Sacramento County Deputy Sheriffs' Assn. v. County of Sacramento

Page 834

59 Cal.Rptr.2d 834

51 Cal.App.4th 1468, 12 IER Cases 723,

97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 48,

97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 53

SACRAMENTO COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFFS' ASSOCIATION et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. C019777.

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Dec. 31, 1996.

Review Denied March 26, 1997.

Mastagni, Holstedt & Chiurazzi and Curtis S. Leavitt, Sacramento, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Porter, Scott, Weiberg & Delehant, A. Irving Scott, Carissa A. Shubb and Stephen E. Horan, Sacramento, for Defendants and Respondents.

SIMS, Associate Justice.

In this civil action by county jail employees arising from warrantless video surveillance of a county jail office, plaintiffs--Sacramento County Deputy Sheriffs' Association ("the Association") and deputy sheriffs Dennis Prizmich, Scott Eckert, and Ray Roberts--appeal from summary judgment entered in favor of defendants Sacramento County, Sacramento County Sheriff's Department, Sheriff Glen Craig, Undersheriff Arthur Henrickson, Chief Robert Denham, and Captain Richard McKee. The trial court determined plaintiffs had no reasonable expectation of privacy. Plaintiffs contend summary judgment was improperly granted because the videotaping assertedly (1) violated protections against unlawful search and seizure (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.; ¹ Cal. Const., art I, § 13 ²), (2) violated statutory prohibitions against invasion of privacy (Pen.Code, § 632 et seq.), and (3) constituted a tortious intrusion into plaintiffs' seclusion. We shall affirm the judgment. ³

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This dispute involves placement of a video camera in the Release Office of the county jail.

Between February and April 1993, the Main Jail division of the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department experienced 11 incidents where inmates' money (totaling $1,124) was missing from the Cashier/Release Office area in the booking loop section of the Main Jail. Cash on a newly admitted inmate is received at the Cashier's Office and placed in a file area for a release officer to remove when the inmate is released.

The Main Jail division began an investigation and determined nine of these cases were thefts. In connection with the criminal investigation, under the supervision of Lieutenant Bill Roberts, a concealed video surveillance camera was placed in the ceiling overlooking the cashier's register and safe in the Cashier's Office. Only supervisors and managers were informed of placement of the camera. The video camera had no audio capabilities.

It was subsequently determined many of the thefts had occurred from the Release Office adjacent to the Cashier's Office, and on April 16, 1993, the camera--still with no audio capabilities--was moved to the Release Office and placed to view the countertop where inmates files were placed. Managers, supervisors and some jail staff were aware of this camera placement. No warrant was obtained.

The Release Office, a small room about seven feet by twelve feet, is adjacent to the Cashier's Office. A solid wood door separates the Release Office from the Cashier's Office, and a solid wood door separates the Cashier's office from the jail corridor. Thus, a person must pass through the Cashier's Office to enter the Release Office. The doors to the Cashier's Office and Release Office are normally secured in an open position. The Release Office door did not have a lock at the time in question. The Release Office has two windows which have been covered and sealed. There is an L-shaped counter holding two computer terminals, and space for two chairs. ⁴

The Release Office was accessible to employees working at the Main Jail--including civilian employees, booking officers, and collections employees. Although the office was not generally accessible to inmates, inmates entered the room on supervised cleaning detail. Additionally, plaintiff Eckert testified in deposition that outside agency personnel sometimes went into the Release Office to use the phone.

At the time of the video surveillance, plaintiff Prizmich was a Sacramento County Sheriff's Deputy assigned to the Main Jail, who was working approximately one day per week in the Release Office. It is undisputed he was the only plaintiff who had any official business in the Release Office while the video camera was placed there.

On April 17, 1993, the day after the camera had been placed in the Release Office, Prizmich and another deputy noticed something sticking out of a vent and discovered the camera. Deputies removed the camera at the direction of Wendell Phillips, president of the Sacramento County Sheriff's Association.

