in purchasing matters, replacement and operation of motor vehicles.

3. The division recommends and implements rules and guidelines regarding the operation of the transportation fleet and watches its implementation with the other divisions.

4. It also develops practices and procedures for the conservation and security of the ground transportation fleet.

5. It also prepares specifications, estimates and requisitions for the purchase of the vehicles; it studies, evaluates and recommends the adjudications of the bids.

6. As head of this Division, Plaintiff Rovira "Directs, coordinates, and supervises all activities related to the Authority's land transportation fleet."

7. The land transportation fleet consists of over 3,000 vehicles, including pick-ups, platform trucks, cargo vans, barren-making vehicles, etc.

8. The fleet has a total cost of over $129,000,000.00.

9. The Head of the Ground Transportation Division participates in bid evaluations for the purchase of motor vehicles, equipment, parts, and accessories.

10. He develops and approves specifications for the purchase of specialized automotive equipment that can improve the services offered by the Agency.

11. He coordinates land transportation services with the Agency's and government agency officials, and private citizens.

12. He provides advice to the Agency officers on matters related to the operation, organization, and maintenance of the land transportation fleet.

13. He prepares, in coordination with his or her subordinates, short and long-term plans that comply with the service, general operation, and expense budget requirements.

14. He also formulates and recommends the establishment of policies and procedures of general application at PREPA.

15. He prepares and submits to the Director of Administration reports regarding economic results and other important aspects of the operations.

16. Plaintiff directs and administers the System of Quality and Loss Control in the division and establishes guidelines and internal policies to make sure that this system is followed.

17. Plaintiff Rovira has not been dismissed as head of the Ground Transportation Division.

18. Plaintiff Rovira's main salary has not been reduced.

19. Plaintiff Rovira has not been transferred.

20. Plaintiff Rovira has not been discharged.

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the entry of summary judgment where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Pagano v. Frank, 983 F.2d 343, 347 (1st Cir.1993); Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 894 (1st Cir.1988). Summary judgment is appropriate where, after drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is material if, based on the substantive law at issue, it might affect the outcome of the case. Id. at 248; Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir.1989). A material issue is "genuine" if there is sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable trier of fact to resolve the issue in the non-moving party's favor. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Boston Athletic Ass'n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 24 (1st Cir.1989).

The party filing a motion for summary judgment bears the initial burden of proof to show "that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The burden then shifts to the non-movant to show that "sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute [exists] to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of truth at trial." See First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 1592-93, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968). The party opposing summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but must affirmatively show, through filing of supporting affidavits or otherwise, that there is a genuine issue for trial. See id.; see also Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 985 F.2d 1113, 1116 (1st Cir.1993). On issues where the non-movant bears the ultimate burden of proof, he must present definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 246-47, 106 S.Ct. at 2514-15.

IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Career v. Trust Position

It has been established that trust employees do not have a cause of action for political discrimination or a property interest in employment. Defendants allege that political affiliation is a proper requirement for Plaintiff's position as head of the Ground Transportation Division because although it carries the title of a career position, it is considered a policymaking or trust position. According to Defendants, the position entails access to confidential information and involves formulating public policy. The current job description of the position includes, among other things: "Directs, coordinates, and supervises all activities related to the Authority's land transportation fleet; provides advice to the agency officers on matters related to the operation, organization, and maintenance of the land...