S.C. Dep't of Motor Vehicles v. Dover

423 S.C. 153

813 S.E.2d 532

SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES, Appellant,

v.Michelle DOVER, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2016-001030

Opinion No. 5544

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard October 2, 2017

Filed March 21, 2018

Frank L. Valenta, Jr., Philip S. Porter, and Brandy Anne Duncan, all of Blythewood, for Appellant.

Michelle Dover, of York, pro se.

KONDUROS, J.:

The South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles (the DMV) appeals the administrative law court's (ALC's) determination that Michelle Dover's reckless driving conviction in Virginia did not constitute a major violation requiring her driver's license to be suspended under the habitual offender statute. We affirm as modified.

FACTS

Dover was convicted in South Carolina for driving under suspension (DUS) on August 14, 2012. Additionally, she pled guilty to driving under the influence (DUI) in South Carolina on August 12, 2014. On May 3, 2015, Dover was ticketed in Virginia for reckless driving. On July 21, 2015, she was convicted of the charge but did not appear before the Virginia court. Virginia reported this violation to the DMV on August 10, 2015, as "RECKLS DRV-SPEEDING EXCESS OF 80MPH-MISD" and with the "ACD Code" of "M84." The American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA) Violations Exchange Code Dictionary (ACD) provides that M84 is the code for "reckless driving." 23 C.F.R. pt. 1327, app. A (2017). The DMV did not receive a copy of Dover's actual ticket.¹

The DMV applied the Virginia conviction to Dover's driving record as a conviction for reckless driving, determined this was her third major violation, and suspended her license due to it finding she met the requirements for being a habitual offender. Dover requested a contested case hearing with the Office of Motor Vehicles Hearings (OMVH), contending she should have been charged with speeding, not reckless driving, in Virginia. At the hearing, Dover did not dispute her two prior South Carolina convictions. She indicated that when she received the ticket in Virginia, she was driving ten miles over the speed limit and "was with the flow of traffic."

Following the hearing, the OMVH hearing officer rescinded Dover's suspension. The hearing officer determined because reckless driving was not listed as an offense in section 56-1-650 of the South Carolina Code, section 56-1-320 of the South Carolina Code applied.² The hearing officer determined the behavior for which Dover was convicted in Virginia, if she had committed it in South Carolina, would not have fallen under South Carolina's reckless driving statute. The hearing officer therefore found the DMV erred in using the conviction as a third major conviction to suspend Dover's license.

The DMV appealed to the ALC. The DMV argued the hearing officer erred in finding the DMV had made a discretionary decision to suspend Dover's license under section 56-1-320. It contended Dover's license was required to be suspended pursuant to section 56-5-1030. It also maintained it could rely on Virginia's categorization of the offense using the ACD Code for reckless driving.

The ALC affirmed the hearing officer's ruling as modified. It determined the hearing officer erred in finding the DMV's decision to suspend Dover's license was discretionary. The ALC also found the Virginia conviction was added to Dover's driving record pursuant to section 56-1-790 under a reciprocal agreement. The ALC held South Carolina law requires "an out-of-state offense must be recorded as if it were a conviction under South Carolina law." It determined that because Dover asserted she was only going ten miles per hour over the speed limit, she would have been charged with speeding in South Carolina, not reckless driving. Therefore, it found the hearing officer did not err in determining the DMV incorrectly suspended Dover's license. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"The OMVH has exclusive jurisdiction over contested cases involving habitual offenders. Decisions by the OMVH hearing officer must be appealed to the ALC." Davis v. S.C. Dep't of Motor Vehicles , 420 S.C. 98, 102, 800 S.E.2d 493, 495 (Ct. App. 2017) (citation omitted). "The [O]MVH is authorized to hear contested cases from the [DMV]. Thus, the [O]MVH is an agency under the Administrative Procedures Act." S.C. Dep't of Motor Vehicles v. McCarson , 391 S.C. 136, 144, 705 S.E.2d 425, 429 (2011) (citations omitted). " Section 1-23-610 of the South Carolina Code [ (Supp. 2017) ] sets forth the standard of review when the court of appeals is sitting in review of a decision by the ALC on an appeal from an administrative agency." S.C. Dep't of Motor Vehicles v. Holtzclaw , 382 S.C. 344, 347, 675 S.E.2d 756, 758 (Ct. App. 2009).

