Rudisills v. California Coastal Commission

ROBIN RUDISILL et al., Plaintiffs, Respondents, and Cross-appellants, v. CALIFORNIA COASTAL COMMISSION, Defendant, LIGHTHOUSE BROOKS, LLC et al., Real Parties in Interest, Appellants, and Cross-respondents. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Real Party in Interest and Appellant.

B299331

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Seventh Division

June 22, 2021

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No BS168074 James C. Chalfant, Judge. Reversed in part, affirmed in part.

Gaines & Stacey, Fred Gaines, and Lisa A. Weinberg for Real Parties in Interest, Appellants, and Cross-respondents Lighthouse Brooks, LLC and Ramin Kolahi.

Michael N. Feuer, City Attorney, Terry P. Kaufmann-Macias Assistant City Attorney, Amy Brothers and Oscar Medellin Deputy City Attorneys, for Real Party in Interest and Appellant City of Los Angeles.

Venskus & Associates and Sabrina Venskus for Plaintiffs, Respondents, and Cross-appellants.

SEGAL J.

INTRODUCTION

This appeal arises out of the construction by Lighthouse Brooks, LLC and Ramin Kolahi (collectively, Lighthouse) of four homes in Venice (the Project). Lighthouse obtained a coastal development permit from the California Coastal Commission after Lighthouse had substantially completed the Project. Robin Rudisill and Jenni Hawk, two Venice residents who opposed the Project, filed a petition for a writ of administrative mandate. The trial court granted the petition and directed the Commission to set aside the permit and reconsider whether the Project complied with the Coastal Act. The court also stayed “the Project.” The Commission and Lighthouse appealed, and we reversed the judgment and directed the trial court to deny the petition for writ of mandate. (See Rudisill v. California Coastal Com. (Dec. 9, 2020, B294460) [nonpub. opn.] (Rudisill I).)

While the appeal was pending, Lighthouse took certain steps to enable residents to occupy the homes, including requesting and obtaining certificates of occupancy from the City of Los Angeles. The trial court granted a request by Rudisill and Hawk to sanction Lighthouse under Code of Civil Procedure section 177.5 for violating the stay.^[1] The court also ordered the City, which at that point was no longer a party to the case, to revoke the certificates of occupancy. Finally, the court denied a motion by Rudisill and Hawk for attorneys' fees.

All of the parties appealed: Lighthouse Brooks, LLC and Kolahi from the order sanctioning each of them $1, 500; the City from the order requiring it to revoke the permits; Rudisill and Hawk from an order denying their motion for attorneys' fees. We reverse the first two orders and affirm the third.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Trial Court Grants a Petition by Rudisill and Hawk for Writ of Administrative Mandate

The facts concerning the Project and the petition for writ of administrative mandate are discussed in more detail in our prior opinion. (See Rudisill I, supra, B294460.) To summarize, the Project is in the coastal zone, as defined by the Coastal Act. (See Pub. Resources Code, § 30103.) In October 2013 the City issued a coastal development permit for Lighthouse to build the Project, but failed to send notice of the permit to the Commission, as required by the Coastal Act.^[2] Lighthouse completed most of the Project between 2013 and 2016. In August 2016 the Commission learned about the Project and informed the City it never received notice the City had issued a permit for the Project, which prompted the City to belatedly send notice of the permit it had issued to Lighthouse three years earlier. Rudisill, Hawk, and several other Venice residents filed an appeal with the Commission challenging the City's decision to issue the permit.^[3] After a public hearing the Commission issued a permit for the Project with certain modifications. (See Rudisill I, supra, B294460.)

Rudisill and Hawk filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate arguing, among other things, the Commission improperly issued the permit without determining whether the Project complied with the Coastal Act. In November 2018 the trial court granted the petition and issued a writ of mandate directing the Commission to set aside the permit and reconsider whether the Project complied with the Coastal Act. The court also ordered that the Project was “stayed pursuant to Section 30623 of the Coastal Act.” In December 2020 we reversed the judgment and directed the court to deny the petition. (See Rudisill I, supra, B294460.)

