Ruffino v. State Street Bank and Trust Co., Civ. A. No. 93-10188-NG.

908 F. Supp. 1019

Barbara C. RUFFINO, Plaintiff, v. STATE STREET BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, David A. Spina, Kenneth D. Stuart, Thomas W. Johnson, Ira B. Gregerman, and Susan G. Rice, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 93-10188-NG.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

November 29, 1995.

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Jessica Block, Kelly L. Wilkins, Peter M. Lefkowitz, Heidlage & Reece, Boston, MA, for Barbara C. Ruffino.

Robert B. Gordon, Richard P. Ward, Ropes & Gray, Boston, MA, for State Street Bank & Trust Co., Thomas W. Johnson, Ira B. Gregerman and Susan G. Rice.

John M. Kahn, Hill & Barlow, Boston, MA, for Kenneth D. Stuart.

ORDER

GERTNER, District Judge.

Defendants have requested that this court dismiss the entirety of plaintiff's case against them.

Their request comes before me in three motions for summary judgment: Motion of Defendant Kenneth D. Stuart, filed September 30, 1994; Motion of Defendants David A. Spina, Thomas W. Johnson, Ira B. Gergerman and Susan G. Rice, filed September 29, 1994; and, Motion of Defendant State Street Bank and Trust Company, filed September 29, 1994.

For the reasons set forth in the accompanying Amended Memorandum and Decision, dated November 29, 1995, I conclude that defendants' motions for summary judgment shall be ALLOWED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. As to each claim, I rule as follows:

1. With respect to plaintiff's claims of sexual harassment against all defendants, under M.G.L. c. 151B (Count I); M.G.L. c. 214, § 1C (Count II), M.G.L. c. 93, § 102 (Count IV) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Count III), defendants' motions for summary judgment are ALLOWED. Accordingly, Count I is DISMISSED IN PART, Count II is DISMISSED, Count III is DISMISSED IN PART, and Count IV is DISMISSED.

2. With respect to plaintiff's retaliation claims, under M.G.L. c. 151B (Count I) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Count III), I DENY summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

3. As to Count V, charging negligent infliction of emotional distress as against defendants State Street Bank, Spina, Stuart, Johnson and Rice, defendants' motions for summary judgment are ALLOWED, and Count V is accordingly DISMISSED.

4. As to Count VI (interference with contractual and/or advantageous relations), I DENY summary judgment as to claims against defendants Spina, Stuart, Johnson and Gregerman. However, defendant Rice's motion for summary judgment is ALLOWED, and Count VI against defendant Rice is accordingly DISMISSED.

5. With respect to Count VII for negligent supervision and retention against defendants State Street Bank, Spina and Johnson, defendants' motions for summary judgment are ALLOWED, and Count VII is accordingly DISMISSED.

6. Count VIII for intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress against defendant Stuart, I DENY summary judgment.

7. As Count IX for wrongful termination against State Street Bank, defendant's motion for summary judgment is ALLOWED, and Count IX is accordingly DISMISSED.

8. As to Count X for the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against State Street Bank, I ALLOW defendant's motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, Count X is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

AMENDED MEMORANDUM AND DECISION¹

GERTNER, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

The plaintiff, Barbara Ruffino, worked as a corporate manager at State Street Bank and Trust. She alleges that, over a period of years, she was subjected to a sexually harassing and hostile work environment. She also charges that when she told supervisors about the discriminatory conditions, she confronted an indifference which turned to retaliation against her as she pressed her complaints.

This case raises some of the close questions of discrimination law: questions of fairness with respect to the filing requirements for plaintiffs who have sought redress within their workplace; questions of the relationship between statutes prohibiting employment discrimination and common law causes of action; and questions of the different language and forms of harassment and retaliation in different work settings.

In her complaint, Ruffino alleges that her employer, defendant State Street Bank and Trust Company ("State Street" or the "Bank"), and certain Bank employees, defendants David Spina, Kenneth D. Stuart, Thomas W. Johnson, Ira B. Gregerman, and Susan G. Rice, violated the Massachusetts Anti-Discrimination Law, M.G.L. c. 151B (Count I) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Count III) by creating a sexually harassing and hostile work environment and then by retaliating against her.

