S.Y v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Paterson

1

S.Y., Plaintiff, v. ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF PATERSON, et al., Defendants.

No. 20cv2605 (EP) (CLW)

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

March 21, 2024

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

PADIN DISTRICT JUDGE.

Defendant Salesians of Don Bosco (“Defendant” or the “Salesian Society”) moves to exclude the testimony of Plaintiff S.Y.'s (“Plaintiff” or “S.Y.”) standard of care expert, as well as for summary judgment on the sole negligence claim brought against it. The Court decides the motions on the papers. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 78(b); L.Civ.R. 78.1. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion to exclude the expert testimony of Plaintiff's standard of care expert will be DENIED in part and GRANTED in part; and Defendant's motion for summary judgment will be DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background^[1],^[2]

Between approximately 1973 and 1975, Plaintiff was enrolled as a student at Don Bosco Technical High School (“Don Bosco”) in Paterson, New Jersey managed by Defendant. D.E. 73 (“Def. SOMF”) ¶ 1; D.E. 63-1 (“Pl. SOMF”) at 4, ¶ 1. During this timeframe, Father Rooney (“Rooney”)^[3] was a teacher at Don Bosco. Def. SOMF ¶ 1. Over the course of these two years, on over 100 occasions, Rooney sexually abused Plaintiff in the Don Bosco's locker room showers and clergy living quarters. See Def. SOMF ¶ 1; Pl. SOMF at 5-6, ¶¶ 8, 12; DE. 63-3, Ex. A (“S.Y. Dep.”) at 146:7-10.

Plaintiff did not report the sexual abuse to anyone. Def. SOMF ¶ 3. However, Plaintiff testified that, on one occasion, a priest or brother^[4] walked into the locked locker room showers where Rooney was sexually abusing Plaintiff. Pl. SOMF at 5-6, ¶¶ 9-11. Plaintiff also testified that, on several occasions, other clergy observed Plaintiff going to and leaving from the clergy living quarters with Rooney, despite the prohibition against students accessing the clergy living quarters. See id. at 6, ¶¶ 15-16. No clergy reported the sexual abuse that Plaintiff underwent at Don Bosco.

In approximately 2005, Defendant issued a “Wellness Plan” to Rooney, which acknowledged that there were seven known victims that Rooney had sexually abused when the victims were minors. Id. at 7, ¶ 19. In approximately 2008, Rooney was laicized and stripped of his clerical status. Id. at 7, ¶ 23.

B. Procedural Background

Plaintiff first filed the case as a putative class action in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Passaic County, against the Salesian Society, the Roman Catholic Diocese of Paterson (the “Diocese”), and Don Bosco. D.E. 1-1 (“Complaint” or “Compl.”). A negligence claim was asserted against the Salesian Society, the Diocese, and Don Bosco, respectively. Id. The Salesian Society subsequently removed the case to this Court, invoking diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). D.E. 1. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the Diocese from the case.^[5] D.E. 3. The Salesian Society moved to dismiss the Complaint, or, in the alternative, to strike certain allegations from the Complaint. D.E. 6. The Court^[6] denied the Salesian Society's motion. D.E. 29.

The Salesian Society^[7] now brings two motions. First, the Salesian Society moves to exclude the expert testimony of Dr. Sherryll Kraizer, Plaintiff's standard of care expert. D.E. 611 (“Exp. Mot.”). Plaintiff opposes. D.E. 62 (“Exp. Opp'n”). The Salesian Society replies. D.E. 64 (“Exp. Reply”). Second, the Salesian Society moves for summary judgment on the negligence claim Plaintiff brings against it. D.E. 60-1 (“SJ Mot.”). Plaintiff opposes. D.E. 63 (“SJ Opp'n”). The Salesian Society replies. D.E. 65 (“SJ Reply”).

II. MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY

A. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert witness testimony. The Federal Rules of Evidence embrace a liberal policy of admissibility, including with respect to expert testimony. Pineda v. Ford Motor Co., 520 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 2008). So long as the proponent of the expert testimony meets the following three prerequisites, Rule 702 does not bar an expert witness from testifying: (1) the proposed expert is qualified; (2) the proposed evidence will be helpful to the trier of fact;^[8] and (3) the proposed evidence is reliable. Fed.R.Evid. 702.^[9]

