Saas v. Major, Lindsey & Afr.

1

HEIDI SAAS, Plaintiff, v. MAJOR, LINDSEY & AFRICA, LLC, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL No. 1:23-cv-02102-JRR

United States District Court, D. Maryland

May 10, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Julie R. Rubin, United States District Judge

Pending before the court is Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Complaint, or, in the Alternative, Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 6; the “Motion”). The court has reviewed all papers, and no hearing is necessary. Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2023). For the reasons that follow, by accompanying order, the Motion (ECF No. 6), construed as a motion to dismiss, will be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

This action arises from Plaintiff's contacts with a recruiter from Major, Lindsey & Africa, LLC (“MLA”).^[1](ECF No. 1; the “Complaint.”) In May of 2021, Plaintiff received a message from Riley Catone, a recruiter with MLA, on LinkedIn, requesting an interview. (ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 5.) Thereafter,^[2] Ms. Catone had a phone interview with Plaintiff in which she told Plaintiff that MLA's “system did not work,” that “women with gaps in their resumes were ‘getting left behind' in the job market,” and that she had “difficulty ‘getting businesses past the motherhood gap' when reviewing candidates.” Id. ¶ 6. Ms. Catone told Plaintiff that she was a “rockstar” and “wanted to sell [her] services to businesses.” Id. Following that call, Plaintiff emailed her resume to Ms Catone for a job posting at Uber. Id. ¶ 7. Ms. Catone shared the Uber job posting with Plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff then messaged the Chief Privacy Officer at Uber via LinkedIn to let her know that her resume would be submitted for the position, and the Chief Privacy Officer responded that her team did not have any openings at that time.^[3](ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 8.) Days later, Ms. Catone contacted Plaintiff about another position with Zendesk. Id. at p. 19. Plaintiff again provided her resume for the position with Zendesk. Id. ¶ 10. Plaintiff then messaged the Chief Privacy Officer at Zendesk via LinkedIn to inform her that her resume had been submitted, but the Chief Privacy Officer responded that the position had been filled. Id. ¶ 10. Thereafter, Plaintiff asked Ms. Catone for an update on her applications and states Ms. Catone “did not confirm whether or not she sent [her] resume to either Uber or Zendesk.” Id. ¶ 11. On September 21, 2021, Ms. Catone emailed Plaintiff about a part-time position, which Plaintiff declined. Id. ¶ 12. On May 4, 2022, another MLA employee emailed Plaintiff about another job, and Plaintiff did not respond. (ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 15.)

Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination against MLA with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on May 31, 2022, alleging that she “think[s]” MLA “[is] using screening tools . . . to screen-out applicants,” and that MLA “did not refer [her] for future jobs and later disappeared.” Id. at p. 21-22. On May 8, 2023, EEOC issued a Right to Sue letter to Plaintiff. Id. at p. 23. Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this court on August 4, 2023 against MLA and Allegis Group, Inc. (“Allegis”). (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff contends that Allegis “owns MLA.” Id. ¶ 3. Though at times inconsistent, Plaintiff asserts the following claims: failure to refer and “algorithmic bias” in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”); retaliation in violation of Title VII and the ADEA; and fraudulent inducement in violation of Maryland law. (ECF No. 1.)

Plaintiff alleges in her Complaint that Defendants use “algorithmic, machine learning, and other technical tools in the conduct of their business, and their use of such tools caused [her] to be unlawfully discriminated against on the basis” of her sex and age. (ECF No. 1-1 ¶ 19.) Plaintiff admits, however, Defendants asserted that they do not use artificial intelligence and that discovery is needed to ascertain the nature of the tools.^[4] Id. She alleges that Defendants' artificial intelligence, “job progression” “tools” result in “automated discrimination” and “result in negative results and disparate impacts” against people who, like Plaintiff, have a “motherhood gap” in their employment.^[5]Id. ¶ 22. As a result, Plaintiff believes that Defendants unlawfully classified her in a way that prevented her resume from being referred to businesses for employment. Id. ¶ 23. Plaintiff simultaneously argues that there were no available positions, and that Defendants instead wanted her resume so they could be “paid for [her] data.” Id. ¶ 30.

