Safford v. Barnes

WILLIAM JOSEPH SAFFORD, Plaintiff, v. B.J. BARNES, Individually and in his official capacity asthe duly elected Sheriff of Guilford County, North Carolina;and M.B. STEWART, Individually and in his official capacity asDeputy Sheriff of Guilford County, North Carolina, Defendants.

1:14cv267

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

November 10, 2014

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

THOMAS D. SCHROEDER, District Judge.

Plaintiff William Safford brings suit against Defendants B.J. Barnes, Sheriff of Guilford County, and M.B. Stewart, a Deputy Sheriff of Guilford County, for alleged violations of Plaintiff's constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as violations of North Carolina law. Before the court is Defendants' motion to dismiss several of Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Doc. 6.) For the reasons set forth below, the motion will be granted in full.

I. BACKGROUND

The allegations of the complaint, viewed in the light mostfavorable to Safford, are as follows:

On March 30, 2011, Safford was in district courtroom number GB1C of the Guilford County Courthouse in Greensboro, North Carolina. (Compl. ¶ 11, Doc. 1.) Safford is a middle-aged male with severe physical ailments, including back problems requiring the use of a cane or other assistance. (Id. ¶ 9.) He faces difficulties sitting or standing for extended periods of time without experiencing considerable discomfort. (Id.)

After sitting in the courtroom for a protracted period of time to have a prior criminal charge against him dismissed, Safford's back "seized up," causing him immediate, severe pain. (Id. ¶ 11.) To ease the pain, Safford stood up in the courtroom. (Id.) Stewart - a Deputy Sheriff of the Guilford County Sheriff's Department and the bailiff on duty in the courtroom at the time - approached Safford and ordered him to return to his seat. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 10-11.) After informing Deputy Stewart of his back ailment and current physical pain, Safford requested that Deputy Stewart allow him to remain standing until the pain subsided in his back. (Id. ¶ 11.) According to Safford, the pain in his back and down his legs would not allow him to sit down or leave the courtroom at that time. (Id.) Deputy Stewart, however, took Safford "by his arms and dragged and forced him out of the courtroom, pushing him through double doors and into [a] hallway where [Deputy Stewart] slammed himforcefully into a wall and forced [Safford's] arm up and behind his back," placing Safford in handcuffs. (Id.) That same day, Safford was placed under arrest for resisting a public officer, per either a magistrate's order or warrant obtained by Deputy Stewart. (Id. ¶ 13.) Sheriff Barnes - the other defendant in this case - is the Sheriff of Guilford County and Deputy Stewart's superior. (Id. ¶ 7.)

Deputy Stewart's actions "greatly aggravated" Safford's physical ailments. (Id. ¶ 12.) Safford underwent medical treatment, resulting in medical bills, and experienced pain and suffering. (Id.)

Safford filed his complaint on March 28, 2014, asserting six causes of action: Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations under § 1983 against Deputy Stewart; Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations under § 1983 against Sheriff Barnes; a North Carolina State law claim of false arrest and imprisonment against Sheriff Barnes and Deputy Stewart; a State law claim of battery against Deputy Stewart; vicarious liability claim against Sheriff Barnes incorporating all § 1983 and State-law claims; and a claim of "judgment against the person" under State law against Deputy Stewart.¹ (Doc. 1.) Sheriff Barnes and Deputy Stewart were named in both their official and individualcapacities. In response to Safford's claims, Defendants concurrently answered and moved to dismiss part of Safford's complaint for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. (Docs. 6, 8.) Plaintiff responded (Doc. 10), and Defendants did not reply. The motion is now ready for consideration.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) provides that a complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss "challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint considered with the assumption that the facts alleged are true." Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted).

B. Fourteenth Amendment Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

In his first and second causes of action, Safford brings claims against Defendants under § 1983 for violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, alleging use of excessive force and arrest without probable cause. Defendants argue that the facts alleged in the complaint plausibly state a claim only under the Fourth Amendment, not the Fourteenth Amendment. Safford appears to concede this point. (Doc. 10 at 6 ("Plaintiff asserts that this is a Fourth Amendment case.").) Nevertheless, he later contends that the alleged facts regarding the use of excessive force state a claim under both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. at 7.)

"In addressing an excessive force claim brought under § 1983, analysis begins by identifying the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed by the challenged application of force." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). Claims of excessive force brought under § 1983 implicate either Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment rights. See Orem v. Rephann, 523 F.3d 442, 445-46 (4th Cir. 2008), abrogated on other grounds by Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 38-39 (2010). "The point at which Fourth Amendment protections end and Fourteenth Amendment protections begin is often murky." Orem, 523 F.3d at 446. The Fourth Amendment governs claims of excessive force "in the course of making an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of [a] person." Graham,490 U.S. at 388; see also Orem, 523 F.3d at 446. By contrast, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the excessive force claims of a pretrial detainee or arrestee. See Orem, 523 F.3d at 446.

In his complaint, Safford alleges that Deputy Stewart used excessive force in removing him from the courtroom. (Compl. ¶ 11.) Because the alleged excessive force occurred before Safford was in custody (i.e., before and during his arrest), the Fourth Amendment - not the Fourteenth Amendment - applies to Safford's claim of excessive force. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 388 (observing that the Fourth Amendment governs claims of excessive force during "the course of an arrest"); Russell v. Wright, 916 F. Supp. 2d 629, 636 (W.D. Va. 2013) ("Claims of excessive force occurring during an arrest are to be evaluated under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution."); cf. Orem, 523 F.3d at 446 (concluding that Fourteenth Amendment applied after arrest). Safford's Fourteenth Amendment claims against both Sheriff Barnes and Deputy Stewart will therefore be dismissed.

C. Fourth Amendment Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Against Sheriff Barnes

Safford's second cause of action alleges that Sheriff Barnes - in his official and individual capacities - is liable for a failure to properly "hire, train, educate, and supervise deputies," resulting in violations of Safford's constitutionalrights. (Compl. ¶¶ 22-24.) Defendants contend that Safford's allegations against Sheriff Barnes - in both capacities - are factually insufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

1. Failure-to-train § 1983 Claim Against Sheriff Barnes in His Official Capacity

Safford claims that Sheriff Barnes - in his official capacity - failed to properly hire, train, educate, and supervise deputies. Specifically, he alleges that "a reasonably well-trained officer in Defendant Stewart's position would have recognized that Mr. Safford was willing to comply with his order but was not physically able to do so because of his injury" and that such an officer "would have allowed Mr. Safford to appropriately address his physical ailments before gently escorting him" out of the courtroom. (Id. ¶ 16.) Defendants contend that these allegations fail to meet the pleading requirements of Twombly and Iqbal. This court agrees with Defendants.

As a preliminary matter, Safford articulates no factual allegations regarding Sheriff Barnes' failure to properly hire or supervise. He appears to acknowledge this conclusion by only arguing that his complaint has stated a claim for failure to train. (See Doc. 10 at 7-11.) In any event, Safford's complaint lacks any facts alleging why Deputy Stewart should nothave been hired or how Deputy Stewart lacked adequate supervision. Safford's claims based on those conclusory allegations will therefore be dismissed. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 ("Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.").

Safford does allege a failure to train on the part of Sheriff Barnes in his official capacity. To impose liability under § 1983 on a municipality for failure to train, the failure to train must reflect the municipality's deliberate indifference to the rights of its citizens. See City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) ("[T]he inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact."); Doe v. Broderick, 225...