S.M. v. Evans-Brant Cent. Sch. Dist.

S.M., individually, and P.M., by his parent and next friend, S.M;P.P., individually, and A.P., by his parent and next friend, P.P., Plaintiffs,

v.Evans-Brant Central School District, Defendant.

09-CV-686S

09-CV-922S

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Dated: July 31, 2013

DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

This Court has combined for decision two actions by S.M. and P.P (parents of P.M. and A.P., respectively) brought against Evans-Brant Central School District.² These actions seek exclusively costs and attorney fees, as authorized by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act ("IDEA"), which provides that such fees are available to "a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). Having been granted relief at the administrative level on behalf of their disabled children, both S.M. and P.P. now contend that they are "prevailing parties" and therefore ought to be awarded fees and costs.

Despite the Supreme Court's admonition that a fee request "should not result in a second major litigation," Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1941, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1983), this Court has already resolved a motion to dismiss in each case and, currently, there are eight pending motions in the combined cases. Each party hasmoved for summary judgment (Defendant has inexplicably so moved twice) and Plaintiffs have moved to strike that second summary judgment motion, resulting in nothing less than precisely what the Supreme Court hoped would not occur.

Nonetheless, the main dispute requires resolution, and many of the tangential motions are superfluous and can be disposed of with little or no discussion (none more so than Defendant's second motion for summary judgment, which does not appear to differ in any substantive manner from its first motion), enabling this Court to finally determine whether, and to what extent, Plaintiffs should be awarded attorney fees.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Statutory and Factual Background

The purpose of the IDEA to ensure that all disabled children receive a free and appropriate public education (commonly referred to as "FAPE") emphasizing "special education and related services designed to meet [the children's] unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A).³ A key component in achieving this goal is the individualized education program, or "IEP," which is a written document jointly created annually by a team consisting of educators and the parents of the disabled child. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401 (14), 1414(d). InNew York, that team is referred to as a Committee on Special Education, or a "CSE." N.Y. Educ. Law § 4402; 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 200.3(a)(1). Under New York and federal education law, parents of disabled children who are dissatisfied with their children's IEP may request, under IDEA-mandated procedures, a review before an impartial hearing officer ("IHO") appointed by the relevant board of education. N.Y. Educ. Law. § 4404; see generally 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (describing requirements for impartial due-process hearing).

The parents here, dissatisfied with the IEPs and educational placement of their disabled children at Evans, both filed this type of complaint. After Evans received the complaint, the parties engaged in a required "resolution session," at which "the parents of the child discuss their complaint [] and the facts that form the basis of the complaint, and the local educational agency is provided the opportunity to resolve the complaint." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(b). Following the meeting, Evans sent both parents a proposed settlement agreement, but the parents rejected the proposal and proceeded to hearings before IHOs.

At the hearings, Evans conceded the underlying defects with the students' IEPs. Its central argument, which it raises again here, was that there remained no justiciable controversy because it took steps to remedy the issues identified in the parents' complaint. The IHOs rejected that argument in both cases and went on to make various rulings.

As for P.P., on May 23, 2008, after the hearing, IHO Martin Kehoe III issued a "pendency" decision in Plaintiffs' favor. Like a preliminary injunction, it ordered Evans to provide certain educational services while the final decision was pending. Subsequently, on July 16, 2008, the IHO issued his final decision, determining that Defendant failed to provide A.P. with a FAPE for the 2007-08 school year.

In S.M.'s case, on June 2, 2008, again after the hearing, IHO Michael Lazan issued a decision in S.M. and P.M's favor, also determining that Evans failed to provide P.M. with appropriate educational programs and services for the 2007-2008 school year. Shortly thereafter, Evans appealed the IHO's decision to the State Review Officer of the New York State Education Department. See N.Y. Educ. Law. § 4404(2); see generally 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (describing requirements for appeal to state agency). Two months later, on August 25, 2008, the State Review Officer upheld the IHO's decision.

After these decisions, both Plaintiffs requested, outside of court, attorney fees and costs from Evans, as authorized by the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(I). Evans denied those requests, prompting the current actions.

B. Procedural History

P.P. commenced this action by filing a complaint in this Court on October 28, 2009. On November 20, 2009, Evans moved to dismiss that complaint. This Court later denied that motion in all respects but one, finding in Evans' favor that P.P. could not recover attorney fees for meetings that occurred before July 16, 2008. (Docket No. 12.)

After discovery, Evans moved for summary judgment (Docket No. 42), and P.P. responded with an affidavit in opposition, indicating that he planned to file his own summary judgment motion. He did so on December 21, 2012. (Docket No. 52.) Thereafter, Evans filed a second motion for summary judgment, styled as a "cross-motion." (Docket No. 59.) P.P. then moved to strike that motion. (Docket No. 62.)

Briefing on those motions closed in February of 2013.

S.M's case followed a similar, but not identical, path. S.M. commenced this case on July 30, 2009, with an initial complaint. S.M. then filed an amended complaint on August12, 2009. Evans moved to dismiss the amended complaint, and, on January 8, 2012, this Court denied that motion in all respects but one, finding in Evans' favor that P.M. should be dismissed as a plaintiff in his individual capacity. In that Decision, this Court also granted S.M. leave to filed a second amended complaint, which he did on January 12, 2012.

From there, the case took a familiar turn: Evans filed a motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 48); S.M. responded, indicating he would soon file his own motion; S.M. filed that motion (Docket No. 55); Evans filed another summary judgment motion (Docket No. 60); and S.M. moved to strike that motion (Docket No. 63).

Briefing on those motions also concluded in February of 2013, at which time this Court took the motions in each case under consideration.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment is warranted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact." A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). An issue of material fact is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the evidence and the inferences drawn from the evidence must be "viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Addickes v. S.H. Kress and Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 90 S. Ct.1598, 1609, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1970). "Only when reasonable minds could not differ as to the import ofevidence is summary judgment proper." Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir. 1991). The function of the court is not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. "Assessments of credibility and choices between conflicting versions of the events are matters for the jury, not for the court on summary judgment." Rule v. Brine, Inc., 85 F.3d 1002, 1011 (2d Cir. 1996).

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Though there are a total of six summary judgment motions pending before the court (three in each case), there are but two related, and relatively straightforward, questions before this Court: Are Plaintiffs entitled to attorney fees? And if so, in what amount?

B. Plaintiffs' eligibility for attorney fees

The IDEA provides that "the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(I). Plaintiffs brought these tandem cases seeking such fees.⁴ Defendant, however, raises various arguments in its motions for summary judgment contending that Plaintiffs should either not receive any fees, or should receive them in a severely reduced fashion. Each will be discussed in turn.

1. Prevailing-Party Status

As noted, the IDEA provides that attorney fees are available to a "prevailing party." Evans first argues that Plaintiffs, including P.P., are not entitled to fees because they arenot "prevailing parties."

This is a bewildering argument considering that this Court, on Evans' motion to dismiss, has already ruled - unequivocally - that P.P. is a prevailing party. See P.P. v. Evans-Brant Central School District, 847 F. Supp. 2d 466, 469 (W.D.N.Y. 2012) ("[T]his Court finds that Evans' contention that Plaintiffs should not be considered 'prevailing parties' is without merit."). This Court finds no cause to revisit that ruling.

Although this issue was not raised in S.M.'s case...