Ruddy v. Polaris Indus.

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EUGENE RUDDY and REBECCA RUDDY, husband and wife, individually and as parents of S.R., a minor, Plaintiffs, v. POLARIS INDUSTRIES, INC. et al., Defendants.

No. 3:17-CV-0423

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania

March 3, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Robert D. Mariani United States District Judge

I. Introduction

Presently before the Court is the Motion of Defendant, The Moore Company, to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (Doc 167) brought by The Moore Company and Motion for Summary Judgment of The Moore Company, Moeller Marine Products (Incorrectly Named as Moeller Marine Products f/k/a Tempo Products, Inc.), Inca Products Acquisition Corporation and Seastar Solutions (Doc. 169). For the reasons that follow The Moore Company's Motion to Dismiss will be denied and the Motion for Summary Judgment by The Moore Company, Moeller Marine Products, Inca Products Acquisition Corporation, and Seastar Solutions will be denied.

II. Factual and Procedural History

These claims arise from events which occurred on July 27, 2016 at Wilsonville Campground on Lake Wallenpaupack. (Fourth Amended Complaint, Doc. 69 at ¶ 27). On that date, Plaintiffs Rebecca Ruddy and Scott Ruddy were allegedly sitting on a personal watercraft ("PWC") that was manufactured and sold by Polaris and when Plaintiffs attempted to turn on the PWC using the ignition, the PWC exploded. (Id. at ¶¶ 1, 28-30). Plaintiffs Rebecca and Scott Ruddy each suffered severe injuries from the explosion. (Id. at ¶¶ 30-41). Tempo Products Co. ("Tempo") manufactured the fuel lines/hoses that were incorporated into the subject PWC by Polaris. (Id. at ¶¶ 56-57; Doc. 167 at ¶ 14).

On March 7, 2017, Plaintiffs Eugene Ruddy and Rebecca Ruddy, husband and wife, individually and as parents of S.R., a minor, filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) against multiple defendants. On November 15, 2017, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. 34) that named Moeller Marine Products f/k/a Tempo Products, Inc. as a defendant. Plaintiffs then filed a Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 48) on May 15, 2018. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Leave Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 15 to File a Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 50) so they could add the Moore Company as a defendant in this case. (Doc. 50 at 1; see also Doc. 167 at 2). Moore opposed Plaintiffs' Motion for Leave, claiming, among other things, that the Court lacked personal jurisdiction over it. (Doc. 54 at 7-8). The Honorable Richard P. Conaboy ultimately granted Plaintiffs' Motion, allowing Plaintiffs to file an amended complaint and add Moore as a defendant to the above-captioned action. Ruddy v. Polaris, Inc., et a/., 2018 WL 3388008, at *2 (M.D.Pa. July 12, 2018). Judge Conaboy noted that "[i]f, as discovery progresses, Moore can demonstrate conclusively that it may not be properly considered an appropriate Defendant in this case, it may then avail itself of other remedies available under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Id. In accordance with Judge Conaboy's Opinion, Plaintiffs filed their Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 65) on July 16, 2018 that, for the first time, named The Moore Company as a defendant. Plaintiffs then filed a Fourth Amended Complaint on July 18, 2018 (Doc. 69), which is the operative complaint in this action.

The Moore Company has its principal place of business in Rhode Island and is also incorporated in Rhode Island. (Doc. 167 at ¶ 1).

In 2008, Moore entered into an Asset Purchase Agreement with Tempo so Moore could "purchase remaining assets of Tempo." (Doc. 167 at ¶ 15; Doc. 169 at ¶ 7; Moore-Tempo Asset Purchase Agreement, Doc. 167-5, Ex. D at 1). After the execution of the APA, Moore directed Tempo's assets to its division Moeller Marine. (Doc. 179 at 6). Soon after the above-captioned action was initiated on March 7, 2017 but before Moore was added as a defendant, Moore sold its one-time division Moeller Marine to Inca Products on May 26, 2017 in an Asset Purchase Agreement between the two companies. (See Moore and Inca Trademark Assignment, Doc. 202-1, Ex. E; Doc. 179-4, Ex. B at 22:10-16).

At the close the discovery, Moore filed the instant Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. (Doc. 167). Moore, together with The Moeller Company, INCA Products Acquisition Corporation, and SeaStar Solutions also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 169).

In Plaintiffs' Counterstatement of Material Facts and Response to Defendants The Moore Company, Moeller Marine Products, Inca Products Acquisition Corporation and Seastar Solutions' Statement of Material Facts (Doc. 186), Plaintiffs failed to respond to Moving Defendants' Statement of Material Facts (Doc. 170) in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and Local Rule 56.1. Instead of responding to the numbered paragraphs within Moving Defendants' Statement of Material Facts (Doc. 170), Plaintiffs responded to the numbered paragraphs within Moving Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 169). This carelessness on behalf of Plaintiffs' Counsel suggests a lack of diligence and inattention to detail that could have been fatal to their clients' claims against Moving Defendants. Only because the Court finds there are sufficient factual disputes in documents and exhibits in the record will the Court not deem Moving Defendants' statements of material fact admitted. In a case as serious as this, where multiple people, including a young child, suffered severe injuries, the Court expects more from the attorneys representing Plaintiffs. The Court expects that Plaintiffs' Counsel's future filings will show careful attention to and submission in accordance with both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of Court.

III. Standards of Review

A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12, a defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2). "Once challenged, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction." O'Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 316 (3d Cir. 2007). "Plaintiffs jurisdictional allegations must be supported with appropriate affidavits or documents, because a Rule 12(b)(2) motion 'requires resolution of factual issues outside the pleadings.'" Brooks v. Bacardi Rum Corp., 943 F.Supp. 559, 561 (E.D.Pa. 1996) (quoting Time Share Vacation Club v. Ati Resorts, Ltd., 735 F.2d 61, 67 n.9 (3d Cir. 1984)). "However, when the court does not hold an evidentiary hearing on the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff need only establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction and the plaintiff is entitled to have its allegations taken as true and all factual disputes drawn in its favor." Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 97 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 457 (3d Cir. 2003) ("It is well established that in deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, a court is required to accept the plaintiffs allegations as true, and is to construe disputed facts in favor of the plaintiff."). "Of course, by accepting a plaintiffs facts as true when a motion to dismiss is originally made, a court is not precluded from revisiting the issue if it appears that the facts alleged to support jurisdiction are in dispute." Carteret Sav. Bank, FA v. Shushan, 954 F.2d 141, 142 n.1 (3d Cir.

B. Motion for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate "only where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Gonzalez v. AMR, 549 F.3d 219, 223 (3d Cir. 2008). "An issue is genuine only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party, and a factual dispute is material only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law." Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). Thus, through summary adjudication, the court may dispose of, those claims that do not present a "genuine dispute as to any material fact." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).

The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once such a showing has been made, the non-moving party must offer specific facts contradicting those averred by the movant to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990). Therefore, the non-moving party may not oppose summary judgment simply on the basis of the pleadings, or on conclusory statements that a factual issue exists. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. "A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by citing to particular parts of materials in the record ... or showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A)-(B). In evaluating whether summary judgment should be granted, "[t]he court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3). "Inferences should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and where the non-moving party's evidence contradicts the movant's, then the non-movant's must be taken as true." Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992), cert, denied 507 U.S. 912, 113 S.Ct. 1262, 122 L.Ed.2d 659 (1993).

However "facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if...