A witness is qualified to provide expert testimony only if the witness has “specialized expertise” in the testimony's subject matter. Schneider ex rel. Est. of Schneider v. Fried, 320 F.3d 396, 404 (3d Cir. 2003); see also In re Paoli R.R. Yard Pcb Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 741 (3d Cir. 1994) (affirming rejection of “overly rigorous requirements of expertise” and expressing “satisf[action] with more generalized qualifications”); Pineda, 520 F.3d at 244 (proposed expert witness need not be “best qualified”). A witness's testimony “fits” a case if it is more likely than not that it would “help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Fed.R.Evid. 702(a); see also United States v. Ford, 481 F.3d 215, 219 n.6 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[F]it is [primarily] a relevance concern.”). And a witness's testimony is reliable if it is founded on “good grounds,” meaning that the testimony is more likely than not “based on sufficient facts or data” derived from “reliable principles and methods” that have been “reliabl[y] appli[ed] . . . to the facts of the case.” Fed.R.Evid. 702(b)-(d); see also UGI Sunbury LLC v. A Permanent Easement for 1.7575 Acres, 949 F.3d 825, 834 (3d Cir. 2020).

In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Supreme Court outlined several non-exclusive factors that a court may consider in determining whether “good grounds” support a witness's testimony, including:

(1) “whether a theory or technique . . . can be (and has been tested)[;]”

(2) “whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication[;]”

(3) “the known or potential rate of error[;]”

(4) “the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation[;]” and

(5) whether the theory or technique has gained “general acceptance.”

509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993). However, the Supreme Court also emphasized that a court's inquiry is “flexible” and relevant factors are case-dependent. Id. at 594; see also Kannankeril v. Terminix Int'l, 128 F.3d 802, 806-07 (3d Cir. 1997) (same). For example, in certain cases, the relevant reliability concerns “may focus upon personal knowledge or experience,” rather than “scientific foundations,” like those listed above. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999); see also States v. Fernwood Hotel & Resort, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4997, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 15, 2014) (holding expert witness's practical and specialized experience rendered opinions sufficiently reliable despite lack of scientific hypothesis or testable theory).

Finally, as long as good grounds for the witness's testimony are shown, the testimony “should be tested by the adversary process-competing expert testimony and active cross- examination-rather than excluded from jurors' scrutiny for fear that they will not grasp its complexities or satisfactorily weigh its inadequacies.” United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 244 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola of P.R. Bottling Co., 161 F.3d 77, 85 (1st Cir. 1998)); Kannankeril, 128 F.3d at 806 (“Admissibility decisions focus on the expert's methods and reasoning; credibility decisions arise after admissibility has been determined.”).

B. Discussion

Defendant attacks all three prerequisites necessary for the admissibility of Dr. Sherryll Kraizer's (“Kraizer”)-Plaintiff's proposed standard of care expert-testimony. Exp. Mot. at 12. Plaintiff refutes each attack. Exp. Opp'n at 2-3. The Court will exclude the portions of Kraizer's Report that consist of legal conclusions and which merely narrate Plaintiff's deposition testimony because they do not “fit” the case.

1. Qualification

Defendant asserts that Kraizer lacks the expertise to testify on: “the general public['s] awareness of the problem of child sexual abuse in the mid[-]1970s[,]” because she “is not a historian and has no expertise in the field of historical analysis.” Exp. Mot. at 1, 6-8. Plaintiff responds that Defendant misstates the liberal standard for determining an expert witness's expertise in a given field, as Kraizer merely uses a timeline derived from “academic books, articles, [and] conference speeches” to determine “what youth-serving organizations knew or should have known regarding the risks of sexual predators seizing on their access to children provided by these organizations” in the mid-1970s. Exp. Opp'n at 2, 19-20. The Court agrees with Plaintiff: Kraizer is qualified to testify on matters concerning child abuse prevention.

Defendant's argument that Kraizer is unqualified is a strawman. Kraizer need not be qualified as a historian, as Defendant suggests to be qualified as “an expert in the field of prevention, recognition, and reporting of child abuse, sexual harassment, and sexual misconduct,” or as an expert “in the standard of care for hiring, retention, policies, and procedures, and supervision of youth-serving organizations about the risks of sexual abuse.” See Exp. Opp'n at 3. Kraizer's curriculum vitae demonstrates her specialized knowledge, training, and experience in the field of child abuse prevention. See generally D.E. 62-2, Ex. A (“Kraizer CV”) (listing, inter alia, Kraizer's extensive experience in consulting and research concerning matters related to child abuse, as well as her experience in providing testimony related to child abuse prevention in over 100 cases). That Kraizer seeks to speak to matters related to child abuse prevention in the past, rather than in the present, does not make her unqualified. See In re...