S.M. v. Dist. of Columbia

S.M., a minor, by her parents and next friends, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.

Civil Action No.: 19-2096 (RC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

December 8, 2020

Re Document Nos.: 10, 12

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; GRANTING DEFENDANT'S CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

I. INTRODUCTION

In this case brought pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Plaintiffs, on behalf of their daughter S.M., challenge an administrative decision that rejected their claim that the District of Columbia Public Schools ("DCPS") denied S.M. a free appropriate public education. Plaintiffs argue that the individualized education program ("IEP") developed by DCPS for S.M. in September of 2018 did not provide sufficient special education services for their daughter. After considering their arguments and hearing testimony from a number of witnesses, an impartial hearing officer determined that DCPS did provide S.M. with a free appropriate public education. Through this lawsuit, Plaintiffs claim that the hearing officer erred by failing to appropriately weigh the evidence of S.M.'s academic progress and the testimony offered by the various expert witnesses. The parties have moved for summary judgment based on the administrative record. Because the Court finds that the impartial hearing officer reasonably concluded that DCPS offered S.M. a free appropriate public education, and for the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is denied and Defendant District of Columbia's (the "District") cross motion for summary judgment is granted.

II. BACKGROUND

A. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482, is designed to "ensure that every child has a meaningful opportunity to benefit from public education." Boose v. District of Columbia, 786 F.3d 1054, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The statute provides that every child with a disability in this country is entitled to a free appropriate public education, or FAPE, that must be tailored to "emphasize[] special education and related services designed to meet [the student's] unique needs." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A).

An IEP is the "primary vehicle" for implementing the FAPE entitlement under the IDEA. Lesesne ex rel. B.F. v. District of Columbia, 447 F.3d 828, 830 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988)). An IEP is a written document that outlines the student's present academic achievement, the student's disability, academic and functional goals, and special education and related services to be provided to the student, among other requirements detailed by federal regulations. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.320; see also Lesesne, 447 F.3d at 830 (stating that an IEP "sets out the child's present educational performance, establishes annual and short-term objectives for improvements in that performance, and describes the specially designed instruction and services that will enable the child to meet those objectives" (quoting Honig, 484 U.S. at 311)). An IEP should be tailored to "the unique circumstances of the child for whom it was created." Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 137 S. Ct. 988, 1001 (2017).

Generally, IEPs are developed collaboratively with a team that includes school administrators, educators, and parents and often includes others, such as medical professionals, to assist in designing the most effective program for the student. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.321. The team, however, may not always agree on the contents of an IEP or the proposed plan forward. A parent or guardian who believes that an IEP as drafted does not provide the student with a FAPE has a "right to seek review of any decisions [he or she] think[s] inappropriate." District of Columbia v. Doe, 611 F.3d 888, 890 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quotations omitted). Review of an IEP begins with the filing of an administrative due process complaint and is followed by a due process hearing conducted by an impartial hearing officer. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f). Administrative decisions of an impartial hearing officer, referred to as hearing officer determinations ("HOD"), can then be appealed through judicial proceedings in a U.S. District Court. See id. § 1415(i)(2)(A).

B. Factual Background

At the time Plaintiffs filed the Complaint, S.M. was an eleven-year-old student who resided in the District of Columbia. Compl. ¶ 4. S.M. has been diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder ("ADHD") and Specific Learning Disorder ("SLD") with impairments in reading and mathematics. A.R. 11. S.M. attended Lafayette Elementary School ("Lafayette") from 2013 until 2018, Compl. ¶¶ 5-8, 18, when her parents unilaterally enrolled her at the Lab School of Washington ("Lab School"), a private school that specializes in educating students with learning disabilities. A.R. 13. S.M. first began receiving special education services at the beginning of the 2014-2015 school year. A.R. 6.

