Ruby v. Sheehan

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CHAD RUBY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JUSTINA SHEEHAN, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 23-0596

Court of Appeals of Iowa

April 10, 2024

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Webster County, Angela L Doyle, Judge.

A plaintiff appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing his premises-liability and negligence-per-se claims and its denial of his crossmotion for partial summary judgment on his negligence-per-se claim.

Gary Dickey and Matthew Sahag of Dickey, Campbell, &Sahag Law Firm, PLC, Des Moines, for appellant.

Jon A Vasey of Spencer Vasey Dirth, Des Moines, for appellee.

Considered by Bower, C.J., and Buller and Langholz, JJ.

LANGHOLZ, Judge.

While attending a New Year's Eve party at Justina Sheehan's rented home, Chad Ruby was stabbed eleven times by another guest using a kitchen knife she found there. Ruby sued the stabber-Alyssa Slusser-and a jury awarded him $20 million in damages. But he also seeks to hold Sheehan-the party host and possessor of the premises-liable for negligently failing to control Slusser to prevent the stabbing. And Ruby asserts a negligence-per-se claim against Sheehan for allegedly violating a city ordinance prohibiting residents from permitting "fighting" in their homes "in such manner as to disturb the neighborhood." The district court agreed with Sheehan that Ruby's negligence claims fail as a matter of law, granted her summary judgment, and denied Ruby's cross-motion for partial summary judgment that Sheehan was negligent per se. Ruby now appeals.

We agree that Ruby's claims both fail. On the premises-liability claim, we reach that result on a different ground than the district court: Sheehan-as a possessor of a private residence and social host-had no duty to prevent another guest from stabbing Ruby during the party. And Ruby's negligence-per-se claim fails because the city ordinance is not specific enough to establish a negligence-per-se standard. We thus affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to Sheehan and its denial of Ruby's cross-motion.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Justina Sheehan and her sister hosted a party on December 31, 2017, to celebrate the new year and remember Sheehan's recently deceased fiance. A dozen people attended. Among them were Ruby and Slusser, who engaged in "friendly" and "flirting conversation" with each other while "hanging out with everybody" early on. Ruby testified that he knew nothing about Slusser and agreed that he had no reason to believe Slusser was violent or would harm him.

The party was held at Sheehan's house, which she rented. She provided alcohol that many-including Ruby, Slusser, and Sheehan herself-imbibed in high quantities as the night wore on. Some guests also brought their own alcohol. Precise accounts of the night differ between the intoxicated partyers. But according to Ruby's testimony, "everybody was having a good time," and "the whole party was fun" with "no issues" for most of the night. Eventually, Ruby and some of his friends engaged in "grappling" and "play fighting," as they apparently often did when hanging out and drinking.

Then, at some point after midnight, things escalated. Another guest "sucker-punched" Ruby in the kitchen, and a more serious fight ensued. While Sheehan and other guests were in the front yard getting the guest who punched Ruby to leave, Slusser stabbed Ruby eleven times with a knife from a set on the kitchen counter.

Sheehan and others returned to find Ruby bloodied in the dining room. Police-who had been called by a neighbor-were right behind. The party disbanded. And paramedics took Ruby for emergency medical treatment.

As a result of her conduct stabbing Ruby, Slusser pleaded guilty to assault with a violent weapon in violation of Iowa Code sections 708.1(2)(c) and 708.2(3) (2017) in August 2018.

About a year later, Ruby brought this lawsuit seeking damages for his stabbing. He claimed assault and battery against Slusser. And he eventually asserted what he titled "premises liability" negligence claims against Sheehan and the owner of her rented home.^[1] In his second amended petition, Ruby asserted only two specifications of negligence against Sheehan:

• "Sheehan [was] negligent in failing to protect Ruby from being harmed on [her] premises," and

• "Sheehan [was] negligent per se in permitting fighting on the property on or about January 1, 2018."

He also asserted a corresponding duty for each specification-that Sheehan had "a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control the conduct of those on the Premises as to prevent them from harming others" and "a duty not to permit fighting on the property." While it was not identified in the petition, Ruby later confirmed that he based his negligence-per-se claim on a Fort Dodge city ordinance that makes it "unlawful for any person, within the city limits to permit . . . any . . . fighting . . . in any house, or upon any premises . . . occupied, possessed or controlled by him, in such manner as to disturb the neighborhood or persons passing along the street." Fort Dodge Mun. Code § 9.04.30.