Ruffino also alleges a host of state law violations: violation of Massachusetts General Law Chapter 214, § 1C (Count II); violation of Chapter 93, § 102 (Count IV); negligent infliction of emotional distress against defendants State Street Bank, Spina, Stuart, Johnson and Rice (Count V); interference with contractual and/or advantageous relations against defendants Spina, Stuart, Johnson, Gregerman, and Rice (Count VI); negligent supervision and retention against defendants State Street Bank, Spina and Johnson (Count VII); intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress against defendant Stuart (Count VIII); wrongful termination against defendant State Street Bank (Count IX); and, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against defendant State Street Bank (Count X).

On June 24, 1992, plaintiff filed an administrative charge with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (MCAD) and the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC). On January 19, 1993, she filed suit in the Massachusetts Superior Court. Defendants removed to federal court.

Defendants move for summary judgment. They challenge the adequacy of Ruffino's sexual harassment claims principally on statute of limitations grounds, arguing that the claims are time-barred. They also reject the contention that Ruffino was sexually harassed at State Street, or that her allegations were improperly handled. As to the retaliation claims, defendants flatly deny that State Street Bank or its agents retaliated against Ruffino. Finally, they contend that the panoply of state law claims brought by plaintiff are either statutorily barred or meritless.

For reasons set forth below, defendants' motions for summary judgment shall be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

Specifically, with respect to Ruffino's state and federal claims of sexual harassment, I GRANT summary judgment to the defendants on the ground that her claims are barred by the relevant limitations period; I further GRANT summary judgment to the defendants on plaintiff's state claims brought under M.G.L. c. 214, § 1C and M.G.L. c. 93, § 102. As to plaintiff's retaliation claims, however, I DENY summary judgment for the defendants, on the ground that plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer the existence of unlawful retaliation.

As to plaintiff's common law claims, I find as follows: Count V for negligent infliction of emotional distress is barred by the Workers' Compensation Act and shall be dismissed; Count VI for interference with contractual relations shall not be dismissed as to defendants Spina, Stuart, Johnson, and Gregerman, and shall be dismissed as to defendant Rice; Count VII for negligent supervision is barred by the Workers' Compensation Act and shall be dismissed; Count VIII for intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress as to defendant Stuart shall not be dismissed; Count IX for wrongful termination shall be dismissed; Count X for the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing shall be dismissed, as the cause of action is not cognizable on these facts.

II. PROCEDURAL STANDARD

Discrimination cases are often bound up in the sort of factual inquiries best left to a jury. Through circumstantial evidence, parties seek to prove motive and intent, issues least suited for a determination on a motion for summary judgment.² E.g., LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 840 (1st Cir.1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1398, 128 L.Ed.2d 72 (1994); Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 985 F.2d 1113, 1116 (1st Cir.1993); Flesner v. Technical Communications Corp., 410 Mass. 805, 809, 575 N.E.2d 1107 (1991).

Summary judgment is appropriate only when all the relevant pleadings and supporting documents, viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, present no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c); Barbour v. Dynamics Research Corp., 63 F.3d 32, 36 (1st Cir.1995); Woods v. Friction Materials, Inc., 30 F.3d 255, 259 (1st Cir.1994); Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 711-716, 575 N.E.2d 734 (1991); Smith College v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, 376 Mass. 221, 227, 380 N.E.2d 121 (1978). Where the moving party makes an initial showing that there exists no genuine issue of material fact, the non-moving party may not merely rely on bald allegations to avoid summary judgment.³ Byrd v. Ronayne, 61 F.3d 1026, 1030 (1st Cir.1995); Madsen v. Erwin, 395 Mass. 715, 719, 481 N.E.2d 1160 (1985). The non-moving party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2514, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355-56, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Barbour, 63 F.3d at 36.⁴

III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts are stated in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. In or about February of 1984, Barbara Ruffino was hired as a training officer by defendant State Street Bank and Trust Company. Less than two years after her initial hire, Ruffino became the Division Personnel Officer ("DPO") for Corporate...