Rumler v. Department of Corrections, Florida

Page 1334

546 F.Supp.2d 1334

Victoria RUMLER, Plaintiff, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, State of FLORIDA, Defendant.

Case No. 2:06-cv-522-FtM-34SPC.

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Fort Myers Division.

April 25, 2008.

Marcus W. Viles, Mark C. Menser, Viles & Beckman, PA, Patrick E. Geraghty, Geraghty, Dougherty & Edwards, PA, Michael Lewis Beckman, Rosado Law Firm PA, Ft. Myers, FL, for Plaintiff.

William Ogden Kratochvil, George, Hartz, Lundeen, Fulmer, Johnstone, King & Stevens, Ft. Myers, FL, for Defendant.

AMENDED ORDER¹

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD, District Judge.

This case is before the Court on Defendants' [sic], Florida Department of Corrections, Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 18; Motion to Dismiss) filed on December 27, 2006. Defendant moves pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)), to dismiss Count I, in part, of the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 19; Amended Complaint), as well as Count III in its entirety on the grounds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Motion at 1. On January 16, 2007, Plaintiff filed Plaintiff Victoria Rumler's Response to Defendant's Motion [sic] to Dismiss Amended Complaint (with Memorandum) (Doc. No. 27; Response). The parties have submitted briefs regarding their respective positions, and the matter is ripe for disposition.

I. Background Facts²

Plaintiff Victoria Rumler alleges that in 2001, while employed as a Corrections Officer with the Florida Department of Corrections (Florida DOC), she "was the victim of an inmate attack which left her with physical as well as psychological injuries." Amended Complaint ¶ 12. At the time, Plaintiff "was an outstanding employee with consistently very good performance evaluations and who qualified for performance bonuses." Id. ¶ 11. As a result of the injuries she sustained in the attack, Plaintiff was "medically precluded from returning to work as a Corrections Officer or from having direct inmate contact." Id. ¶ 12. Accordingly, Plaintiff filed for and received workers' compensation benefits, and later obtained new employment with the Florida DOC as a "stores consultant," which entailed a transfer to Hendry Correctional Institution (Hendry C.I.) in Hendry County, Florida. Id. ¶ 13. The "stores consultant" position "involves work outside the prison compound itself and does not require entry into the prison or contact with inmates in their cells." Id. ¶ 14. Nonetheless, Plaintiff contends that, in an effort to force her to resign, the Florida DOC demanded that, "in addition to her duties as [s]tores [c]onsultant, [she] assume the duty of mail carrier, responsible for the hand delivery of legal mail to inmates, in the prison, in their cells." Id. ¶ 15. Plaintiff asserts that the decision to require her to become a mail carrier, "against the advice of her doctor, was a deliberate and knowing attempt to punish [her] for filing for Worker's [sic] Compensation benefits." Id. ¶ 16. She maintains that she "repeatedly asked for a return to her normal duties," and also made a request for accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Id. ¶ 17, Exhibit D. Plaintiff claims that her demands were "ignored or rejected." Id. ¶ 17.

In 2005, Plaintiff became pregnant, and experienced medical complications with the pregnancy. Id. ¶ 18. She "requested relief from her mail-carrier duties or ... some effort to accommodate her due to her physical condition," but Defendant refused. Id. Accordingly, Plaintiff alleges that she filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which was received by the EEOC on September 12, 2005. Id. ¶ 19.

On November 5, 2005, Plaintiff "applied for and received family leave under the Family Leave Act." Id. ¶ 21. After the birth of her child in January 2006, Plaintiff began experiencing "serious health problems." Id. ¶ 22. Thus, Plaintiff sought relief through the "Sick Leave Pool," and although she claims that Defendant "mishandled the sick leave request," Plaintiff received 600 hours of sick time donated by state workers. Id. ¶ 23. During this time, she further alleges that Defendant "refused to properly credit [her] accumulated leaves, shorted [sic] her pay and caused her health insurance to lapse .... [and] ignored the Plaintiff's regular and required communications regarding her medical status and absenteeism." Id. ¶ 24. Plaintiff also alleges that the new warden was absent or unavailable at the time of these events. Id. ¶ 25.

