Russell v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

426 S.C. 281

826 S.E.2d 863

Paula RUSSELL, Claimant, Petitioner,

v.WAL-MART STORES, INC., Employer, and Illinois National Insurance Company, Carrier, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2018-000354

Opinion No. 27875

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard February 21, 2019

Filed April 3, 2019

C. Daniel Vega, of Chappell Smith & Arden, P.A., of Columbia, for Petitioner.

Johnnie W. Baxley III, of Willson Jones Carter & Baxley, of Mount Pleasant, for Respondents.

JUSTICE FEW :

An appellate panel of the workers' compensation commission remanded Paula Russell's change of condition claim to a single commissioner for what would be a third ruling on the same claim. Russell appealed the remand order to the court of appeals, which dismissed the appeal on the ground the order was not a final decision, and thus not immediately appealable. We find the remand order is immediately appealable because the commission's unwarranted delay in making a final decision requires immediate review to avoid leaving Russell with no adequate remedy on an appeal from a final decision. We reverse the court of appeals' order dismissing the appeal, reverse the appellate panel's remand order, and remand to any appellate panel of the commission for an immediate and final review of the original commissioner's decision.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Russell injured her back in 2009 while working at a Wal-Mart store in Conway. The commission found Russell suffered a 7% permanent partial disability, and awarded her twenty-one weeks of temporary total disability compensation. In 2011, Russell requested review of her award, claiming there had been a "change of condition caused by the original injury" pursuant to subsection 42-17-90(A) of the South Carolina Code (2015).

A single commissioner conducted a full evidentiary hearing on the 2011 claim on February 11, 2013. In a detailed order dated August 5, 2013, the commissioner found Russell had proven a change of condition. The commissioner ordered Wal-Mart to pay temporary total disability benefits beyond the original twenty-one weeks "through the present date and continuing." The commissioner based the award on Russell's testimony, and the testimony and medical records of two treating physicians. The commissioner explained in her order she relied on testimony of the two physicians who described a "physical, anatomical change" and an "increase in the size of the disc protrusion," demonstrated by an "objective" comparison of MRI images taken before and after the award.

An appellate panel reversed the commissioner. The panel dismissed Russell's testimony on the ground "it is conclusory and self-serving." The panel discounted the testimony and medical records of the two physicians, stating, "Both [physicians] ultimately testified there was no objective or significant radiographical difference to be noted in the MRI scans done before and after the original award." In an order dated January 30, 2014, the panel found Russell "failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence ... [she] has sustained a change of condition."

Russell appealed to the court of appeals. The court of appeals found the appellate panel "erred in requiring a change of condition to be established by objective evidence." Russell v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 415 S.C. 395, 398, 782 S.E.2d 753, 755 (Ct. App. 2016). The court of appeals reversed the panel and remanded "to the Commission," 415 S.C. at 401, 782 S.E.2d at 757, with no express remand instructions.

The court of appeals remitted the case to the commission on May 3, 2016. On March 20, 2017, a second commissioner filed a detailed order finding Russell "met her burden of proving a change of condition." On September 15, 2017, however, a new appellate panel vacated the second commissioner's order and remanded for what would be a third commissioner to make a third ruling. The panel stated, "At the remand hearing, the Single Commissioner shall conduct a full evidentiary hearing and allow both parties to submit testimony, medical records, and other additional evidence for consideration as to the issue of any award of benefits under the Act if the change of condition is found to be compensable."

Russell appealed the September 15, 2017 order to the court of appeals. In an unpublished decision, the court of appeals found the appellate panel's remand order was not immediately appealable and dismissed the appeal. Russell filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with this Court. She argued the commission's repeated remands for new hearings created a "perpetual"¹ "cycle of orders and appeals such that [she] will be deprived of an adequate remedy." We granted the petition, and now reverse.