Plaintiff also states that one of the Defendants (but does not identify which one) retaliated against her by “creating and furnishing . . . defamatory data” about her to others “in an effort to disqualify [her] from being referred to employers because [she] filed” a charge of discrimination with EEOC. (ECF No. 1-1 at p. 1, ¶ 29.) However, she admits that discovery is needed to determine whether they actually did as alleged. Id. ¶ 29.

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that one of the Defendants, presumably MLA, knowingly induced her to email her personal data (her resume) to it “by making false representations and promising lucrative positions that did not exist.” Id. ¶ 30. MLA did so to “monetize [her] data,” with “no intention of getting [her] a job, or [with] a reckless disregard for their obligation to try and present [her] resume for consideration of employment.” Id.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f)

Federal pleading requirements require that a claim for relief contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Accordingly, under Rule 12(f), the court may, on its own or on motion by a party, “strike from a pleading . . . any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter” where it is insufficient. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f). “In determining whether to grant a motion to strike, the court ‘enjoys wide discretion . . . in order to minimize delay, prejudice and confusion by narrowing the issues for discovery and trial.'” Baltimore v. Baltimore City L. Dep't, No. CV ELH-22-1901, 2022 WL 17812642, at *2 (D. Md. Dec. 16, 2022) (quoting Haley Paint Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 279 F.R.D. 331, 336 (D. Md. 2012)). “Rule 12(f) motions are generally viewed with disfavor because striking a portion of a pleading is a drastic remedy and because it is often sought by the movant simply as a dilatory tactic.” Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 347 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Accordingly, on a Rule 12(f) motion, the court “must view the pleading under attack in a light most favorable to the pleader.” Haley Paint Co., 279 F.R.D. at 336.

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

A motion asserted under Rule 12(b)(6) “test[s] the sufficiency of a complaint;” it does not “resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999)). Accordingly, a “Rule 12(b)(6) motion should only be granted if, after accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the plaintiff's complaint as true and drawing all reasonable factual inferences from those facts in the plaintiff's favor, it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his claim entitling him to relief.” Edwards, 178 F.3d at 244.

“While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations and footnote omitted). “[A] complaint that provides no more than ‘labels and conclusions,' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,' is insufficient.” Bourgeois v. Live Nation Ent., Inc., 3 F.Supp.3d 423, 434 (D. Md. 2014) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “The [c]ourt must be able to deduce ‘more than the mere possibility of misconduct'; the facts of the complaint, accepted as true, must demonstrate that the plaintiff is entitled to relief.” Evans v. 7520 Surratts Rd. Operations, LLC, No. 8:21-CV-01637-PX, 2021 WL 5326463, at *2 (D. Md. Nov. 16, 2021) (quoting Ruffin v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 126 F.Supp.3d 521, 526 (D. Md. 2015)).

Relevant here, “pro se pleadings are liberally construed and held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Gray v. Wash. Metro Area Transit Auth., No. DKC-16-1792, 2017 WL 511910, at *2 (D. Md. Feb. 8, 2017) (citing Erickson v. Paradus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). “Liberal construction means that the court will read the pleadings to state a valid claim to the extent that it is possible to do so from the facts available; it does not mean that the court should rewrite the complaint to include claims never presented.” Id. (citations omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

Defendants first ask this court to strike the complaint, as it constitutes a “shotgun pleading” that fails to apprise Defendants of the claims against them and the grounds in support of the specific claims.^[6](ECF No. 6-1 at p. 8-9.) Alternatively, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed because it fails to state plausible claims under Title VII, the ADEA, and Maryland law.^[7] Id. at p. 10-18. Plaintiff opposes the Motion. (ECF No. 10.)

A. Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Complaint

Defendants argue the Complaint as a whole should be struck as a “shotgun pleading.” (ECF No. 6-1 at p. 7.) “A ‘shotgun pleading' is...