As of the time of the trial court proceedings, the thief remained unidentified.

On September 17, 1993, plaintiffs filed this lawsuit alleging (1) wrongful search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the federal Constitution and article I, section 13, of the state Constitution, ⁵ (2) invasion of privacy in violation of Penal Code section 632, (3) physical intrusion into plaintiffs' seclusion, and (4) unfair labor practice. The pleading sought compensatory damages, punitive damages, "other relief" as the court may deem proper, and (under the fourth count) injunctive relief restricting future use of surveillance. Though the pleading was filed as a class action, the trial court granted defendants' motion to decertify the class action and strike the Association as class representative. The trial court also granted a defense motion for summary adjudication on the unfair labor practice claim.

In September 1994, defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting among other things that plaintiffs had no subjective or objectively reasonable expectation of privacy under the circumstances.

In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, two plaintiffs submitted declarations stating they had a "subjective expectation of privacy" while in the Release Office, because (1) access was limited to jail employees, ⁶ (2) the office was not visible from the public service area of the jail or from the outside, (3) activities in the office could not be seen or overheard by persons not present, (4) there were no catwalks or galleries from which the office could be observed, (5) they had never heard of video surveillance being used as an investigative technique in the main jail, (6) while in the office they could observe or overhear anyone approaching, (7) no provision in the employee manual or collective bargaining agreement authorized the use of video surveillance, (8) they would store personal belongings in the office, and (9) they did not believe they were subject to video surveillance in that location.

Prizmich attested he used the office for playing cards, balancing his checkbook, checking statistics for a "fantasy football league," and undoing his pants so as to tuck in his shirt. Prizmich said he closed the door when he did anything private, and he had "been informed" the office was his to maintain and control when he was assigned as Release Officer. He declared he could keep people from entering the office. Plaintiff Eckert attested he used the office to drop his pants and adjust bandages around a knee injury. Though plaintiff Ray Roberts apparently submitted no declaration, his deposition testimony (submitted by defendants) indicated only that he had engaged in private conversations in the office. Though the camera had no audio capabilities, all plaintiffs made a point of asserting they used the office for private conversations. Plaintiffs argued their expectation of privacy was reasonable.

The reporter's transcript of the hearing on the summary judgment motion shows defense counsel argued plaintiffs had no viable claims, because there was no evidence any of the plaintiffs were captured on film. The trial court responded it was defendants' burden, as the parties moving for summary judgment, to present evidence that plaintiffs were not captured on film, and moreover the record supported an inference that plaintiffs were caught on film. Defense counsel disagreed. Plaintiffs' counsel stated he had supplemental declarations from plaintiffs concerning their being caught on the tape. The trial court said it did not need them but would allow them to be filed with the court. The declarations--from Prizmich and Ray Roberts--attest they viewed the videotape and saw themselves on it. ⁷

The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, stating "The plaintiffs have no reasonable expectation of privacy from video surveillance within the release room."

Judgment was entered in favor of defendants.

Plaintiffs appeal, challenging only the summary judgment decision.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard Of Review

A motion for summary judgment will be granted if the moving papers establish there is no triable issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c; Jacobs v. Fire Ins. Exchange (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1268, 42 [51 Cal.App.4th 1476] Cal.Rptr.2d 906.) A defendant may show entitlement to summary judgment either by showing one or more elements of each cause of action cannot be established, or by establishing an affirmative defense. (Ibid.) Since a summary judgment motion raises only questions of law, our review is de novo, applying the same analysis required of the trial court. (Jacobs, supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at p. 1268, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 906.) We analyze the issues framed by the pleadings, determine whether the moving party has established facts that negate the opposing party's claims and, where the moving party has made a prima facie showing justifying summary judgment, determine whether the opposing party has demonstrated the existence of a triable issue of material fact. (Ibid.)

II. Constitutional Claims

As indicated, plaintiffs' first cause of action alleges a civil rights claim based on an allegedly unconstitutional search and seizure by...