II. Analysis

One primary goal of the Workers' Compensation Act is to provide quick and efficient resolution of work-related injury claims so neither employers nor employees become bogged down in complicated and protracted litigation. See Peay v. U.S. Silica Co. , 313 S.C. 91, 94, 437 S.E.2d 64, 65 (1993) (recognizing "Workers' compensation laws were intended by the Legislature to ... provid[e] sure, swift recovery for workplace injuries regardless of fault"). This Court recently emphasized the goal, stating, "The Workers' Compensation Act was designed to supplant tort law by providing a no-fault system focusing on quick recovery, relatively ascertainable awards, and limited litigation." Nicholson v. S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. , 411 S.C. 381, 389, 769 S.E.2d 1, 5 (2015) (citing Wigfall v. Tideland Utils., Inc. , 354 S.C. 100, 115, 580 S.E.2d 100, 107 (2003) ).² The court of appeals addressed this goal in another case in which the commission unreasonably delayed addressing the merits of claims, stating, "If the claimants were entitled to benefits, they were entitled to receive them many years ago. If the claimants were not entitled to benefits, [the employers] were entitled to have the claims denied many years ago." Ex parte S.C. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n , 411 S.C. 501, 506, 768 S.E.2d 670, 673 (Ct. App. 2015).

The Administrative Procedures Act limits the role of the judicial branch of government in meeting the goal of quick decisions in limited litigation by restricting appeals to final decisions in most cases. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380 (Supp. 2018) ("A party ... who is aggrieved by a final decision ... is entitled to judicial review...."); Spalt v. S.C. Dep't of Motor Vehicles , 423 S.C. 576, 583, 816 S.E.2d 579, 583 (2018) (stating "the Administrative Procedures Act permits an appeal only from ‘a final decision ...’ " (quoting Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth. v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control , 387 S.C. 265, 266, 692 S.E.2d 894 (2010) )). Nevertheless, this Court has struggled to foster quick and efficient resolution of work-related injury claims by discouraging the commission from making repeated, unnecessary remands. In Bone v. U.S. Food Service , we cited "lingering confusion in this area [of immediate appealability] that has arisen after the passage of the Administrative Procedures Act" as a basis for granting certiorari to review the court of appeals' dismissal of an interlocutory appeal. 399 S.C. 566, 570, 733 S.E.2d 200, 202 (2012), adhered to on reh'g , 404 S.C. 67, 744 S.E.2d 552 (2013). Ultimately, we denied an immediate appeal and permitted a remand for a new hearing, 404 S.C. at 84, 744 S.E.2d at 562, but we highlighted the prejudice employers and employees may suffer from delaying appeal of interlocutory orders until after final judgment, 404 S.C. at 82-83, 744 S.E.2d at 561. The dissent in Bone addressed the problem even more directly. Justice Hearn wrote, "Moreover, the interests of judicial economy demand a rejection of the majority's view. Taken to its logical conclusion, the majority's position could have cases trapped in a cycle of remands for years." 404 S.C. at 92, 744 S.E.2d at 566 (Hearn, J., dissenting).

In Hilton v. Flakeboard America Limited , 418 S.C. 245, 791 S.E.2d 719 (2016), we again faced the prejudice workers' compensation litigants may encounter when the commission orders repeated remands, and appeal must be delayed until a final decision. We stated, "Under these unique circumstances where the Commission has ordered the relitigation of the entire dispute without regard to the matters raised by the appealing party, we find that requiring Hilton to wait until the final agency decision to appeal would not provide him an adequate remedy." 418 S.C. at 250, 791 S.E.2d at 722 ; see § 1-23-380 ("A preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or ruling is immediately reviewable if review of the final agency decision would not provide an adequate remedy."). We foresaw in Hilton precisely what has happened in this case, that "a party could face the possibility of repeated unexplained ‘do overs’ before a final decision of the Commission." 418 S.C. at 252, 791 S.E.2d at 723. In Hilton , we granted an immediate appeal despite the fact the commission's order was not a final decision. Id. ; see also 418 S.C. at 253, 791 S.E.2d at 723 (Kittredge, J., concurring) (contending "the petitioners in Bone made the identical argument ..., that review of a final agency decision would not provide an adequate remedy").

If this Court's role in achieving this goal of the Workers' Compensation Act is limited, however, the commission's role is primary. See James v. Anne's Inc. , 390 S.C. 188, 201-02, 701 S.E.2d 730, 737 (2010) (stating the " ‘workers' compensation commission ... is, in the first instance, responsible for effectuating the purposes of the workers' compensation act by administering, enforcing, and construing its provisions in order to secure its humane objectives.’ " (quoting 100 C.J.S. Workers' Compensation § 706 (2000) )). The Workers' Compensation Act sets forth the procedure the commission should follow to fulfill its purpose. Subsection 42-17-40(A) of the South Carolina Code (2015) provides, "The commission or any of its members shall hear the parties at issue and their...