Russell v. N.Y. Univ.

Avram S. Turkel, for appellant.

Joseph C. O'Keefe, for respondents New York University, et al.

David M. Alberts, for respondents Joseph M. Thometz et al.

OPINION

GARCIA, J.

Plaintiff was subjected to offensive and demeaning conduct by her colleagues and sued them and her employer in federal court alleging violations of various federal, New York State, and New York City statutes, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The parties engaged in the full discovery process, including depositions and document production, and defendants moved for summary judgment. A federal judge made detailed factual findings and applied those findings to defendants' federal claims, ultimately granting defendants' summary judgment motions, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff brought a nearly identical suit in Supreme Court, raising claims over which the federal district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Supreme Court dismissed plaintiff's complaint as barred by collateral estoppel and for failing to state a claim, the Appellate Division agreed, and we now affirm.

For several months, plaintiff, an adjunct professor at NYU, received unsolicited, offensive mail to her NYU mailbox and email account that targeted her based on her age, religion, gender identity, and sexual orientation. She was also the victim of online impersonation, with offensive comments posted in her name on various websites. She reported this conduct to various individuals and employment offices at NYU and the incidents were thoroughly investigated, the offenders sought, and measures taken to limit the harmful impact of the conduct on plaintiff. Dissatisfied with NYU's response, plaintiff elected to file suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against NYU and certain administrators (collectively, NYU), as well as the individuals she claimed were responsible for the conduct against her (the individual defendants), alleging discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation under various federal statutes, the New York State Human Rights Law (the State HRL), and the New York City Human Rights Law (the City HRL), as well as a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED).

A court-annexed mediation between the parties was unsuccessful, and the parties proceeded to discovery, entering into a standard confidentiality agreement before exchanging documents and conducting depositions. After receiving discovery materials designated confidential, plaintiff contacted an NYU professor identified by defendants as a potential witness and sent her a series of hostile and threatening emails. Despite receiving a cease-and-desist letter from NYU's counsel, plaintiff continued to send disturbing emails to the potential witness. Several days later, plaintiff received a letter advising her that her NYU employment was terminated because she "was engaged in harassing, intimidating, and threatening a faculty member" and was "in violation of a court directive."

Plaintiff's union filed a grievance challenging her termination. An arbitrator later determined that plaintiff had engaged in misconduct that justified "some discipline," that it was a "serious issue that required a serious response," but that the conduct "did not rise to the level that would justify immediate termination." The arbitrator awarded plaintiff back pay but did not award reinstatement. Plaintiff amended her complaint to allege retaliation based on her termination, claiming that she was fired for refusing to settle during the mediation.

At the close of discovery, NYU and the individual defendants moved for summary judgment. In a thorough opinion with extensive fact finding, the district court granted defendants' motions (Russell v New York Univ., 2017 WL 3049534, * 31-38 [SD NY, July 17, 2017, No. 15 Civ. 2185 (GHW)]). In short, the district court rejected plaintiff's hostile work environment claim because "no reasonable jury could find that NYU responded negligently here," and plaintiff's discrimination and retaliation claims because plaintiff presented no evidence that her termination occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination, no evidence of a causal connection between her termination and any protected activity, no evidence that her termination was a pretext for discrimination, and no evidence of any retaliatory motive for her termination (2017 WL 3049536, *31-36). The district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's City and State HRL claims and dismissed those claims without prejudice (id. at *39-40). Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of her hostile work environment and retaliation claims and the Second Circuit affirmed (739 Fed.Appx 28 [2d Cir 2018]).

While her appeal was pending, plaintiff filed this action in Supreme Court, Bronx County, alleging violations of the State and City HRLs, renewing her IIED claim, adding another NYU administrator as a defendant, and asserting a new protected category of disability. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint as barred by collateral estoppel and for failure to state a claim, and Supreme Court granted these motions (2020 NY Slip Op 35215[U], *17 [Sup Ct, Bronx County 2020]). The court dismissed the discrimination claims against the NYU defendants, on the basis that the federal district court found "that the NYU defendants exhaustively investigated the harassment by the individual defendants, that the NYU defendants were not [] aware of and did not participate in the harassment, [and] that they took reasonable action to address the claims" (id. at *11). Next, the court dismissed the retaliation claims against NYU, reasoning that "under the more liberal analysis of the City Human Rights Law," "no basis exists for a finding that unlawful discrimination was the basis for an adverse employment action" based on the "factual findings of the federal court [that] make clear that no pretext or retaliatory animus existed for the termination of plaintiff's employment" (2020 NY Slip Op 35215[U], *13-15). Plaintiff's claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed, with the court holding that the district court's findings that the individual defendants had no supervisory role over plaintiff precluded any claim under the relevant statutes because "co-workers who engage in discriminatory conduct who have no role in supervision or terms of employment are not liable under the NYCHRL or the NYSHRL" (id. at *16). Derivative aiding and abetting claims against the individual defendants did not survive because the primary claims against NYU were dismissed (id.).

The Appellate Division affirmed, with the full panel agreeing that plaintiff was collaterally estopped from proceeding on her discrimination and hostile work environment claims and that the individual defendants could not be held liable under the City HRL in the absence of any supervisory authority (204 A.D.3d 577, 579, 593 [1st Dept 2022]). While the majority held that plaintiff was collaterally estopped from proceeding on her retaliation claim by the federal court's finding "that plaintiff failed to present evidence that NYU's reason [for plaintiff's termination] was pretextual" (id. at 579-580), the dissent would have held that "[t]he temporal proximity between plaintiff's refusal to settle her discrimination claims and her termination some five weeks later supports an inference that she was terminated in retaliation for refusing to settle and continuing to prosecute her discrimination claims," "buttressed by the arbitrator's finding that her termination was an unduly harsh remedy for her conduct" (id. at 588). Plaintiff's appeal comes to this Court as of right pursuant to CPLR 5601 (a).

II.

The courts below properly applied our established principles of collateral estoppel in the context of the unique requirements of the City Human Rights Law. Collateral estoppel "bars the relitigation of an issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determination essential to the prior judgment" and so "the determination of an essential issue is binding in a subsequent action, even if it recurs in the context of a different claim" (Paramount Pictures Corp. v Allianz Risk Transfer AG, 31 N.Y.3d 64, 72 [2018] [internal citations and quotation marks omitted]). If there is identity of issues between the prior determination and the instant litigation, and the precluded party had a full and fair opportunity to contest the prior determination, collateral estoppel applies and the prior determination is binding in the subsequent action (see Kaufman v Eli Lilly & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 449, 455 [1985]).

Courts in New York are not infrequently called upon to apply these principles in cases where plaintiffs have initially sought to have their rights vindicated in federal court, particularly in the employment context. After federal courts in those cases have supervised extensive discovery, made findings of fact and liability determinations adverse to plaintiffs, granted summary judgment on the federal claims, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over claims brought under the City and State HRLs, plaintiffs may opt to pursue these claims in state courts (see e.g. Johnson v IAC/Inter Active Corp., 179 A.D.3d 551, 552 [1st Dept 2020] [collateral estoppel applied to preclude plaintiff's claims under the "more liberal analysis" of City HRL following district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants]; Williams v NYC Transit Auth., 171 A.D.3d 990, 992-993 [2d Dept 2019] [same]; Milione v City University of NY, 153 A.D.3d 807, 808-809 [2d Dept 2017] [same]; Simmons-Grant v Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP, 116 A.D.3d 134,...