Sabra v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist.

479 F.Supp.3d 808

Mohamed SABRA and Council on American-Islamic Relations of Arizona, Plaintiffs,

v.MARICOPA COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT and Nicholas Damask, Defendants.

No. CV-20-01080-PHX-SMB

United States District Court, D. Arizona.

Signed August 18, 2020

David Ali Chami, Price Law Group APC, Raeesabbas Mohamed, RM Warner PLC, Scottsdale, AZ, Ahmed Khaled Soussi, Council on American-Islamic Relations Arizona, Mesa, AZ, for Plaintiffs.

David D. Garner, Travis Charles Hunt, Osborn Maledon PA, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendant Maricopa County Community College District.

David D. Garner, Travis Charles Hunt, Osborn Maledon PA, Phoenix, AZ, Jacqueline Mendez Soto, James Evans Barton, II, Torres Law Group PLLC, Tempe, AZ, for Defendant Nicholas Damask.

ORDER

Susan M. Brnovich, United States District Judge

Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 25) Although a preliminary injunction motion is also pending, the Court has postponed its ruling on that motion until resolving this one because of the dispositive legal issues raised. (Doc. 27) Oral argument was heard on August 6, 2020 for this motion. (Doc. 33) After considering the pleadings and oral argument, the Court will grant the motion for the reasons explained below.

I. BACKGROUND

Arising out of an Islamic Terrorism module in an online World Politics course taught by Dr. Nicholas Damask, this case tests the limits of the First Amendment's Religion Clauses. Mohamed Sabra enrolled in this spring semester course at Scottsdale Community College ("SCC") in 2020. (Id. ¶ 7.) Its syllabus describes it as one that will provide an "[i]ntroduction to the principles and issues relating to the study of international relations. Evaluation of the political, economic, national, and transnational rationale for international interactions." (Id. )

The course is organized into six modules, each containing multiple components to explore various topics concerning world politics. (Id. ¶ 8.) The Islamic Terrorism module challenged by Mr. Sabra and the Council on American-Islamic Relations of Arizona ("CAIR-AZ") had three components: a PowerPoint presentation, excerpts from Future Jihad , and a quiz. (Id. ¶¶ 8-9.) The PowerPoint presentation explored world politics through three sub-topics: (1) "Defining Terrorism"; (2) "Islamic Terrorism: Definition"; and (3) "Islamic Terrorism: Analysis." (Id. ¶¶ 10-32.) The second component required students to read excerpts from Future Jihad , a book published by Walid Phares, and the quiz evaluated students on their comprehension of course material with twenty-five multiple choice questions. (See id. ¶¶ 33-53.)

Plaintiffs take issue with Dr. Damask's instruction throughout these various Islamic Terrorism module components, alleging that his teachings violate the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Id. ¶¶ 64-74.) Plaintiffs allege his instruction unconstitutionally "conclude[es] that Islam ‘mandates’ terrorism and the killing of Non-Muslims, and that this is the only interpretation of religious texts, but without any disclaimer to inform students that this is one-perspective and that Islam itself does not condone terrorism." (Id. ¶ 67.) They further allege that Dr. Damask "is not teaching that only some extremists espouse these beliefs, but rather that literally, Islam itself teaches the mandates of terrorism." (Id. ¶ 68.) And "[t]he only objectively reasonable construction of [Dr.] Damask's actions," Plaintiffs allege, "is that his primary message is the disapproval of Islam." (Id. ¶ 69.) As it specifically concerns the quiz, Plaintiffs allege "[it] forced [Mr.] Sabra to agree to [Dr. Damask's] radical interpretation of Islam." (Id. ¶ 74.) And when Mr. Sabra refused to answer questions in accordance with what he learned in the course, his answers were marked wrong, and his course grade was negatively impacted. (Id. )

Plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause claims are brought against Dr. Damask in his individual and official capacities and the Maricopa County Community College District ("MCCCD") under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.¹ Each Plaintiff requests declaratory and injunctive relief, nominal damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs. Dr. Damask and MCCCD move to dismiss both Plaintiffs’ claims under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute[.]" Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). As a result, "[i]t is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction and the burden of establishing the contrary rests with the party asserting jurisdiction." Id. (internal and external citations omitted). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a party may move to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Carijano v. Occidental Petroleum Corp. , 643 F.3d 1216, 1227 (9th Cir. 2011). Motions to dismiss under this Rule "may attack either the allegations of the complaint as insufficient to confer upon the court subject matter jurisdiction, or the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact." Renteria v. United States , 452 F.Supp.2d 910, 919 (D. Ariz. 2006) (citing Thornhill Publ'g Co., Inc. v. Gen. Tel. & Elec. Corp. , 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979) ). And "unlike a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the moving party may submit ‘affidavits or any other evidence properly before the court.’ " Assoc. of Am. Med. Colleges v. United States , 217 F.3d 770, 778 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting St. Clair v. City of Chico , 880 F.2d 199, 201 (9th Cir. 1989) ). If the moving party submits evidence showing a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, "[i]t then becomes necessary for the party opposing the motion to present affidavits or any other evidence necessary to satisfy its burden of establishing that the court, in fact, possesses subject matter jurisdiction." St. Clair , 880 F.2d at 201. But "[w]hen the motion to dismiss attacks the allegations of the complaint as insufficient[,]" like here, "all allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party."

Renteria , 452 F.Supp.2d at 919 (citing Fed'n of African Am. Contr. v. City of Oakland , 96 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 1996) ).

In addition to moving to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, a party may move to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When evaluating a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), well-pled factual allegations are presumed true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cousins v. Lockyer , 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must meet Rule 8(a)(2)’s minimum requirements. Rule 8(a)(2) requires a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," so that the defendant has "fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson , 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) ). A complaint setting forth a cognizable legal theory survives a motion to dismiss if it contains enough factual allegations stating a claim to relief that is "plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). Facial plausibility only exists if the pleader sets forth "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. Plausibility does not equal "probability," but requires "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. "Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent’ with a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’ " Id. (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).

III. DISCUSSION

The Court begins with Defendants’ challenges to the Court's power to hear this case. Just because Plaintiffs allege First Amendment claims does not necessarily mean the Court can render a judgment affecting the parties’ rights.² Rather, only if the Court has jurisdiction can the parties’ grievances be heard. If that is the case, the Court will turn to the remaining arguments under Rule 12(b)(6).

A. Article III Standing

The Court's jurisdiction is limited to cases and controversies. Raines v. Byrd , 521 U.S. 811, 818, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997). "Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause." Ex parte McCardle , 74 U.S. 506, 514, 7 Wall. 506, 19 L.Ed. 264 (1868) ; DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno , 547 U.S. 332, 341, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 164 L.Ed.2d 589 (2006) ("If a dispute is not a proper case or controversy, the courts have no business deciding it, or expounding the law in the course of doing so."). To show a case or controversy exists, each plaintiff must establish that he, she, or it has standing to bring its alleged claims. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560–61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). To show such a thing, "[each] plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that [he, she, or it] suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent, (2) that the injury was caused by the defendant[s], and (3) that the injury would likely be redressed by the requested judicial relief." Thole v. U.S. Bank N.A. , ––– U.S. ––––, 140 S.Ct. 1615, 1618, ...