Russo v. Patchogue-Medford Sch. Dist.

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DAYNA RUSSO, Plaintiff, v. PATCHOGUE-MEDFORD SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.

No. 22-CV-01569 (HG) (SIL)

United States District Court, E.D. New York

January 12, 2024

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

HECTOR GONZALEZ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff is an employee of Defendant Patchogue-Medford School District, which was subject to a New York State Department of Health requirement mandating it to implement periodic COVID-19 testing. As an alternative to testing, school personnel could provide proof that they had received a COVID-19 vaccine. After Defendant implemented the state's test-or-vaccination requirement, Plaintiff sought several different religious accommodations, which Defendant denied and Defendant placed her on unpaid leave until the state's requirement expired. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant's denial of her requests for accommodation violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and that certain information that Defendant asked about Plaintiff and her family when assessing her proposed accommodations violated the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (“GINA”).

Defendant has moved for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's claims in full. ECF No. 19 (Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment). The Court grants Defendant's motion and dismisses Plaintiff's complaint because, as further set forth below, no reasonable jury could: (i) reject Defendant's defense that Plaintiff's proposed accommodations would impose an undue hardship on Defendant, or (ii) find that the information Defendant requested from Plaintiff fell within the scope of information protected by GINA.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a school psychologist employed by Defendant Patchogue-Medford School District. ECF No. 22 at 37 (Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment). She received a probationary appointment to that position in advance of the 20182019 school year and received tenure effective August 29, 2021. Id. at 37-39. Plaintiff's job responsibilities included: (i) performing “behavioral,” “psychological,” and “educational” assessments of students; (ii) participating in one-on-one and group counseling sessions with students; and (iii) “conducting non-violent crisis intervention.” ECF No. 19-7 at 2 (Exhibit E to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment).

On September 2, 2021, the New York State Department of Health issued a determination, pursuant to delegated authority requiring both public and non-public schools that served students between pre-kindergarten and the twelfth grade to implement weekly COVID-19 testing. ECF No. 19-3 (Exhibit A to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment). That determination also allowed school personnel to opt out of testing by providing proof that they had received a COVID-19 vaccine. Id. Plaintiff was unwilling to do either based on her religious belief that receiving medical intervention would amount to an abandonment of her faith in God's protection and ability to keep her healthy. ECF No 22 at 30-35. Plaintiff considers both COVID-19 vaccines and tests to be medical interventions. Id. Plaintiff also opposed receiving certain types of COVID-19 vaccines for the additional reason that they were allegedly tested or produced using fetal cells that were derived from an aborted human fetus. Id. at 32.

Plaintiff asked one of Defendant's Assistant Superintendents by email for a religious exemption from the state's test-or-vaccination requirement. ECF No. 19-4 (Exhibit B to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment). He responded by informing Plaintiff that the requirement did not authorize religious exemptions. Id. Approximately two weeks after that email exchange, the Assistant Superintendent met twice with Plaintiff, another Assistant Superintendent, and a representative from Plaintiff's union to discuss Plaintiff's request for an exemption. ECF Nos. 19-5 & 19-6 (Exhibits C and D to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment). During the first meeting, Defendant offered Plaintiff an accommodation of receiving a saliva-based test, rather than the nasal swab that it was using for other employees. ECF No. 19-6 at 2.

Plaintiff also provided Defendant with a letter describing in greater detail her religious objections to receiving COVID-19 vaccines or tests. ECF No. 22 at 30-35. In that letter, Plaintiff requested, as an alternative accommodation, that she be permitted to work in-person while completing periodic health questionnaires, as Defendant's employees had previously done when working in-person before the state implemented its test-or-vaccination requirement. Id. at 34. During Plaintiff's second meeting, one of the Assistant Superintendents asked Plaintiff whether she or her child had previously received vaccines, about her views on certain medical procedures, and whether Plaintiff's child attended periodic doctor's appointments. ECF No. 1 at 14, 31-32 (Complaint); ECF No. 19-6 at 2. Plaintiff claims that, by requesting this information, the district violated GINA. ECF No. 1 at 14.

After the second meeting, one of Defendant's Assistant Superintendents sent Plaintiff a letter denying Plaintiff's request for an accommodation. ECF No. 19-6. Defendant explained that exempting Plaintiff from the state's test-or-vaccination requirement, including by permitting Plaintiff to work in-person while completing health questionnaires, would impose an undue hardship on Defendant because it would bring Defendant out of compliance with state law. Id. at 2-3.

Defendant further stated that exempting Plaintiff from the state's requirement would increase the risk of COVID-19 transmission among students and school personnel. Id.

Plaintiff responded to Defendant's denial of her requested accommodations by writing a letter to Defendant's Superintendent. ECF No. 22 at 66-69. In that letter, Plaintiff proposed as yet another potential accommodation that she be permitted to work remotely and that Defendant limit her job responsibilities to tasks that could be performed remotely. Id. at 67-68. Plaintiff noted that she had performed some of her work remotely at various points during the COVID-19 pandemic and that her role as the chairperson of the district's special education committee was still being performed remotely. Id. The Superintendent responded to Plaintiff's request by confirming that Defendant was denying Plaintiff's prior requests for accommodations and also denying her proposed accommodation of remote work. ECF No. 19-7. The Superintendent explained that allowing Plaintiff to work remotely would impose an undue hardship on Defendant because Plaintiff's physical presence was necessary to perform essential functions of her job. Id. at 2.

Defendant ultimately placed Plaintiff on an unpaid leave of absence, starting on October 12, 2021, and continuing for the remainder of the 2021-2022 school year, or until the state's test-or-vaccination requirement expired, whichever was earlier. ECF No. 22 at 59, 61-62. Since that requirement did expire at the end of the school year, Defendant ended Plaintiff's leave status, effective July 1, 2022, and she resumed performing her duties with pay. Id. at 64. Defendant hired a temporary replacement to cover Plaintiff's position and paid that employee a pro-rated annual salary of $68,030. ECF No. 19-8 at 11 (Exhibit F to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment).

Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and the New York State Division of Human Rights, alleging that Defendant discriminated against her because of her religion. ECF No. 1 at 48-51. Plaintiff did not check the box on that form indicating that she was asserting a claim for discrimination based on “genetic information.” Id. at 48. However, Plaintiff's description of Defendant's allegedly discriminatory conduct included the fact that Defendant asked questions about Plaintiff's and her child's medical history when assessing her request for a religious exemption. Id. at 49. The EEOC sent Plaintiff a right-to-sue letter on December 27, 2021, which explained that Plaintiff must commence any lawsuit within 90 days. Id. at 52. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on March 22, 2022, thereby complying with the 90-day time limit. Id. at 1.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In other words, a court should grant summary judgment “if the pleadings, depositions answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986).^[1] The moving party has the burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “Where the moving party demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the opposing party must come forward with specific evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact.” Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co., 654 F.3d 347, 358 (2d Cir. 2011).

When deciding a summary judgment motion, any ambiguities and inferences drawn from the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. LaFond v. Gen Physics Servs. Corp., 50 F.3d 165, 171 (2d Cir. 1995). Additionally, “it is well established that a court is ordinarily obligated to afford a special solicitude to pro se litigants, particularly where motions for summary judgment are concerned.” Harris v. Miller, 818 F.3d 49, 57 (2d Cir. 2016). This means that the Court must “liberally construe pleadings and briefs submitted by pro...