S.L. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs.

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In the Matter of S.L. (Minor Child), Child in Need of Services S.L. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent, v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner and Kids' Voices of Indiana, Appellee-Guardian Ad Litem

No. 23A-JC-117

Court of Appeals of Indiana

June 30, 2023

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.

Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Alicia A Gooden, Judge The Honorable Marcia J. Harper, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 49D14-2202-JC-1349

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Danielle Sheff Sheff Law Office Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SERVICES Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana David E. Corey Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE KIDS' VOICE OF INDIANA Katherine Meger Kelsey Indianapolis, Indiana

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Weissmann, Judge.

[¶1] S.L. (Mother) challenges the trial court's determination that her 14-year-old son (Child) was a child in need of services (CHINS) based on domestic violence in their home. The judgment followed two assaults by Mother's long-time boyfriend (Boyfriend) against Mother while Child was present. After Boyfriend's attacks, Mother denied or minimized the domestic violence, was generally uncooperative in the CHINS proceedings, and had continued contact with Boyfriend, despite claiming that she had ended the relationship.

[¶2] The trial court determined that Child was a CHINS because he lacked “a safe and stable home environment that is free from domestic violence” and was “unlikely to receive [it] without the coercive intervention of the Court.” App. Vol. II, p. 116. Concluding the record supports that judgment, we affirm.

Facts

[¶3] The domestic violence that prompted the CHINS proceedings first arose in December 2021, when Boyfriend was charged with domestic battery against Mother. The trial court issued a no-contact order barring Boyfriend's contact with Mother. Mother soon wrote the court to request that it vacate the order so that Boyfriend could return to living with Mother and Child. Mother asserted in the letter that Boyfriend was not a danger to her. She referred to Boyfriend as Child's surrogate father and noted that he helped to care for Child, who has both physical and intellectual disabilities.

[¶4] Less than one month after Boyfriend's arrest, he assaulted Mother again, smacking her in the face and throwing her around her living room. The attack, which occurred while Child was within the home, left Mother bloodied and with torn clothes. Mother refused to allow investigating officers to speak to Child.

[¶5] A couple of months later, the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) received a report about the family. A DCS investigator traveled to Mother's home, but Mother said she could not meet then and that Child was not at home. The investigator and Mother agreed to meet at Mother's home the next day. But when the investigator arrived at Mother's home at the agreed time, Mother was not there. After Mother failed to respond to the investigator's numerous phone calls that day, the investigator left a letter at Mother's home. When Mother still did not respond, the investigator returned to Mother's home again but found her absent. The investigator then spoke to Child at his school.

[¶6] The investigator asked Child "if he felt safe at home, if he was happy there, if he got enough food to eat." Tr. Vol. II, p. 11. Child responded by shifting in his seat, appearing nervous, and wetting his pants. DCS therefore took emergency custody of Child. The investigator repeatedly attempted to contact Mother by phone and eventually notified her by leaving a letter on the door of Mother's home. Mother went to the DCS office and screamed profanities at the investigator and other DCS staff. Mother denied all domestic violence incidents, claiming that Boyfriend and she had merely argued and no physical violence had ever occurred. Mother also denied that Boyfriend had ever lived in her home.

[¶7] DCS asked Mother to leave the office due to her behavior. The investigator spoke to Child's father (Father), who said that he was aware of possible domestic violence between Mother and Boyfriend. DCS placed Child temporarily with Father, who lived in Illinois.^[1]

[¶8] DCS petitioned to find Child to be a CHINS. After a detention hearing, the court ordered Child to remain with Father and for Mother to participate in supervised visitation. When first meeting with DCS, Mother again denied any domestic violence. Mother then refused to cooperate with DCS. She was combative and expressed resentment over what she viewed as DCS's unnecessary intervention. Ultimately, Mother underwent a domestic violence assessment. Still, she informed DCS that she would not participate in any recommended domestic violence classes.

[¶9] During a visit with Child in Illinois, Mother and a DCS visitation supervisor noticed bruising on Child's arm and neck. Mother and the visitation supervisor reported the injuries to the DCS "hotline." Mother never visited with Child after that and did not respond to requests to schedule more visits. Video visits with Child were arranged because Mother told DCS that she did not want inperson visits with Child. Mother also did not complete home-based therapy services to which she had been referred.

[¶10] After the CHINS factfinding hearing but before the court entered judgment, DCS moved to remove Child from Father's care. The trial court granted that motion, and Child ultimately was placed in Mother's home for a temporary trial visitation. The court later entered its judgment finding Child to be a CHINS.

[¶11] Mother failed to appear at the dispositional hearing, although her counsel represented her there. The court ordered Mother to complete a domestic violence assessment and follow all related recommendations. Mother appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[¶12] Mother contends the evidence does not support several of the trial court's factual findings as well as its ultimate CHINS determination. A valid CHINS judgment requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the child is under the age of eighteen; (2) there exists at least one of eleven different statutory circumstances under which a child may be found a CHINS; and (3) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that they are not receiving and are unlikely to receive without the coercive intervention of the court. In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. 2012). The trial court found DCS adequately proved all three elements, including that Child was a CHINS under Indiana Code § 31-34-1-1.

[¶13] A child is a CHINS under Indiana Code § 31-34-1-1 when

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent . . . to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent . . . is financially able to do so;

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent . . . to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

[¶14] When reviewing the trial court's CHINS determination, we will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility. K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1253. When, as here, the trial court enters findings of facts and conclusions of law sua sponte, we apply a two-tiered standard of review requiring that we first consider whether the evidence supports the findings and then determine whether the findings support the judgment. Matter of AR.B., 199 N.E.3d 1232, 1237 (Ind.Ct.App. 2022). "We review the remaining issues under the general judgment standard, which provides that a judgment 'will be affirmed if it can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence.'" We will reverse only if the CHINS determination is clearly erroneous. Id.

I. Challenged Factual Findings

[¶15] Mother contests ten of the trial court's findings as either unsupported by the evidence or immaterial to the judgment. Mother's claims are unpersuasive.

[¶16] Mother first challenges Finding No. 15, which states that the DCS investigator observed Child to be "very uncomfortable" during her interview of him, given his squirming and urination. App. Vol. II, p. 115. Mother contends Child's actions could be interpreted differently and that his discomfort during the interview did not support the CHINS finding. But such a claim is merely a request to reweigh the evidence.

[¶17] Mother next challenges Finding No. 16, which detailed Mother's combative behavior in the DCS office after Mother learned that DCS had taken emergency custody of Child. Mother alleges that Finding No. 16 is incomplete, but she does not claim that it is unsupported by the evidence. Therefore, we view this claim as just another request to reweigh the evidence.

[¶18] Mother also contends Finding No. 16 is immaterial. But Mother's combative behavior and refusal to recognize any problems in her care of Child were highly relevant to the trial court's determination under Indiana Code § 31-34-1-1(2) that, absent court intervention, Child was not likely to receive the safe home that he needed.

[¶19] Mother similarly claims that Findings 18-20 and 22-25 are immaterial to the CHINS determination. Those findings relate to Boyfriend's domestic violence, Mother's request to lift the no-contact order, and various activities in...