Ryan v. City of Lincoln, Corp.

RICHARD J. RYAN, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF LINCOLN, a municipal corporation; COUNTY OF PLACER,a charter County; TONI FRAYJI, an individual, FRAYJI DESIGN GROUP INC.,a California Corporation, and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, Defendants.

No. 2:18-cv-00096-KJM-DB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

December 5, 2018

ORDER

Defendant City of Lincoln moves under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) to dismiss all claims against it in plaintiff Richard Ryan's operative First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. ECF No. 12. Having reviewed the complaint's allegations and the parties' respective briefing on the motion, the court GRANTS defendant's motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Ryan brings five claims against the City of Lincoln, among other defendants, related to defendants' alleged taking of Ryan's property for public use without providing just compensation. FAC ¶ 23. Two of the claims are federal claims: Inverse condemnation in violation of the Fifth Amendment (claim 1) and violation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment (claim 2). Id. ¶¶ 23-32. The other three claims are state claims: Making a false promise (claim 3) and two claims for intentional misrepresentation (claims 4 and 5). Id. ¶¶ 33-44. Ryan purchased the subject property—968 Virginiatown Road, Lincoln, California—in 2001. Id. ¶¶ 12-13. In January 2015, Placer County issued Ryan a residential construction permit to build his personal residence on the property. Id. ¶¶ 13-14, 17, 20. On May 6, 2015, the City formally began annexation proceedings with respect to a large portion of County territory to facilitate development of a master-plan community known as the Lincoln Village 1 Specific Plan ("Village 1 Plan"). Id. ¶ 15. Ryan's property sits within the territory that was annexed. Id. Ryan alleges he did not receive notice from the City of the annexation until after it become final, id. ¶ 16; the City promised him, despite the annexation, that he could still "absolutely build his house," id. ¶ 17; but the City and County then conspired to prevent him from completing construction of his home, id. ¶ 18. Further, Ryan alleges County officials informed him on March 14, 2017 of a discrepancy involving a water well on his property, and told him that if the discrepancy was not resolved by the residential construction permit's expiration date of May 5, 2017, the County would not renew his permit. Id. ¶¶ 14, 20. Ryan did not resolve the discrepancy and the County declined to renew his permit. Id. ¶ 21. Finally, Ryan claims the City has demanded he move his house pad to a new location, which is cost prohibitive. Id. Alternatively, by zoning the property "Open Space" under the Village 1 Plan, Ryan alleges the City has effectively rendered his property void of all intended use. Id.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a defending party may move for dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. "A Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack may be facial or factual." Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). A facial attack claims the "allegations contained in [the] complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction," whereas a factual attack "disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction." Id. If there is ambiguity as to whether the attack is facial or factual, the court applies a facial analysis. See Wichansky v. Zoel Holding Co., Inc., 702 F. App'x 559, 560 (9th Cir. 2017) (district court erred in construing defendants' 12(b)(1) motion as factual, rather than facial, where ambiguity existed).

The court treats a jurisdictional "facial attack as it would a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6): Accepting the plaintiff's allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor, the court determines whether the allegations are sufficient as a legal matter to invoke the court's jurisdiction." Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014). Accordingly, the court ordinarily "may not consider any material beyond the pleadings" when deciding the motion. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). The court may, however, consider extrinsic evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 201 by taking judicial notice of "matters of public record." Id. at 688-89 (quoting Mack v. South Bay Beer Distrib., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986)).

Here, although it does not say so explicitly, the City appears to bring a facial attack. See ECF No. 19 (citing O'Bryan v. Holy See, 556 F.3d 361, 376 (6th Cir. 2009) (addressing standards applicable "in a 12(b)(1) facial challenge . . .")). Ryan does not take a position to the contrary. Therefore, the court analyzes the motion as a facial challenge. See Wichansky, 702 F. App'x at 560; see also BP Chemicals Ltd. v. Jiangsu Sopo Corp., 285 F.3d 677, 680 (8th Cir. 2002) (treating 12(b)(1) motion as facial where movant, although not explicitly asking, confined jurisdictional challenge to the allegations in the complaint only).

III. REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

As a preliminary matter, both the City and Ryan ask the court to take judicial notice of several documents in support of their respective positions. Reqs. for Jud. Notice, ECF Nos. 17, 20. Ryan seeks judicial notice of a claim form filed with the City complaining of his inability to build his home. ECF No. 17. The City requests the Village 1 Plan and portions of the City's zoning ordinance be judicially noticed. ECF No. 20. As explained below, Ryan's request for judicial notice is DENIED, and the City's request is GRANTED.

The court may judicially notice a fact so long as it is not subject to reasonable dispute because it "(1) is generally known within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Generally, "public records and government documents available from reliable sources on the Internet, such as websites run by governmental agencies" are subject to judicial notice. Gerritsen v. Warner Bros. Entm't Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1033 (C.D. Cal. 2015).

Here, Ryan asks the court to judicially notice a "City of Lincoln Liability Claim Form" that he says he submitted seeking monetary damages related to the inability to construct his home as planned. ECF No. 17. The City objects to Ryan's request "to the extent it seeks to take judicial notice of anything beyond the fact that Plaintiff filed the claim." ECF No. 19 at 12 n.5.¹ The court declines to take judicial notice of the contents of Ryan's claim form because the contents are not readily determined from indisputable sources. Nor is the claim form incorporated by reference in the operative complaint, and the truth of the contents are generally disputed by the City. Cf. Pierce v. Cty. of Marin, 291 F. Supp. 3d 982, 990 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (taking judicial notice of county claim form because it was referenced in complaint and undisputed by opposing party). While the court could take notice of the date on which the claim form was filed and the fact of its filing, these judicially noticeable facts are irrelevant to the issues before the court. See Schaldach v. Dignity Health, No. 2:12-CV-02492-MCE-KJN, 2015 WL 5896023, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2015) ("The Court has no obligation to take judicial notice of irrelevant facts and declines to do so here.").

The City's unopposed request for judicial notice is granted because the Village 1 Plan and portions of the City's zoning ordinance are readily available public records maintained on a government agency website. See Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497, 510 n.2 (N.D. Cal.) (taking judicial notice of letter from Assistant Attorney General maintained on official government website), recon. denied, 267 F. Supp. 3d 1201 (N.D. Cal. 2017), appeal dismissed as moot sub nom. City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Trump, No. 17-16886, 2018 WL 1401847 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2018). The court thus relies on the information contained in the Village

///// 1 Plan and portions of the City's zoning ordinance, specifically Lincoln Municipal Code §§ 18.54.030, 18.54.040, 18.58.020, in resolving this motion.

A. Claim One: Inverse Condemnation

Under the Fifth Amendment, "[w]hen the government physically takes possession of an interest in property for some public purpose, it has a categorical duty to compensate the former owner, regardless of whether the interest that is taken constitutes an entire parcel or merely a part thereof." Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322 (2002) (citation omitted). A Fifth Amendment takings action brought in federal court is ripe for review only if two requirements are satisfied: (1) "the government entity charged with implementing the regulations [must have] reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue," and (2) the plaintiff must have sought "compensation through the procedures the State has provided for doing so." Williamson Cty. Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 186, 194 (1985). If these two prongs, referred to as the "finality" prong and the "exhaustion" prong respectively, are not satisfied, the claim is unripe and must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. City of Carson, 353 F.3d 824, 830 (9th Cir. 2004).

There is, however, one exception Ryan suggests is relevant here. A "futility exception" can apply to the finality prong: "[u]nder this exception, the requirement of the submission of a development plan is excused if such an application would be an idle and futile act." Hohbach Realty Co. P'ship v. City of Palo Alto, No. 10-339-JF (PVT), 2010 WL 2077212, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 20, 2010) (citing Kinzli v. City of Santa Cruz, 818 F.2d 1449,...