Ruddy v. Polaris Indus.

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EUGENE RUDDY and REBECCA RUDDY, husband and wife, individually and as parents of S.R., a minor, Plaintiffs, v. POLARIS INDUSTRIES, INC. et al., Defendants.

No. 3:17-CV-0423

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania

March 3, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ROBERT D. MARIANI UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. Introduction

On March 7, 2017, Plaintiffs Eugene Ruddy and Rebecca Ruddy husband and wife, individually and as parents of S.R., a minor, filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) against multiple defendants, including Carter Fuel Systems, Inc. and Tenneco Inc.^[1] Collectively, Plaintiffs assert six claims against Defendants in their Fourth Amended Complaint (Doc. 69): negligence (Count I); strict liability (Count II); breach of warranty (Count III); gross negligence, recklessness, malice (Count IV); loss of consortium (Count V); and negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count VI). Presently before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 165) filed by Carter Fuel Systems, Inc. and Tenneco, Inc. (collectively, "Moving Defendants").

Moving Defendants Carter Fuel and Tenneco, Inc. have submitted a Statement of Material Facts (Doc. 165) as to which they submit there is no genuine issue or dispute of material fact for trial, as well as a number of exhibits attached thereto. Plaintiffs submitted a Response to the Statement of Material Facts, along with a Counterstatement of Material Facts and a Brief in Opposition to Moving Defendants' Motion (Doc. 182, Doc. 183).^[2]

These claims arise from events which occurred on July 27, 2016 at Wilsonville Campground on Lake Wallenpaupack. (Doc. 165 at ¶ 5). On that date, Plaintiffs Rebecca Ruddy and Scott Ruddy were allegedly sitting on a personal watercraft ("PWC") that was manufactured and sold by Polaris and when Plaintiffs attempted to turn on the PWC using the ignition, the PWC exploded. (Id. at ¶ 6). Plaintiffs Rebecca and Scott Ruddy each suffered severe injuries from the explosion. (Id.). Plaintiffs' PWC was manufactured and supplied by Polaris Industries, Inc., and Polaris Sales, Inc. (collectively, "Polaris") and Moving Defendants manufactured and supplied the fuel pump assembly which was installed into the PWC by Polaris. (Id. at ¶¶ 6, 9).^[3] For the reasons discussed below, the Court will deny Moving Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

II. Legal Standards

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate "only where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Gonzalez v. AMR, 549 F.3d 219, 223 (3d Cir. 2008). "An issue is genuine only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party, and a factual dispute is material only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law." Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). Thus, through summary adjudication, the court may dispose of those claims that do not present a "genuine dispute as to any material fact." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).

The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once such a showing has been made, the non-moving party must offer specific facts contradicting those averred by the movant to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990). Therefore, the non-moving party may not oppose summary judgment simply on the basis of the pleadings, or on conclusory statements that a factual issue exists. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. "A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by citing to particular parts of materials in the record ... or showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A)-(B). In evaluating whether summary judgment should be granted, "[t]he court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3). "Inferences should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and where the non-moving party's evidence contradicts the movant's, then the non-movant's must be taken as true." Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992), cert, denied 507 U.S. 912, 113 S.Ct. 1262, 122 L.Ed.2d 659 (1993).

However, "facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a 'genuine' dispute as to those facts." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). If a party has carried its burden under the summary judgment rule,

its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial. The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact. When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.

Id. (internal quotations, citations, and alterations omitted).

"In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court may not make credibility determinations or engage in any weighing of evidence." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Therefore, when evidentiary facts are in dispute, when the credibility of witnesses may be in issue, or when conflicting evidence must be weighed, a full trial is usually necessary.

B. Causes of Action

Plaintiffs assert a total of six claims against Defendants in their Fourth Amended Complaint ("Complaint") (Doc. 69): negligence (Count I); strict liability (Count II); breach of warranty (Count III)^[4]; gross negligence, recklessness, malice (Count IV); loss of consortium (Count V); and negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count VI). Although Moving Defendants request this Court to dismiss all claims and cross-claims asserted against them (Doc. 165 at 15), Moving Defendants' Motion focuses solely on Plaintiffs' claim for strict liability and does not present arguments as to why they are entitled to summary judgment on the other five claims asserted in Plaintiffs' Complaint. Thus, the Court will only determine whether Moving Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Count II of Plaintiffs' complaint.

1. Strict Liability

Pennsylvania law on the doctrine of products liability governs in a diversity action. Fleck v. KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc., 981 F.2d 107, 113 (3d Cir. 1992). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has adopted Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., 104 A.3d 328, 359 (Pa. 2014) (citing Webb v. Zern, 220 A.2d 853 (Pa. 1966)). Section 402A provides:

(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or the consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if

a. The seller is engaged in the business of selling such product, and b. It is expected to and does reach the consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.

(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although

a. The seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and

b. The user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.

To prevail on a strict liability claim, the plaintiff must prove that the product was defective due to a manufacturing, design, or failure-to-warn defect, that the defect existed when it left the defendant's hands, and that the product's defect caused the alleged harm. Igwe v. Skaggs, 258 F.Supp.3d 596, 609 (W.D.Pa. 2017) (citing High v. Pa. Supply, Inc., 154 A.3d 341, 345-46 (Pa. Super. 2017)).

"[A] plaintiff pursuing a cause upon a theory of strict liability in tort must prove that the product is in a 'defective condition'" by demonstrating "either that (1) the danger is unknowable and unacceptable to the average or ordinary consumer, or that (2) a reasonable person would conclude that the probability and seriousness of harm caused by the product outweigh the burden or costs of taking precautions." Tincher, 104 A.3d at 335. The Tincher Court held that the issue of

[w]hether a product is in a defective condition is a question of fact ordinarily submitted for determination to the finder of fact; the question is removed from the jury's consideration only where it is clear that reasonable minds could not differ on the issue. Thus, the trial court is relegated to its traditional role of determining issues of law, e.g., on dispositive motions, and articulating the law for the jury, premised upon the governing legal theory, the facts adduced at trial and relevant advocacy by the parties.

Id. Tincher further explained that trial courts "do not necessarily have the expertise to conduct the social policy inquiry into the risks and utilities of a plethora of products and to decide as a matter of law whether a product is unreasonably dangerous except perhaps in the most obvious cases." Id. at 380; see also Lewis v. Lycoming, 2015 WL 3444220, at *4 (E.D.Pa. May 29, 2015) ("There is ample room in...