The review of the [ALC]'s order must be confined to the record. The court may not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the [ALC] as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court of appeals may affirm the decision or remand the case for further proceedings; or, it may reverse or modify the decision if the substantive rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the finding, conclusion, or decision is:

(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(c) made upon unlawful procedure;

(d) affected by other error of law;

(e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or

(f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-610(B) (Supp. 2017).

"Substantial evidence, when considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the same conclusion as the [ALC] and is more than a mere scintilla of evidence." Davis , 420 S.C. at 103, 800 S.E.2d at 495 (alteration by court) (quoting Original Blue Ribbon Taxi Corp. v. S.C. Dep't of Motor Vehicles , 380 S.C. 600, 605, 670 S.E.2d 674, 676 (Ct. App. 2008) ). "The mere possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent a finding from being supported by substantial evidence." Original Blue Ribbon Taxi Corp. , 380 S.C. at 605, 670 S.E.2d at 677 (quoting Olson v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control , 379 S.C. 57, 63, 663 S.E.2d 497, 501 (Ct. App. 2008) ).

LAW/ANALYSIS

The DMV contends the ALC erred in affirming the OMVH hearing officer's reversal of Dover's suspension. The DMV asserts it can rely on Virginia's categorization of Dover's offense as reckless driving and as an ACD Code M84 conviction. Further, it maintains public policy demands Dover's suspension be upheld because the DMV does not have the resources to investigate every M84 conviction from Virginia. We disagree.³

"Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law, which this [c]ourt is free to decide without any deference to the tribunal below." Duke Energy Corp. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue , 415 S.C. 351, 355, 782 S.E.2d 590, 592 (2016). "The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature." Centex Int'l, Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue , 406 S.C. 132, 139, 750 S.E.2d 65, 69 (2013) (quoting Sloan v. Hardee , 371 S.C. 495, 498, 640 S.E.2d 457, 459 (2007) ). "[W]e must follow the plain and unambiguous language in a statute and have ‘no right to impose another meaning.’ " Grier v. AMISUB of S.C., Inc. , 397 S.C. 532, 535-36, 725 S.E.2d 693, 695 (2012) (quoting Hodges v. Rainey , 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000) ).

"[T]he [O]MVH is an agency under the Administrative Procedures Act." S.C. Dep't of Motor Vehicles v. McCarson , 391 S.C. 136, 144, 705 S.E.2d 425, 429 (2011) (citations omitted). "[T]he deference doctrine ... provides that whe[n] an agency charged with administering a statute or regulation has interpreted the statute or regulation, courts, including the ALC, will defer to the agency's interpretation absent compelling reasons." Kiawah Dev. Partners, II v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control , 411 S.C. 16, 34, 766 S.E.2d 707, 718 (2014). "We defer to an agency interpretation unless it is ‘arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.’ " Id. at 34-35, 766 S.E.2d at 718 (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837, 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) ). "The findings of an administrative agency are presumed correct and will be set aside only if unsupported by substantial evidence." S.C. Dep't of Motor Vehicles v. Nelson , 364 S.C. 514, 519, 613 S.E.2d 544, 547 (Ct. App. 2005).

The South Carolina Code provides that for convictions⁴ required to be reported to other states under the Driver License Compact "a member state shall give the same effect to the report as if the conviction had occurred in that state. For a conviction that is not required to be reported under subsection (A), the provisions of [s]ection 56-1-320 shall govern the effect of the reported conviction in this [s]tate." S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-650(C) (2018).

The DMV argues subsection 56-1-320(A) of the South Carolina Code (2018) is relevant to the determination of this case but acknowledges a reckless driving conviction alone does not lead to a license suspension. That subsection allows the DMV the discretion to "suspend or revoke the license ... upon receiving notice of the conviction of the person in another state of an offense therein which, if committed in this [s]tate, would be grounds for the suspension or revocation of the South Carolina license." § 56-1-320(A). Consequently, it is not determinative of the outcome in this case.

"When a person is convicted of one or more of the offenses listed in [s]ection 56-1-1020[ ]... [of the South Carolina Code (2018) ], the [DMV] must review its records for that person." S.C. Code Ann. § 56-1-1030(A) (2018). "If the [DMV] [then] determines ... the person is a[ ] habitual offender as defined in [s]ection 56-1-1020, the [DMV] must revoke or suspend the person's driver's...