Ryan v. City of Detroit, Case No. 11-CV-10900

DEBORAH RYAN, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF DETROIT, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 11-CV-10900

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

March 25, 2015

HON. MARK A. GOLDSMITH

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS FALK AND SCHULTZ'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Dkt. 148)

I. INTRODUCTION

This is a civil rights case brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff Deborah Ryan, in her individual capacity and as the representative of the estate of her daughter, Patricia "Katie" Williams, filed suit alleging that Defendants City of Detroit, Detroit police officers Dwane Blackmon and Barbara Kozloff, City of Canton, and Canton police officers Adam Falk and Mark Schultz failed to respond properly to a report made to the Canton Police Department ("CPD") of domestic violence committed by Ed Williams upon his wife, Katie Williams. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants' failure enabled Ed to murder Katie, both of whom were Detroit police officers. In her section 1983 claim alleging equal-protection violations against Falk and Schultz (collectively, for purposes of this decision, "Defendants"), Plaintiff contends that Katie was treated less favorably than other alleged victims of domestic violence because her assailant was a police officer.

This matter is presently before the Court on Defendants' third motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity (Dkt. 148). Briefing has been completed, and oralargument was held on December 15, 2014. As explained fully below, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has erroneously advanced a class-of-one theory in support of her equal-protection claim, when, at most, the only arguably viable legal theory to support this claim would be a traditional equal-protection theory. Because the briefing by all parties fails to address this theory, the Court cannot determine at this time whether Defendants are entitled to a judgment disposing of the entirety of Plaintiff's equal-protection claim. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants' motion in part and denies it in part.

II. BACKGROUND

The Court addressed the factual and procedural background of this case in an Opinion and Order granting in part and denying in part a motion for summary judgment filed by the City of Canton, Falk, and Schultz. See Ryan v. City of Detroit, 977 F. Supp. 2d 738, 741-745 (E.D. Mich. 2013). In their submissions, the parties rely, in part, on the facts set forth in that decision. Defs. Br. at 1; Pl. Resp. at 1-2 (Dkt. 150). They also rely on additional facts developed during discovery, but such facts do not bear on the issue upon which this decision is based. Therefore, the Court will not repeat the factual and procedural background set forth in its earlier decision, nor recite the newly adduced facts.

In its decision on the first motion, the Court granted summary judgment to Defendant Canton, holding that Plaintiff had failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact that Canton had a policy or custom of discriminating against victims of domestic violence whose assailants were police officers. Ryan, 977 F. Supp. 2d at 746-752. The Court also denied the motion without prejudice as to Defendants Falk and Schultz because, although they had invoked the defense of qualified immunity, they had failed to develop any argument with regard to Plaintiff's equal-protection claim. Id. at 752-753. To allow the issue to be properly presented to the Court,the parties stipulated to Falk and Schultz's filing of a second motion for summary judgment. 10/11/2013 Stipulated Order (Dkt. 121).

In their second motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 122), Falk and Schultz argued that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that Katie was treated differently than any other domestic-violence victim. See Ryan v. City of Detroit, No. 11-CV-10900, 2013 WL 6730051, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 19, 2013). More specifically, Defendants argued that Plaintiff did not "show any comparison to other domestic violence victims to show a discrepancy in arrest rates, nor [did] she show that [Defendants] failed to arrest Mr. Williams as a means of intentionally discriminating against the decedent." Id. The Court agreed, holding that Plaintiff "must provide comparative evidence establishing differential treatment." Id. at *5. Nonetheless, the Court denied the second motion for summary judgment without prejudice, in order for Plaintiff to conduct further discovery and present comparative evidence. Id. at *7-8. The Court noted that it would entertain a renewed motion for summary judgment, id. at *8, which is now presently before the Court.

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

A court "shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When evaluating a summary judgment motion,

credibility judgments and weighing of the evidence are prohibited. Rather, the evidence should be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Thus, the facts and any inferences that can be drawn from those facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

Biegas v. Quickway Carriers, 573 F.3d 365, 373 (6th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks and brackets omitted).

When a defendant seeks summary judgment, the defendant "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quotation marks omitted). "To withstand summary judgment, the nonmoving party must present sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact." Humenny v. Genex Corp., 390 F.3d 901, 904 (6th Cir. 2004). The opposing party "may not rely on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant's denial of a disputed fact but must make an affirmative showing with proper evidence in order to defeat the motion." Alexander v. CareSource, 576 F.3d 551, 558 (6th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted). A mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient; rather, "there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmovant]." Anderson, 447 U.S. at 252.

IV. ANALYSIS

Government officials, including law enforcement officials, are generally shielded from civil liability when performing discretionary functions, unless their conduct violates a clearly established statutory or constitutional right such that a reasonable officer would have known that his or her conduct was unlawful. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (same). Once a defendant raises qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the defendant is not entitled to such immunity. Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 472 (6th Cir. 2013).

In opposing Defendants' claim of qualified immunity, Plaintiff must show the following: (i) Defendants violated a constitutional or statutory right based on the facts alleged, and (ii) theright was clearly established. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2020 (2014) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001)). If Plaintiff is unable to establish the violation of a constitutional or statutory right, the Court's inquiry ends and Defendants are entitled to immunity. Perez v. Oakland Cnty., 466 F.3d 416, 426-427 (6th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 823 (2007).

Defendants contend that summary judgment should be granted in their favor based on qualified immunity, arguing two central points: (i) they committed no constitutional violation because there was no differential treatment, as compared to similarly situated individuals; and (ii) there is no "clearly established right" of a domestic-violence victim assaulted by a police officer to be treated the same as a domestic-violence victim assaulted by a civilian. Plaintiff responds by asserting that the evidence supports a class-of-one theory. The Court concludes that Plaintiff has not identified sufficient evidence to show a constitutional violation based on a class-of-one theory. However, the Court cannot rule on a traditional equal-protection theory, because that theory is not addressed in the parties' briefing.

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a person acting under the color of state law deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Harris v. City of Circleville, 583 F.3d 356, 364 (6th Cir. 2009) (same). The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits discrimination by the government that "'burdens a fundamental right, targets a suspect class, or intentionally treats one differently than others similarly situated without any rational basis for the difference.'" Loesel v. City of Frankenmuth, 692 F.3d 452, 461 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Rondigo, L.L.C. v. Twp. of Richmond, 641 F.3d 673, 681-682 (6th Cir. 2011)); see also Davis v. Prison Health Servs., 679 F.3d 433, 438 (6th Cir. 2012) ("The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment'protects against invidious discrimination among similarly-situated individuals or implicating fundamental rights.'" (quoting Scarbrough v. Morgan Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 260 (6th Cir. 2006))).

Plaintiff does not contend either that a fundamental right has been burdened or that Katie belonged to a suspect class. Rather, Plaintiff premises her equal-protection claim on a class-of-one theory, as recognized by the Supreme Court in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) and Enquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591 (2008). See Pl. Resp. at 21 (Dkt. 150) (stating...