Ryan v. Adams

RICHARD A. RYAN, Petitioner, v. MALINDA ADAMS, SUPERINTENDENT DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, Respondents.

Civil Action No. 2:19-cv-0542

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania

June 3, 2021

Marilyn J. Horan, United States District Judge

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Cynthia Reed Eddy, Chief United States Magistrate Judge

I. RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner, Richard A. Ryan, a prisoner currently confined at the State Correctional Institution at Mercer, in Mercer, Pennsylvania, has filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 3). He is challenging the judgment of sentence imposed on him by the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, on April 27, 2016, in his criminal case at CP-02-CR-0012696-2015. For the reasons outlined below, it is recommended that the Petition be denied and a certificate of appealability likewise be denied.

II. REPORT

A. Jurisdiction

This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the federal habeas statute applicable to prisoners in custody pursuant to a state court judgment. That provision allows a federal court to grant a state prisoner the writ of habeas corpus “on the ground that he or she is in custody in violation of the Constitution . . . of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). It is Mr. Ryan's burden, as petitioner, to prove he is entitled to the writ. Id., see, e.g., Vickers v. Superintendent Graterford SCI, 858 F.3d 841, 848-49 (3d Cir. 2017).

B. Relevant and Procedural Background

On April 27, 2016, Mr. Ryan pled guilty pursuant to a negotiated guilty plea to Rape of a Child, Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse with a Child, Aggravated Indecent Assault, Incest of a Minor, and Endangering the Welfare of a Child. In exchange, the Commonwealth dismissed five charges^[1] and agreed upon a term of imprisonment to seven to fifteen years.

During the plea and sentencing hearing on April 27, 2016, the Commonwealth summarized the facts of the case:

Your Honor, had the Commonwealth proceeded to trial in this case the Commonwealth would have called Detective Kuma along with Detective Felicion of the Allegheny County Police Department. We also would have called the victim[ ].

The detectives would have testified that they received a report of suspected child sexual abuse through Moon Township Police Department. They took over the investigation of the case and that in speaking with the victim she disclosed at the time of 16 years of age that between the ages of six and eleven years old that she had been repeatedly sexually abused by her father at their residence, that the abuse began as digital penetration of the vagina and progressed to oral sex around the time she was eight years old and progressed to vaginal and anal six.

She would have testified that the defendant is her biological father. She would have testified that these occurrences happened often and regularly in that home. She also would have testified that the defendant being her biological father was in the role as caretaker for her in the home and that these events were occurring over the course of five years and that she did not feel at that young age she would be safe in telling anyone.

And with that, Your Honor, the Commonwealth - I'm sorry, and also the Commonwealth would have introduced evidence of a recorded voice mail from the defendant making statements to someone in order to have them relay as a message to the victim asking that she not proceed with the charges, that she not report this to the police and asking for her mercy and forgiveness for what he had done.

With that the Commonwealth would rest.

Plea and Sentencing Transcript, at 5-7 (ECF No. 27). During the plea hearing, Mr. Ryan was represented by Patrick Sweeney, Esquire, of the Allegheny County Public Defender's office.

Pursuant to the plea agreement, Mr. Ryan was immediately sentenced to a term of seven to fifteen years imprisonment, to be followed by a five-year term of probation. No post-sentence motions were filed and no direct appeal was taken. Commonwealth v. Ryan, No. 47 WDA 2018, Memorandum filed 10/9/2018. (ECF No. 25-5, Exh. 5).

Mr. Ryan then filed a pro se petition for post-conviction collateral relief under Pennsylvania's Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). Attorney Rachel Santoriella was appointed to represent Mr. Ryan during the PCRA proceedings. On January 23, 2018, PCRA counsel filed a No Merit Letter / Motion to Withdraw. The PCRA court denied the petition on March 5, 2018, and Mr. Ryan filed a Notice of Appeal pro se. The PCRA court appointed Attorney Scott Coffey to represent Mr. Ryan in the appeal. The Superior Court affirmed the denial of the PCRA Petition on October 9, 2018, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Mr. Ryan's petition for allowance of appeal.

Having been denied relief in state court, Mr. Ryan filed a pro se federal habeas petition in this Court, in which he raises four issues. (ECF No. 3). Respondents filed an Answer in which they argue that Claims 1-3 should be denied on the merits under AEDPA's standard of review. As to Claim 4, Respondents argue this claim is procedurally defaulted because the Pennsylvania Superior Court deemed it waived on appeal and Mr. Ryan has failed to carry his burden to overcome the procedural default. (ECF No. 25). The Court has reviewed the filings of the parties, the Guilty Plea - Explanation of Defendant's Rights signed by Mr. Ryan and his attorney on April 27, 2016, (ECF No. 27 at 1-11), the Guilty Plea / Sentencing Transcript (ECF No. 27 at 12-24), and the Memorandum Opinion of the Superior Court filed October 9, 2018 (ECF No. 8-1 at 16-25). The matter is briefed and ripe for resolution.

C. The Standard for Habeas Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

“The writ of habeas corpus stands as a safeguard against imprisonment of those held in violation of the law.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 91 (2011). Federal courts reviewing habeas corpus petitions “must be vigilant and independent . . . a commitment that entails substantial judicial resources.” Id. This case is governed by the federal habeas statute applicable to state prisoners, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), “which imposes significant procedural and substantive limitations on the scope” of the Court's review.^[2] Wilkerson v. Superintendent Fayette SCI, 871 F.3d 221, 227 (3d Cir. 2017). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, federal courts in habeas cases must give considerable deference to determinations of state trial and appellate courts. See Renico v. Lett, 599 U.S. 766, 772 (2010). Various standards must be met before the Court can review the merits of Mr. Ryan's habeas petition.

1. Has the Petition Presented Cognizable Habeas Claims?

Habeas relief may be afforded to a state prisoner only when his or her custody violates federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 6 (2010). Mr. Ryan has presented four claims in this federal habeas petition, all of which are cognizable claims.

2. Federal Habeas Review of Properly Exhausted Claims

Among AEDPA's procedural prerequisites is a requirement that the petitioner “has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State” before seeking relief in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). An exhausted claim is one that has been “fairly presented” to the state courts “by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process, ” and which has been adjudicated on the merits. Carpenter v. Vaughn, 296, F.3d 138, 146 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844-45 (1999)); Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 298, 302 (2013). “Fair presentation” of a claim merely requires the petitioner to “present [the] federal claim's factual and legal substance to the state courts in a manner that puts them on notice that a federal claim is being asserted.” Greene v. Palakovich, 606 F.3d 85, 93 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). For § 2254(d) purposes, a claim has been adjudicated on the merits “when a state court has made a decision that finally resolves the claim on the basis of its substance, rather than on a procedural, or other, ground.” Collins v. Sec'y of Pa. Dep't of Corr., 742 F.3d 528, 545 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d 105, 117 (3d Cir. 2009)).

When a claim is properly exhausted in the state courts and then raised on federal habeas review, the level of deference afforded to the state-court decision is substantial. Bey v. Superintendent Greene SCI, 856 F.3d 230, 236 (3d Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub nom., Gilmore v. Bey, 138 S.Ct. 740 (2018). AEDPA “does not ‘permit federal judges to . . . casually second-guess the decisions of their state-court colleagues or defense attorneys.' ” Collins, 742 F.3d at 543 (quoting Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 14 (2013)). As a result, under § 2254(d), federal habeas relief is unavailable for exhausted claims unless the state-court adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law . . . or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

This is an intentionally difficult standard to meet. Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. Section 2254(d) “preserves authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with” clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Id. Thus, to obtain federal habeas relief on an exhausted claim “a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification...