Roy v. Bachmann

121 Conn.App. 220

994 A.2d 676

Anne Marie ROYv.Andrew G. BACHMANN et al.

No. 30522.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 23, 2009.

Decided May 18, 2010.

Anthony V. Federice, for the appellants (named plaintiff et al.).

Christopher L. Goings, with whom, on the brief, was Collin Seguin, certified legal intern, for the appellees (defendants).

BISHOP, HARPER and WEST, Js.

BISHOP, J.

In this appeal, we must determine whether the exclusivity rule of the Workers' Compensation Act ¹ (act); General Statutes § 31-275 et seq.; shields the owners of a parking lot that they leased to a corporation, in which they were majority stockholders and officers, from liability for damages arising from injuries sustained by an employee of the corporation during the course of her employment. The plaintiffs ² Anne Marie Roy and Steven Roy appeal from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of the defendants, Andrew G. Bachmann and Jane B. Bachmann.³ The plaintiffs contend that the court improperly determined that the defendants were Anne Marie Roy's employer and that, accordingly, their action was barred by the exclusivity provision of the act. Although the court accurately concluded that Connecticut has rejected the dual capacity doctrine as an exception to the exclusivity rule, it should not have been a factor in the court's reasoning because the record unequivocally reveals that Anne Marie Roy's employer was the Dymax Corporation (Dymax) at the time of her injury. We conclude that, because the defendants were not covered by the exclusivity provision of the act as Anne Marie Roy's employer, summary judgment should not have been granted. Accordingly we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural history. On September 12, 2005, Anne Marie Roy was employed by Dymax. On that date, she sustained injuries, including a fractured hip, when she fell in the parking lot located at 51 Greenwoods Road, Torrington-Dymax' place of business. At the time of the incident that led to her injuries, Anne Marie Roy was in the course of her employment with Dymax. She was paid benefits under our workers' compensation statutory scheme by Dymax. The defendants owned the parcel of land located at 51 Greenwoods Road and leased it to Dymax. The plaintiffs brought this action against the defendants, alleging negligence and loss of consortium. On July 23, 2008, the defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiffs' action was barred by the exclusivity rule of the act. By memorandum of decision filed October 27, 2008, the court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment in their favor. The plaintiffs filed a motion to reargue, which the court denied. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

As a preliminary matter, we set forth the well settled standard of review applicable to a trial court's decision to grant a motion for summary judgment. “Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.... The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and that the party is, therefore, entitled to judgment as a matter of law....”

“[T]he trial court does not sit as the trier of fact when ruling on a motion for summary judgment.... [Its] function is not to decide issues of material fact, but rather to determine whether any such issues exist.... On appeal, we must determine whether the legal conclusions reached by the trial court are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision of the trial court.... Our review of the trial court's decision to grant the defendant's motion for summary judgment is plenary.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Keller v. Beckenstein, 117 Conn.App. 550, 556-58, 979 A.2d 1055, cert. denied, 294 Conn. 913, 983 A.2d 274 (2009).

Connecticut's statutory scheme for workers' compensation provides a framework for an employee who sustains a work-related injury to receive prescribed benefits without having to prove fault. In return, the employee is barred from bringing a third party claim against either a fellow employee or the employer. ⁴ See General Statutes § 31-284 et seq. The trade-off between an employee who sustains a work-related injury and the employer does not prevent such an employee from bringing an action against a third party tortfeasor. Indeed, General Statutes § 31-293 provides that an employer who has paid workers' compensation benefits may intervene in any such action in order to seek recovery of the amounts paid to the employee from any judgment he or she may obtain in the third party action.⁵

In our statutory workers' compensation scheme there are only two exceptions to the act's exclusivity provision. According to the terms of General Statutes § 31-293a, the right to workers' compensation is an employee's exclusive remedy “unless such wrong was wilful or malicious or the action is based on the fellow employee's negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle as defined in section 14-1....” Additionally, our Supreme Court has recognized exceptions for a minor who has been illegally employed; see Blancato v. Feldspar Corp., 203 Conn. 34, 522 A.2d 1235 (1987); and for intentional torts committed by an employer upon an employee. See Jett v. Dunlap, 179 Conn. 215, 425 A.2d 1263 (1979), as further elucidated in Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 229 Conn. 99, 639 A.2d 507 (1994).

Some other states, but not Connecticut, have recognized an additional exception to the exclusivity provisions of their workers' compensation laws to permit a third party action against an employer or fellow employee who causes injury to an employee while the employer or fellow employee is acting in a nonemployment capacity. This exception, known as the dual capacity doctrine, is implicated only when the liability defendant is the employer or a fellow employee, both otherwise immune from tort liability by the exclusivity provisions of workers' compensation statutes. Cases dealing with the dual capacity doctrine make it plain that it only comes into play when an employee brings a third party claim against his or her employer or fellow employee. Noted workers' compensation commentator Arthur Larson has described the dual capacity doctrine as follows: “An employer may become a third person, vulnerable to tort suit by an employee, if-and only if-it possesses a second persona so completely independent from and unrelated to its status as employer that by established standards the law recognizes that persona as a separate legal person.” 6 A. Larson, Workers' Compensation Law (2009) § 113.01[1]. It is central to the cases involving the dual capacity doctrine that the identity of the defendant as the employer or fellow employee is not questioned. The issue in these cases, rather, is whether, in spite of the exclusivity provisions of workers' compensation law, the defendant may yet be liable in some other capacity than that of employer or fellow employee.

In Panaro v. Electrolux Corp., 208 Conn. 589, 593, 545 A.2d 1086 (1988), our Supreme Court expressly rejected the dual capacity doctrine in a case involving both a fellow employee and the employer. Thus, if this were a case in which the defendants were the employer seeking the protection of the exclusivity provision of the act, and the plaintiffs were seeking an exception to that exclusivity provision on the basis of the dual capacity doctrine, the court's rendering of summary judgment would have been appropriate. However, because Anne Marie Roy was employed by Dymax and not the defendants, her claim against the defendants is not one against her employer at all. Thus, the dual capacity doctrine should have played no role in the court's summary disposition.⁶

At the time of her injury, Anne Marie Roy was employed by Dymax, which, as her employer, paid her workers' compensation benefits. These facts were alleged by Anne Marie Roy in her substituted complaint and admitted by the defendants.⁷ Additionally, the record reveals that the employer is Dymax, a Connecticut stock corporation with sixty-one shareholders holding an aggregate of 386,846 shares of outstanding stock. Between them, the defendants own 265,358 shares of stock. Notwithstanding these allegations and admissions, the court found that the defendants were Anne Marie Roy's employer at the time of her injury, and, as such, were entitled to the benefit of the exclusivity provision of the act. In rendering summary judgment, the court appears to have ignored the plaintiffs' allegations and the defendants' corresponding admissions. The court also appears to have incorrectly equated the defendants with Dymax on the basis of their officer status and majority holdings in the corporation. We know of no legal authority for such a conclusion.⁸

To the extent that the court conflated the defendants with Dymax, it incorrectly engaged in fact-finding, a function not appropriate for summary disposition.⁹

In sum, the trial court misconstrued the plaintiffs' complaint as a claim against Anne Marie Roy's employer. A fair reading of the plaintiffs' complaint, however, does not support such a construction. It is undisputed that Dymax paid Anne Marie Roy's workers' compensation and, as a consequence of being her employer, Dymax is insulated from tort liability for her injuries. The defendants against whom the plaintiffs have brought suit are individuals, the Bachmanns, and not Dymax. That the defendants have a stock...