Ruffin v. State

992 So.2d 1165

Micah RUFFIN v. STATE of Mississippi.

No. 2007-KA-00695-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

October 23, 2008.

Imhotep Alkebu-Lan, attorney for appellant.

Office of the Attorney General by John R. Henry, attorney for appellee.

Before WALLER, P.J., EASLEY and GRAVES, JJ.

WALLER, Presiding Justice, for the Court.

¶ 1. Micah Ruffin was found guilty of armed robbery and capital murder in the Circuit Court of Yazoo County. Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS

¶ 2. On July 1, 2002, Krystal White, Cortiss Washington, Osbie Levi Jefferson, Darwin Strahan, Micah Ruffin, Thomas Giles, Tommy White, Jr., and Latoya Allen, along with her four children, were gathered at the home of Tommy White, Jr., in Yazoo County. Around mid-morning, a game of dice commenced. Several people, including Strahan, joined the game intermittently. Eventually, Tommy White, Jr., and Giles were the only two remaining competitors. As they continued the game, Strahan walked outside. Moments later, he stepped back inside and called for Ruffin to join him outside. Shortly thereafter, Strahan and Ruffin burst through the door. Strahan began beating Giles with a brick. Ruffin had a gun that he used to hit Giles at least once.¹ Giles was severely beaten² and robbed of his shoes and his money.³

¶ 3. At some point, Ruffin gave the gun to Strahan. Strahan then ordered everyone to the back of the home. In the meantime, Ruffin pulled the car around, popped the trunk, and went back inside. Strahan pulled Giles up by the hair, walked him outside, and told him to get into the trunk of the car. Strahan then went back inside and asked if anyone was leaving with him. Krystal White and Washington left with Strahan and Ruffin.

¶ 4. Ruffin drove to a frontage road just off Highway 3, and backed the car into a cornfield. Both Ruffin and Strahan exited the car. Strahan pulled Giles out the trunk, and walked him to the edge of the cornfield. Ruffin returned to the car and asked Krystal White to hand him his "toy," i.e., the gun. Ruffin brought the gun to Strahan. Strahan then shot Giles six times in the head with the .22 caliber gun.

¶ 5. They fled the scene, and Ruffin drove the party to Jackson, Mississippi. They initially stopped at the home of Krystal White's mother, but were unable to get inside. They stopped briefly at Ruffin's home, at which point Ruffin instructed Washington to wash the car. The party eventually rented a hotel room in Jackson.

¶ 6. On July 1, 2002, Eric Snow, an investigator with the Yazoo City Police Department, received notice that a body had been discovered in a cornfield off Highway 3. Deputy Dan Nunn informed Snow that he had responded to a call earlier that same day at the home of Tommy White, Jr. Snow later received a call from Allen, who provided him the names of everyone who had been at the home of Tommy White, Jr., on the morning in question. Ruffin eventually was arrested in Jackson and interrogated at the Yazoo City Police Department. He gave two tape-recorded statements to the police.

¶ 7. Ruffin was indicted on armed robbery and capital murder in the commission of a kidnapping. A jury trial was conducted in the Circuit Court of Yazoo County on April 2-5, 2007. Allen, Jefferson, Washington, Tommy White, Jr., and Krystal White testified at trial. Ruffin was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. He was also found guilty of armed robbery and sentenced to ten years, to run concurrently with the life sentence.

DISCUSSION

I. The trial court erred in denying Ruffin's motion to suppress.

¶ 8. This Court will reverse the denial of a motion to suppress only if the trial court's ruling is manifest error or contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Palm v. State, 748 So.2d 135, 142 (Miss.1999) (citing McGowan v. State, 706 So.2d 231, 235 (Miss.1997)). This Court will not reverse the lower court's finding that the confession was voluntary and admissible so long as the court applied the correct principles of law and the finding is factually supported by the evidence. Palm, 748 So.2d at 142 (citing Greenlee v. State, 725 So.2d 816, 826 (Miss. 1998)). Once a trial judge determines admissibility, the defendant/appellant faces a heavy burden in trying to reverse on appeal. Greenlee, 725 So.2d 816, 826 (Miss. 1998) (quoting Hunt v. State, 687 So.2d 1154, 1160 (Miss.1996)).

