Saintpreux v. Mayorkas

MARVIN SAINTPREUX, Plaintiff, v. ALEJANDRO MAYORKAS, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 1:19-cv-01364 (CJN)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

September 1, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION

CARL J. NICHOLS United States District Judge

Marvin SaintPreux took a job as an Emergency Management Specialist with the Federal Emergency Management Agency in 2016, and he was terminated a year and a half later. See generally Compl., ECF No. 1. He claims that his termination was both discriminatory and retaliatory, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. FEMA has moved for summary judgment on both claims.^[1] See generally Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Def's Mot.”) ECF No. 25. The Court grants the Motion for reasons that follow.

I. Background

SaintPreux an African-American man, started his two-year appointment as an Emergency Management Specialist with FEMA in January 2016. Compl. ¶ 4; Def.'s Mot., ECF No. 25-15, Ex. 11 at 2. Charlotte Porter served as SaintPreux's first-line supervisor for his first couple months on the job until Matthew Lyttle assumed the role. Compl. ¶ 6; Def.'s Mot., ECF No. 25-15, Ex. 16 at 2. Both Lyttle and Porter are Caucasian. Compl. ¶ 6.

At FEMA, SaintPreux worked with the Individual and Community Preparedness Division. Id. ¶ 4. His primary duties involved supporting programs that reached out to local communities to help them prepare for possible disasters. Id. ¶ 7. While SaintPreux's position required him to conduct himself in accordance with workplace standards, perform his job at a high level, and prepare for meetings and events, the parties disagree over the extent to which SaintPreux did all the above effectively. SaintPreux claims that he excelled as an employee and did so “without any incidents.” Id. SaintPreux alleges that, rather than acknowledge his successful completion of his work assignments, his supervisors “resented that he was successful in his work and looked for faults in his performance to justify the termination of his employment.” Id. ¶ 8.

FEMA tells a different story, claiming instead that SaintPreux time and again failed to live up to expectations. In September 2016, for instance, Lyttle and Porter evaluated SaintPreux's practice presentations in preparation for event taking place at a college in Alabama. Def.'s Mot., ECF No. 25-20, Ex. 16 at 2. They decided that SaintPreux was not ready to present and that he should communicate to others that his visit would be cancelled. Id. at 3. SaintPreux, FEMA asserts, failed to tell anyone about the significance of his expected presentation. Id. It took several days to find a replacement speaker to fill SaintPreux's void. Id. As a result of the cancellation, Lyttle instructed SaintPreux to include him in all emails and meetings that involve communication with outside stakeholders. Id.

Then, in October 2016, Lyttle contacted human resources to discuss his lack of satisfaction with SaintPreux's progress and to request that SaintPreux be placed on “Performance Improvement Plan.” Def.'s Mot., ECF No. 25-7, Ex. 3 at 2. In response, Human resources informed Lyttle that SaintPreux lacked eligibility for the plan and instead proposed “termination [as] the recommended course of action.” Id. After discussions with leadership, Lyttle decided to give SaintPreux “another opportunity to improve his performance.” Def.'s Mot., ECF No. 25-20, Ex. 16 at 4.

SaintPreux, FEMA claims, failed to improve after getting another shot. He missed deadlines, skipped out on meetings, took leave on a day he had been scheduled to attend a fair, appeared at meetings with outside stakeholders without informing management, and visited a local nonprofit instead of teleworking from home as instructed. See Def.'s Mot., ECF No. 25-17, Ex. 13 at 2.

A culmination of events spurred SaintPreux to file an informal, administrative complaint alleging race discrimination in May 2017. Compl. ¶ 14. A couple weeks later, Lyttle reached out to human resources a second time about SaintPreux's poor performance and to discuss grounds for termination. See Def.'s Mot., ECF No. 25-14, Ex. 10 at 2-3. After attempts at mediation failed, SaintPreux filed a formal complaint in August 2017. Compl. ¶ 14. Shortly thereafter, FEMA terminated SaintPreux's employment, citing a host of examples that demonstrated his poor work performance. Id.

SaintPreux filed this lawsuit on May 10, 2019. See generally Id. He alleged that FEMA discriminated against him on account of his race and color, and that his termination was the product of unlawful retaliation. Id. ¶¶ 15-25. This Court granted in part Defendant's motion to dismiss, Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 8, which narrowed the issues to SaintPreux's unlawful discrimination claim on the basis of his race and his unlawful retaliation claim. With discovery complete, FEMA has moved for summary judgment on the outstanding claims. See generally Def's Mot.

II. Summary Judgment

A court may grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A “genuine” dispute about a material fact does not exist unless “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). If the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party must set forth “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial” to defeat the motion. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). Though the Court “may not resolve genuine disputes of fact in favor of the party seeking summary judgment, ” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014) (citation omitted), the nonmoving party must show more than “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of” its position, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. In other words, “there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for [the nonmoving party].” Id.

“Credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51 (2000) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). Yet “[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).

Although “summary judgment must be approached with specific caution in discrimination cases, a plaintiff is not relieved of his obligation to support his allegations by affidavits or other competent evidence showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Baylor v. Powell, 459 F.Supp.3d 47, 53 (D.D.C. 2020) (quotation omitted). As “conclusory allegations” and “unsubstantiated speculation” will not suffice to create genuine issues of material fact, “[s]ummary judgment for a defendant is most likely when a plaintiff's claim is supported solely by the plaintiff's own self-serving, conclusory statements.” Bell v. E. River Fam. Strengthening Collaborative, Inc., 480 F.Supp. 143, 149 (D.D.C. 2020) (quotation omitted).

A. SaintPreux's Claim of Unlawful Discrimination

Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII makes it an “unlawful employment practice” to “discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Claims of unlawful discrimination in violation of Title VII “may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence.” Oviedo v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 948 F.3d 386, 394 (D.C. Cir. 2020). To establish a prima facie discrimination claim with indirect evidence, a plaintiff must show that (1) he falls within a protected category, (2) he suffered an adverse employment action, (3) and the unfavorable action gives rise to an inference of discrimination. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993); Chappell-Johnson v. Powell, 440 F.3d 484, 488 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

Absent direct evidence, discrimination claims proceed under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002) (clarifying that where a plaintiff produces direct evidence, she “may prevail without proving all the elements of a prima facie case.”). Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory or non-retaliatory reason on which it relied in taking the complained-of action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. This burden is “one of production” in which an employer must produce evidence “sufficient for the trier of fact to conclude” that the action was taken for the provided reason. Mastro v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 447 F.3d 843, 854 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981) (noting that an employer's explanation for the challenged action must be “clear and reasonably specific”). Some helpful factors used to decide whether the employer has satisfied its burden to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the action taken include: whether (1) the employer produced “evidence that a factfinder may consider [at summary judgment];” (2) “the factfinder, if it believed the evidence, [could reasonably] find that the employer's action was motivated by a nondiscriminatory reason;” (3) the nondiscriminatory reason is “facially credible in light of the...