B. Rudisill and Hawk Seek Sanctions Against Lighthouse for Violating the Stay

In February 2019, while the appeal was pending, Rudisill and Hawk observed some activity at the Project and discovered that in January 2019 the City had issued certificates of occupancy for three of the four homes. Rudisill and Hawk filed an application for an order to show cause why the court should not sanction Lighthouse under section 177.5 for violating the stay. The trial court granted the application, set the matter for a hearing, and ordered the City to appear. After discussing the scope of the stay with the parties at the hearing, the court entered an order stating that “the project is enjoined, except for use of the property, ” and that “no further permits for the property shall be issued.”

In response to the order to show cause, Lighthouse contended the only construction at the Project was a series of “cosmetic changes” to the interior of one of the homes by a tenant, not by Lighthouse. In their reply, Rudisill and Hawk submitted additional information they claimed demonstrated Lighthouse violated the stay, including that Lighthouse submitted a permit application related to the homes in December 2018 and that Lighthouse performed corrective work between December 2018 and January 2019 to obtain a certificate of occupancy for one of the homes. Rudisill and Hawk also contended Lighthouse violated the trial court's February 2019 order clarifying the scope of the stay because, later on the same day the court entered the clarification order, the City issued the certificate of occupancy for that home. In addition to seeking monetary sanctions under section 177.5, Rudisill and Hawk filed a motion for attorneys' fees under section 575.2, the statute governing failure to comply with local rules, and the private attorney general doctrine articulated in Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, seeking over $141, 000 in attorneys' fees.

In a surreply Lighthouse explained that the December 2018 permit application was for an awning Lighthouse had installed on one of the residential units before the trial court issued the writ of mandate. Lighthouse explained the corrective work included removing a temporary power pole for the Project that was no longer needed. With respect to the final certificate of occupancy the City issued, Lighthouse stated that it applied for the certificate before the court's February 2019 order, but that the City happened to issue the permit the day the court made the order.

C. The Trial Court Sanctions Lighthouse, but Denies the Motion by Rudisill and Hawk for Attorneys' Fees

The parties appeared at the hearing in July 2019, and the City made a special appearance. The trial court sanctioned Lighthouse Brooks, LLC and Kolahi $1, 500 each for violating the stay. The court ruled Lighthouse violated the stay by submitting a permit application for the previously installed awning, by removing the temporary power pole and performing corrective work, and by requesting certificates of occupancy from the City. The court also ruled, however, Lighthouse was not responsible for construction performed inside the homes by the tenants. The trial court also found the City acted as Lighthouse's agent when it issued the certificates of occupancy. The court ordered the City to “revoke all Certificates of Occupancy issued for the Project... within ten (10) days of the date of entry of this Order.”

The court denied the motion by Rudisill and Hawk for attorneys' fees. The court ruled that they were not entitled to fees under section 575.2 because Lighthouse had not violated a local rule and that they were not entitled to fees under the private attorney general doctrine or its codification in section 1021.5 because Lighthouse's violations were “minor” and not “serious in nature” and the request for sanctions did not concern an important right affecting the public interest or confer a significant public benefit. Lighthouse timely appealed, and Rudisill and Hawk cross-appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. The Trial Court Erred in Ordering the City To Revoke the Certificates of Occupancy

The City argues the trial court lacked jurisdiction to order it to revoke the certificates of occupancy because the City was not a party to the action at the time the court made the order. As Rudisill and Hawk appear to concede by not opposing the City's appeal, the court erred in issuing the order against the City.

Generally “[a] court's power is limited to adjudicating disputes between persons who have been designated as parties or made parties by service of process; it has ‘no power to adjudicate a personal claim or obligation unless it has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.' [¶] Consistent with this principle, courts have long observed a general rule against entering injunctions against nonparties.” (Hassel v. Bird (2018) 5 Cal.5th 522, 549(conc. opn. of Kruger, J.); see People ex rel Gwinn v. Kothari (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 759, 769 [“an injunction is binding only on the parties to an action or those acting in concert with them”]; see also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc. (1969) 395 U.S. 100, 110 112 [89 S.Ct. 1562, 23 L.Ed.2d 129] [injunction against a nonparty was improper because “it is...