¶ 9. A valid waiver of Miranda⁴ rights must be made "`voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.'" Chim v. State, 972 So.2d 601, 603 (Miss.2008) (citing Coverson v. State of Mississippi, 617 So.2d 642, 647 (Miss.1993)). The State's burden of proving all facts prerequisite to admissibility is met, and a prima facie case is made out "by the testimony of an officer, or other person having knowledge of the facts, that the confession was voluntarily made without any threats, coercion, or offer of reward." Cox v. State, 586 So.2d 761, 763 (Miss.1991). The defendant must rebut the State's prima facie case by offering "testimony that violence, threats of violence, or offers of reward induced the confession." Cox, 586 So.2d at 763.

¶ 10. A waiver is voluntary if it is the result of "`free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion or deception.'" Chim, 972 So.2d at 603 (Miss. 2008) (citing Coverson, 617 So.2d at 647). "`[A] waiver is knowing and intelligent if it is made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.'" Chim, 972 So.2d at 603 (citing Coverson, 617 So.2d at 647).

¶ 11. On the evening of July 8, 2002, Ruffin gave two statements at the Yazoo City Police Department. These statements were tape-recorded and subsequently were transcribed. The first statement began at 8:00 p.m., with only investigator Snow and Ruffin in the room. Snow testified that he read Ruffin his Miranda rights before handing him the Miranda form to read for himself. Snow stated that Ruffin appeared to understand and signed the form, just below the statement of rights. Snow then read Ruffin the lower portion of the Miranda form regarding waiver of rights and handed the form to Ruffin for his review. Ruffin did not sign beneath the waiver portion of the form, but nevertheless agreed to talk. At no time did Ruffin indicate that he wished to stop talking or attempt to invoke his right to an attorney. Snow testified that he did not threaten Ruffin, and that Ruffin gave his statement freely and voluntarily. The first statement concluded at 8:28 p.m.

¶ 12. Following the first statement, and before either person left the room, Ruffin volunteered to give another statement. The second statement commenced at 8:36 p.m., with Detectives Thomas Ervin, Charles Taylor, and Larry Davis present.⁵ Before this second statement, Snow stated, "I ADVICED [SIC] YOU OF YOUR MIRANDA RIGHTS ON THE OTHER TAPE. DO YOU KNOW WHAT YOUR RIGHTS ARE? YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY AND YOU CAN STOP THIS INTERVIEW ANYTIME YOU LIKE. DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT?" Ruffin indicated that he understood and proceeded to give the second statement. Snow testified that no threats, coercion, or promises were made to Ruffin, and that this second statement also was made freely and voluntary.

¶ 13. Ruffin testified at the suppression hearing. He stated that he was enrolled in a special-education program and suffered from dyslexia, which made it difficult for him to read unless the words were large. When asked whether he had any recollection of being informed of his Miranda rights, Ruffin responded, "I can't remember." He said that he did not understand what was happening at the time of the interrogation because he had never been subjected to an interrogation.

¶ 14. The trial court denied Ruffin's motion to suppress as follows:

The evidence presented is that Officer Snow advised the defendant of his rights orally. The defendant testified that he does not recall, that he does not remember whether or not he was given his rights. Therefore, this Court has to take the statement of Officer Snow that he did orally inform him of his Miranda rights.

Therefore, the evidence before the Court indicates that the defendant was given his Miranda rights, that he understood. There was no indication that he did not understand his rights. There's nothing, no testimony from the defendant or the officers that he advised him that he was dyslexic or he did not understand his rights.

Therefore, the Court finds that [Ruffin's statements] are voluntary, freely-made ....

¶ 15. Ruffin argues that he did not voluntarily waive his privilege against self-incrimination. For support, he points to the fact he did not sign the waiver portion of the Miranda form, and did not execute another Miranda form prior to the second interrogation. More significantly, he alleges that he was coerced to talk. He submits that Snow threatened or intimidated him with comments made both on and off the record. Additionally, Ruffin contends that his mental impairment(s) rendered him unable knowingly and intelligently to waive his rights.

¶ 16. Ruffin first submits that his statements should have been suppressed because he did not sign the waiver portion of the Miranda form or execute a second Miranda form. Yet, there is no requirement that a valid waiver must be in writing and signed for an incriminating statement to be admissible. Armstead v. State, 978 So.2d 642, 648 (Miss.2008) (citing Davis v. State, 320 So.2d 789, 790 (Miss. 1975)). All that is required is that the accused be "afforded the protection of the Miranda warning and [ ] thereafter knowingly and intelligently waive[ ] his rights and freely and voluntarily make[ ] the statement." Davis, 320 So.2d at 790. Therefore, Ruffin's failure to sign the waiver portion of the Miranda form or execute a second Miranda form is non-dispositive.

¶ 17. We find sufficient evidence to support that Ruffin was adequately advised of his Miranda rights. Snow testified that he read Ruffin his Mir...