Ruiz v. Stephens

728 F.3d 416

Rolando RUIZ, Petitioner–Appellant

v.William STEPHENS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent–Appellee.

No. 11–70011.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Aug. 26, 2013.

Kathryn M. Kase, Esq., Houston, TX, Lee Benjamin Kovarsky, Esq., Baltimore, MD, for Petitioner–Appellant.

Jeremy Craig Greenwell, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Austin, TX, for Respondent–Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DENNIS, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:

In 1995, a Texas jury sentenced Rolando Ruiz to death for the murder-for-hire of Theresa Rodriguez. Ruiz challenged his capital sentence in habeas proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, asserting a Wiggins claim for constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied relief and Ruiz now seeks a certificate of appealability. We deny Ruiz's request.

I.

In July 1992, Mark Rodriguez approached Rolando Ruiz at the home of a mutual friend, asking Ruiz if he “wanted to make some money.” ¹ When Ruiz responded affirmatively, Mark ² explained that he needed Ruiz to kill Theresa Rodriguez, the wife of Mark's brother, Michael Rodriguez. Mark invited Ruiz into his brother Michael's car, and Michael introduced himself. The trio then drove to the Macaroni Grill in San Antonio where Michael wanted the murder to take place. Michael instructed Ruiz to kill and rob Theresa as the couple arrived at the restaurant on the night of Friday, July 10. After Ruiz accepted the deal, Michael paid him $1000.00, promising another $1000.00 once Ruiz completed the murder.

In accordance with the plan, Ruiz went to the Macaroni Grill on Friday night. However, after seeing a security guard, Ruiz called off the hit. On the following day, Saturday, July 11, Ruiz called Michael, and the two agreed that Ruiz would carry out the murder as Michael and Theresa left the Nakoma Theatres that night. In accordance with Michael's instructions, Ruiz went to the Nakoma Theatres. However, after Michael and Theresa failed to show up at the agreed-upon time, Ruiz left. He later called Michael, who explained that “something [had come] up.” On Monday, July 13, Michael instructed Ruiz to carry out the plan at the Nakoma Theatres on the following night, Tuesday, July 14. At 7:00 p.m. on Tuesday, Mark called Ruiz to confirm that Mark and Michael were with Theresa at the Nakoma Theaters, and that the plan was on. Ruiz drove to the theaters and watched as the two brothers and Theresa got into Michael's car. Ruiz trailed the trio in his truck as they drove home. After Michael pulled into his driveway, Ruiz parked his truck at the neighboring house. Ruiz walked up the driveway and pretended to ask for directions from Mark. Ruiz then asked Mark: “do I do it?” Mark responded: “Yes.” Ruiz walked up to the passenger side of Michael's car. As Theresa stepped out of the car, she looked up at Ruiz and smiled at him. Ruiz leveled a gun to her head and shot her once, killing her. He then left the scene, got rid of his truck, played some basketball, and went to bed. On Friday, July 17, Mark paid Ruiz the second $1000.00 installment. Ruiz “spent it all on clothes and partying.”

In the early hours of the morning on July 23, 1992, officers of the San Antonio Police Department arrested Ruiz at an apartment in San Antonio. ³ Thereafter, Ruiz gave police investigators three voluntary, written statements in which he admitted the above-referenced facts relating to his killing of Theresa Rodriguez.⁴ On October 21, 1992, a Bexar County grand jury indicted Ruiz on a single count of capital murder.⁵ After Ruiz retracted his earlier admissions, his case proceeded to a jury trial. ⁶ At trial, Ruiz claimed that he had never confessed to Theresa's murder-for-hire but merely signed blank Miranda waiver forms.⁷ Though Ruiz admitted that he killed Theresa, he claimed that he had done so unintentionally after ingesting a large quantity of narcotics.⁸ The prosecution responded by presenting testimony from police officers and civilian witnesses who confirmed that all three of Ruiz's written statements were knowing and voluntary.⁹ It also presented a variety of circumstantial evidence to prove that Ruiz had killed Theresa pursuant to an agreement with the Rodriguez brothers.¹⁰

On January 18, 1995, after deliberating for slightly over two hours, the jury returned its verdict, finding Ruiz guilty of capital murder.¹¹ On the same date, the punishment phase of Ruiz's trial began.¹² Under the applicable Texas capital sentencing statute, the jury had to make two unanimous determinations to sentence Ruiz to death. First, it had to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that Ruiz posed a continuing danger to society.¹³ Second, it had to determine that taking into consideration all of the evidence, including the circumstances of Ruiz's offense, his character and background, and his personal moral culpability, there were insufficient mitigating circumstances to warrant a sentenceof life imprisonment rather than a death sentence.¹⁴