In October 2020, Sheehan moved for summary judgment seeking to dismiss the claims against her. In her briefing, she argued that "she did not have a duty to protect [Ruby] from Defendant Slusser or otherwise control Defendant Slusser's conduct and therefore, she is not liable as a matter of law." Alternatively, she argued that even if she owed a duty, "there is not sufficient evidence to create a jury question on whether she breached that duty, because the stabbing of [Ruby] by Defendant Slusser was not foreseeable." Finally, Sheehan argued that the negligence-per-se claim failed because the city ordinance "lacks the requisite specificity to establish a standard of care."

Ruby resisted Sheehan's motion and filed his own partial summary judgment motion on the negligence-per-se claim. He contended that because there was no dispute that "Sheehan permitted Slusser to stab Ruby on her premises," the court could rule as a matter of law that Sheehan was negligent per se based on the ordinance, leaving only damages as a fact dispute for trial.

In a January 2021 order, the district court granted Sheehan summary judgment, denied Ruby's cross-motion for partial summary judgment, and dismissed all of Ruby's claims against Sheehan. The court did not decide whether Sheehan owed Ruby a duty-and instead assumed that she did-because it considered "the issue of breach to be [the] crux of the matter." And while acknowledging that "[q]uestions of knowledge or reasonableness are generally left for juries to decide," the court held Ruby had failed to come forward with any evidence creating a material fact dispute that "Sheehan had knowledge of the immediate circumstances or the general character of Slusser to foresee Slusser stabbing Ruby." And so, the court concluded that Sheehan's conduct was not negligent as a matter of law.

The court also held that Ruby's negligence-per-se claim failed for three reasons. First, the court held that the ordinance Ruby relied on lacked sufficient specificity because it only applied to fighting that "disturb[s] the neighborhood or persons passing along the street." Second, the court reasoned that because the ordinance "is aimed at preserving peace for the public," it is not intended to protect "[t]he harm claimed by Ruby, getting stabbed at a house party." And finally, the court concluded that "Ruby is not within the class of persons the ordinance is intended to protect" because it "expressly applies to the neighborhood or persons passing along the street" and "Ruby is neither."

Ruby then voluntarily dismissed his claims against the owner of Sheehan's home. And the case proceeded to trial only on Ruby's claim against Slusser. The jury found Slusser liable for battery and awarded Ruby $20 million in compensatory and punitive damages. Now that the case has reached final judgment,^[2] Ruby appeals the district court's summary judgment rulings dismissing his claims against Sheehan and denying his cross-motion for partial summary judgment on his negligence-per-se claim.

II. Ruby's Premises Liability Claim

We review the district court's rulings on the cross-motions for summary judgment for correction of errors at law. Morris v. Legends Fieldhouse Bar &Grill, LLC, 958 N.W.2d 817, 821 (Iowa 2021). Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. (cleaned up); see also Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3).

To succeed on his premises liability negligence claim, Ruby must prove: (1) "a duty to conform to a standard of conduct to protect others"; (2) "a failure to conform to that standard"; (3) "factual cause and scope of liability"; and (4) "damages." Thompson v. Kaczinski, 774 N.W.2d 829, 834, 837 (Iowa 2009); see also Hill v. Damm, 804 N.W.2d 95, 99 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011). The first element-"whether a duty is owed under particular circumstances"-"is a matter of law for the court's determination." Morris, 958 N.W.2d at 821. But the remaining elements "are factual questions," generally entrusted to the factfinder for decision. Hill, 804 N.W.2d at 99; see also Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(j) (requiring no citation to the "well established" proposition that "[g]enerally questions of negligence . . . are for the jury" and only to "be decided as matters of law" "in exceptional cases").

In her summary judgment motion, Sheehan argued that she had no duty to control her guests to prevent Ruby's stabbing and that, even if such a duty existed, Ruby had presented no evidence that she failed to conform to the duty. The district court declined to decide whether Sheehan had a duty but agreed with Sheehan...