At the beginning of the 2017-2018 school year, S.M.'s IEP provided for placement in a general education setting with 2.5 hours per week of special education services in math, reading,and written expression. A.R. 6-7. Based on her progress in the fall of 2017, S.M.'s parents and teachers agreed in December 2017 that S.M. required more special education support. A.R. 7. An IEP team convened on December 12, 2017 and developed a new plan that provided for 19.5 hours per week of special education services in reading, math, and written expression outside general education. A.R. 8. The December 2017 IEP also called for 120 minutes per month of behavioral support services. A.R. 8. S.M. would be placed in a Specific Learning Support ("SLS") classroom for her special education services, but would still attend elective classes, lunch, and recess with typically developing peers. A.R. 8. S.M. would begin each day in a general education classroom for forty-five minutes to work on a computer instructional program for math. A.R. 8. S.M.'s mother agreed with the December 2017 IEP. A.R. 8.

Still concerned with S.M.'s progress, her father requested an independent educational evaluation ("IEE") in March of 2018. A.R. 9. The results of the IEE, conducted by Dr. Robert Foster, indicated that S.M. performed below average in a number of different social and academic areas. See A.R. 10-11, 28. Dr. Foster diagnosed S.M. with ADHD and SLD with impairments in reading and mathematics. A.R. 11. S.M.'s test scores from the 2017-2018 school year indicated that she continued to fall behind her peers. On the Text Reading and Comprehension ("TRC") assessment, she scored at level "H" at the beginning of the year and the end of the year—a score well behind grade level expectations. A.R. 10. On the Dynamic Indicators of Basic Early Literacy Skills ("DIBELS") assessment, S.M. showed slight improvement in oral reading fluency and reading comprehension but remained well below grade level. A.R. 10. In math, on the i-Ready assessment, S.M. actually scored lower at the end of the year than she did at the beginning. A.R. 10. In response to the 2017-2018 school year, Plaintiffs placed S.M. at the Lab School for a summer tutorial program. A.R. 11, 28. S.M.'s parentsconsidered her time at the Lab School "to be the most positive learning experience [S.M.] had ever had." A.R. 11.

In September 2018, S.M.'s IEP team convened to review her IEP.¹ A.R. 13; see also A.R. 103-37. The September 2018 IEP did not alter the special education services offered to S.M.—just as in the December 2017 IEP, S.M. would receive 19.5 hours of special education in the SLS classroom, 120 minutes per month of behavioral support services, and would attend elective classes, lunch, and recess with her typically developing peers. A.R. 15; A.R. 127. Plaintiffs disagreed with offering S.M. the same services and expressed a need for more special education support. A.R. 15. Plaintiffs requested that DCPS fund S.M.'s placement at the Lab School. A.R. 15. S.M. remained at the Lab School for the duration of the 2018-2019 school year. Compl. ¶ 18.

Plaintiffs challenged the September 2018 IEP in an administrative due process hearing before Hearing Officer Peter Vaden. A.R. 3. Plaintiffs presented four witnesses, including S.M.'s mother and two experts, Amy Mounce, an educational consultant, and Dr. Foster, who had conducted the IEE. A.R. 4, 28. Ms. Mounce, who was part of the September 2018 IEP team, testified that she observed S.M. in a classroom setting at the Lab School for approximately five hours, see A.R. 378, and opined that, based on her expertise and observations, S.M. needed a more restrictive setting than what the September 2018 IEP offered, A.R. 410-11. Dr. Foster, who conducted the IEE and observed S.M. for an hour at Lafayette, A.R. 464, testified that he disagreed with the September 2018 IEP and that S.M. needed more special education servicesand a more restrictive environment, A.R. 463. Dr. Foster did acknowledge that S.M. could benefit from interaction with nondisabled peers, but that those benefits could be outweighed by the consequences of not having a restrictive enough environment. A.R. 474-76.

DCPS presented five witnesses, including her special education teacher, her clinical social worker, and the principal of Lafayette. A.R. 4. Ashley Swartz, S.M.'s special education teacher at Lafayette, testified about her observations of S.M. in the classroom, though she only instructed S.M. for about a month at the end of the 2017-2018 school year. A.R. 612. She had filled out an IEP progress report for S.M. that indicated S.M. was "progressing in all goals, [but] [was not] yet mastering any of those goals." A.R. 614; see also A.R. 315-22 (IEP Progress Report - Annual Goals). Sophia Carre, S.M.'s clinical social worker at Lafayette, testified that S.M. had progressed in all her behavioral goals by the end of the 2017-...