The prosecution presented overwhelming evidence of Ruiz's character for violence. Three close friends of Ruiz testified that Ruiz liked to fight and sometimes carried a gun.¹⁵ A police officer and an eyewitness testified about an incident on June 8, 1992, in which Ruiz pulled his then-girlfriend, Roxanne Conway, out of her car, viciously beat her, stole the car, and proceeded to lead police on a brief chase before finally surrendering the vehicle.¹⁶ Numerous officers and guards from the Bexar County Adult Detention Center testified that while Ruiz was awaiting trial, he had joined the violent Texas Syndicate prison gang.¹⁷ They also testified that Ruiz and other gang members had viciously attacked prison guards and other inmates on at least three occasions in 1992 and 1993, with each incident resulting in serious injuries.¹⁸

The defense's sentencing stage strategy apparently focused on disproving the prosecution's case for Ruiz's violent character. Ruiz's friend testified that Ruiz was a nice person.¹⁹ Ruiz's former basketball coach and teacher described Ruiz as an excellent, polite student.²⁰ Ruiz's uncle and cousin testified that they had never known Ruiz to be violent, that they were unaware of his drug problems, and that they did not believe he deserved to die. ²¹ Ruiz's mother testified that Ruiz had a “normal” childhood, had displayed no behavioral problems as a child, had expressed remorse for his crime, and was still a good person inside who deserved to live.²² She suggested that Ruiz began having problems at age 17, when he started abusing drugs.²³ Finally, Roxanne Conway, Ruiz's former girlfriend, testified that Ruiz was always “very sweet” and “caring” to her, that he had apologized for assaulting her, and that she had forgiven him because she believed that his attack was due to his drug problem.²⁴ On cross-examination, however, Conway admitted that at the time of the assault, she felt as though Ruiz was trying to kill her.²⁵ Moreover, Conway acknowledged that she had suffered severe facial and dental injuries as a consequence of Ruiz's attack, which required stitches and multiple dental surgeries.²⁶

In its closing statement to the sentencing jury, the prosecution observed that the defense's own witness, Roxanne Conway, underscored Ruiz's danger to society.²⁷ The prosecution pointed out that the defense had proffered “no evidence ... whatsoeverof anything mitigating,” noting that “there is nothing about [Ruiz's] background, his upbringing, his education, nothing about his personal moral culpability that diminishes in any way the fact that he deserves to pay [the death] penalty.” ²⁸ On January 20, 1995, after deliberating for slightly over 90 minutes, the jury found for the prosecution on both special issues, sentencing Ruiz to death. ²⁹

II.

On February 18, 2004, Ruiz filed a federal habeas petition claiming that his trial counsel, Donald Mach, had failed to investigate and present mitigating evidence of Ruiz's abusive childhood.³⁰ The district court reluctantly rejected Ruiz's ineffective assistance claim as procedurally defaulted, noting that Ruiz's state habeas counsel had presented the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (“CCA”) with a set of “boilerplate, frivolous” arguments that did not include an ineffective assistance claim.³¹ The court observed that Ruiz's claim was “potentially meritorious” and characterized his state habeas counsel's representation as “appallingly inept” and “egregiously deficient.” ³² Nevertheless, the court rejected Ruiz's request for a stay while Ruiz returned to the CCA to raise his ostensibly defaulted claim, observing that “such an action would be an exercise in futility.” ³³

Notwithstanding the district court's admonition, Ruiz filed a second petition for state habeas relief raising his ineffective assistance claim, along with affidavits and other supporting documentation.³⁴ The CCA rejected Ruiz's petition in a summary order.³⁵ Ruiz then returned to the federal district court on a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment, arguing that the CCA's dismissal was an on-the-merits rejection of his ineffective assistance claim that undermined the district court's earlier judgment that the claim was procedurally defaulted.³⁶ The district court rejected Ruiz's motion, defending its earlier opinion and finding that the CCA's summary dismissal rested on state procedural grounds.³⁷ Ruiz appealed to this Court, which reversed and remanded to the district court to consider Ruiz's ineffective assistance claim on the merits.³⁸ As we explained in our remand opinion, the CCA's summary dismissal can reasonably be read as an on-the-merits rejection of Ruiz's ineffective assistance claim.³⁹ Under Michigan v. Long, which establishes that a state court dismissal of a federal...