The EEOC notified Defendant of Plaintiff's claims, and Defendant responded to the charge on January 11, 2006. Id. ¶ 26. Thereafter, on May 31, 2006, Jim Tridico, the acting Warden of Hendry C.I., sent Plaintiff a letter, advising her that disciplinary charges were being brought against her for "conduct inconsistent with the maintenance of proper security and welfare of the institution; excessive absenteeism; absence without authorized leave; negligence; conduct unbecoming a public employee and failure to follow oral or written instructions." Id. Exhibit G at 1. Subsequently, on June 8, 2006, Plaintiff submitted written notice to Defendant of her intent to file additional charges with the EEOC for retaliation if Defendant continued to "force [her] to deliver the legal mail and go on the Compound and/or Confinement. ..." Id. Exhibit F. A "predetermination conference" was held in the Warden's office at Hendry C.I., in which "the Warden reviewed and adjudicated the charges against [Plaintiff]."³ Id. ¶ 30. On July 14, 2006, Warden Tridico sent Plaintiff a letter notifying her that her employment had been terminated, effective at the close of business on the same day. Id. Exhibit H at 1.

At the time of Plaintiff's predetermination hearing, her ADA complaint was still pending before the EEOC. Id. ¶ 31. After an investigation, the EEOC determined that pregnancy, the specific disability claimed by Plaintiff, did not fall within the Act, and therefore denied relief. See id. ¶ 32. Plaintiff was provided with a Notice of Right to Sue by the EEOC On June 29, 2006. See id. ¶ 5, Exhibit A. In addition, prior to the commencement of the instant action, Plaintiff alleges that she filed a timely written charge of retaliation under the ADA with the EEOC. Id. ¶ 5. Further, she alleges that she submitted written notice to the Florida Department of Financial Services and the Defendant as required by Florida Statutes section 768.28(6). Id. ¶ 7.

II. Procedural History

The Complaint in this action was originally filed in this Court on September 29, 2006, see Complaint (Doc. No. 1), and later amended after Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, see Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 8);⁴ Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 19; Amended Complaint). In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following three claims against the Florida DOC: retaliatory firing in violation of the ADA (Count I); deprivation of a property interest in employment without due process of law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count II);⁵ and retaliation in violation of Florida's Workers' Compensation Act (Count III).⁶ See Amended Complaint at 8-9, 11-12. On January 17, 2007, the parties submitted a Case Management Report (Doc. No. 28; Case Management Report), and on January 19, 2007, the Honorable Sheri Polster Chappell, United States Magistrate Judge, entered a Case Management and Scheduling Order (Doc. No. 29; Case Management Order) setting the deadlines for this case. The Case Management Order initially established October 5, 2007, as the deadline for completing discovery and November 5, 2007, as the deadline for filing dispositive motions. Case Management Order at 1. However, the discovery deadline was initially extended to October 29, 2007, see Order (Doc. No. 48), and later to March 10, 2008, and the deadline to file dispositive motions was extended to April 11, 2008, see Order (Doc. No. 56). On November 8, 2007, Magistrate Judge Chappell entered an order resetting this case for the August 2008 trial term. See id. As noted above, on December 27, 2006, Defendant filed the instant Motion seeking dismissal of Count I, in part, and Count III of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint.

III. Standard of Review

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court "must accept the allegations set forth in the complaint as true." Lotierzo v. A Woman's World Med. Ctr., 278 F.3d 1180, 1182 (11th Cir.2002); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n. 1, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002). In addition, all reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Omar ex. rel. Cannon v. Lindsey, 334 F.3d 1246, 1247 (11th Cir.2003) (per curiam). Nonetheless, the plaintiff must still meet some minimal pleading requirements. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262-63 (11th Cir.2004) (citations omitted). Indeed, while "[s]pecific facts are not necessary," the complaint should "`give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Erickson v. Pardus, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," Bell Atlantic, 127 S.Ct. at 1974. The "plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. at 1964-65 (internal quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that "[c]onclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal") (internal citation and quotations omitted).

IV. Discussion

In the Motion, Defendant argues that dismissal of Count I, in part, as well as Count III of...