Saint-Cyr v. United States

1

ANDRE SAINT-CYR, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 22-13110

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit

April 24, 2024

DO NOT PUBLISH

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket Nos. 0:20-cv-61184-WPD 0:13-cr-30267-WPD-2

Before WILSON, BRANCH, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM

Andre Saint-Cyr appeals from the district court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of his pro se "motion for reconsideration . . . or petition for writ of audita querela, habeas corpus, or error coram nobis" on the ground that it was an unauthorized second or successive motion to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. After review, we conclude that it was not a second or successive motion because there was a new, intervening amended judgment. Accordingly, we vacate and remand.

I. Background

In 2014, a jury found Saint-Cyr guilty of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Count 1); conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846 (Count 2); attempted possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846 (Count 3); conspiracy to use a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence as set forth in Count 1 and a drugtrafficking crime as set forth in Counts 2 and 3 of the indictment, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(o) (Count 4); use of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence as set forth in Count 1 of the indictment, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count 5); use of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime as set forth in Counts 2 and 3 of the indictment, in violation of § 924(c) (Count 6); and possession of an unregistered firearm (silencer), in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (Count 7). The district court sentenced Saint-Cyr to a total of 295 months' imprisonment, which included a term of 60 months' imprisonment on each of Counts 5 and 6, to run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the other counts.^[1] We affirmed on appeal. United States v. Cazy, 618 Fed.Appx. 569 (11th Cir. 2015).

In July 2016, Saint-Cyr filed a pro se motion to vacate sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing in relevant part that, Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015),^[2] invalidated his convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Counts 5 and 6). The district court denied the motion on the merits.^[3] Thereafter, Saint-Cyr filed at least two other pro se § 2255 motions that were dismissed as unauthorized second or successive motions.

Meanwhile, in United States v. Davis, the Supreme Court extended its holding in Johnson and its progeny to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and struck down a portion of § 924(c)(3)(B)'s definition of a crime of violence as unconstitutionally vague. 139 S.Ct. 2319, 2324-25, 2336 (2019). Thereafter, we held that Davis announced a new rule of constitutional law within the meaning of § 2255(h)(2) that was retroactively applicable. See In re Hammoud, 931 F.3d 1032, 103839 (11th Cir. 2019).

Post-Davis, Saint-Cyr, proceeding pro se, requested permission from this Court to file a second or successive § 2255 motion challenging his convictions on Counts 4 and 5 in light of Davis, and we granted his request. The district court ultimately granted Saint-Cyr relief as to Count 5 only, concluding that conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery was no longer a valid predicate crime of violence for purposes of § 924(c) post-Davis, thereby rendering his conviction on Count 5 unlawful. Accordingly, in July 2020, the district court issued an amended judgment vacating Count 5 and the corresponding 60-month sentence and related special assessment. However, Saint-Cyr's total sentence remained the same.

Saint-Cyr subsequently filed a pro se motion for a limited resentencing and appointment of counsel. The district court denied the motion explaining that Saint-Cyr had already received a "limited resentencing" when the court issued the amended judgment. The district court elaborated about its sentencing decision further in a second order denying Saint-Cyr relief, explaining as follows:

The Court exercises discretion and declines to see the need for a new sentencing hearing. Because a limited resentencing was appropriate, there is no need for the court to require Saint Cyr's presence or to allow objections. Moreover, there was no sentencing hearing for a transcript to be prepared from. The request for an updated [presentence investigation report] is Denied. The Court does not share Saint-Cyr's negative view of the ATF sting in this case. The Court has considered the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and a 248 month sentence promotes respect for the law and acts as a deterrent.

Wherefore, Saint Cyr's Motion to Vacate Count Five is Granted, but denied as to Count Four and dismissed as the Count Six. The Clerk has already filed an amended judgement, vacating Count Five and one special assessment. The remaining 248 month sentence remains intact. The request for appointment of counsel is denied.

Almost two years later, on August 22, 2022, Saint-Cyr filed the underlying pro se "motion for reconsideration of court's prior order or petition for writ of audita querela, habeas corpus, or error coram nobis," which is the subject of the present appeal. He maintained that his § 924(o) conviction (Count 4) was no longer valid post-Davis and in light of the Supreme Court's then-recent decision in United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022),^[4] and he urged the district court to reconsider its prior ruling. He also challenged the validity of his conviction for Count 6, and he requested an evidentiary hearing.

Two days after Saint-Cyr filed his motion, the district court construed it as a § 2255 motion and dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that it was filed without the required permission from this Court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(h), 2244(b)(3)(A). The district court also explained that relief was not available under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) because that rule does not permit "re-litigation of matters previously decided in a collateral attack." Likewise, the court noted that audita querela "does not apply to this successive motion to vacate," and habeas corpus was unavailable because it "lies only in the district where Saint-Cyr is housed." Finally, the court explained that "[c]oram [n]obis [did] not apply because [Saint-Cyr was] still in custody." Saint-Cyr, proceeding pro se, now appeals.^[5]

II. Discussion

Saint-Cyr argues that the district court erred in construing his motion for reconsideration as an unauthorized successive § 2255 motion because he did not seek to raise a new claim, but merely sought reconsideration of the court's prior ruling which was erroneous. He notes that he filed the motion under "several theories" of relief because he was not sure which one was proper, and that the district court has a duty to liberally construe his pro se motion "under any vehicle that would provide relief." Finally, he maintains that he is entitled to relief on the merits of his claims and an evidentiary hearing.

"Federal courts have long recognized that they have an obligation to look behind the label of a motion filed by a pro se inmate and determine whether the motion is, in effect, cognizable under a different remedial statutory framework." Gooden v. United States, 627 F.3d 846, 847 (11th Cir. 2010).

"We review de novo the district court's dismissal of a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion as second or successive." McIver v. United States, 307 F.3d 1327, 1329 (11th Cir. 2002). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") provides that, before a movant may file a second or successive § 2255 motion, he first must obtain an order from the court of appeals authorizing the district court to consider the motion. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(3)(A), 2255(h). Absent authorization from this Court, the district court lacks jurisdiction to consider a second or successive motion to vacate sentence. See Armstrong v. United States, 986 F.3d 1345, 1347 (11th Cir. 2021) (explaining that without the requisite authorization, "the district court must dismiss a second or successive § 2255 [motion] for lack of jurisdiction"). However, AEDPA does not define what it means for a petition to be "second or successive." See generally 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2255. Rather, "second or successive is a term of art, [a]nd since it limits the courts' jurisdiction, we read it narrowly." Scott v. United States, 890 F.3d 1239, 1247 (11th Cir. 2018) (quotations and internal citation omitted).

"Whether a petition is second or successive depends on the judgment challenged." Patterson v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 849 F.3d 1321, 1325 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (emphasis omitted) (quotations omitted). "[T]he judgment to which AEDPA refers is the underlying conviction and the most recent sentence that authorizes the petitioner's current detention." Ferreira v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 494 F.3d 1286, 1292 (11th Cir. 2007); Insignares v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 755 F.3d 1273, 1281 (11th Cir. 2014) ("[T]here is one judgment, comprised of both the sentence and conviction."). Thus, "where . . . there is a new judgment intervening between the two habeas petitions, an application challenging the resulting new judgment is not second or successive ...." Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 341-42 (2010) (quotations and internal citations omitted).

Here as an initial matter, the district court did not err in looking beyond the label of Saint-Cyr's pro se motion to "determine whether the motion [was], in effect, cognizable under a different...