Saladrigas v. City of O'Fallon

2020 IL App (5th) 190466

166 N.E.3d 224

445 Ill.Dec. 195

Rogelio SALADRIGAS, on Behalf of Himself and All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.The CITY OF O'FALLON, Defendant-Appellee.

NO. 5-19-0466

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District.

Opinion Filed: August 26, 2020

Rehearing denied September 9, 2020

Donna Morrison Polinske and Brian L. Polinske, of Edwardsville, for appellant.

Brian M. Funk, of O'Halloran, Kosoff, Geitner & Cook, LLC, of Northbrook, for appellee.

JUSTICE BOIE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 This class action case presents a constitutional challenge to the validity of an ordinance enacted by the defendant, the City of O'Fallon (O'Fallon). O'Fallon's ordinance authorizes the municipality to impound a motor vehicle that is used to commit certain offenses, including driving under the influence. The ordinance also provides for a $500 charge to the owner of any motor vehicle that is impounded under the ordinance. The $500 charge is in addition to any fees imposed for the vehicle's towing and storage and any penalties imposed for the underlying offense.

¶ 2 The plaintiff, Rogelio Saladrigas, filed a class action complaint, alleging that O'Fallon's ordinance was unconstitutional because the amount of the "administrative fee" was not reasonably related to the recoupment of any actual costs incurred by O'Fallon. O'Fallon filed a motion for summary judgment maintaining that its ordinance called for a $500 "fine" that is imposed as a penalty to deter criminal behavior, not a "fee" to recoup costs. O'Fallon argued that, as a "fine," the amount passes constitutional muster because the amount is not grossly disproportionate to the offenses that call for the fine to be imposed.

¶ 3 O'Fallon's motion for summary judgment, therefore, required the circuit court to interpret the language of the ordinance and determine whether it imposed a fine or a fee. The circuit court interpreted O'Fallon's ordinance as providing for a $500 fine. As a result, the circuit court granted O'Fallon's motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff did not contend that a $500 "fine" was grossly disproportionate to the underlying offenses calling for the fine. The plaintiff now appeals the circuit court's judgment, arguing that the ordinance provides for a fee, not a fine.

¶ 4 For the following reasons, we agree with the plaintiff and construe O'Fallon's ordinance as imposing a fee, rather than a fine. Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court's summary judgment in favor of O'Fallon and remand for further proceedings.

¶ 5 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 6 The facts of this case are not disputed. O'Fallon is a home rule municipality. Pursuant to its home rule powers, O'Fallon enacted an ordinance¹ that imposes an "administrative fee" that must be paid by the owner of a motor vehicle when the motor vehicle is used to commit certain violations. The amount of the administrative fee depends on the violation. For more serious violations, the ordinance sets out a "Level I" administrative fee of $500 and for less serious violations, a "Level II" administrative fee of $250. Level I violations include, among other violations, driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs and driving with a suspended or revoked driver's license.²

¶ 7 In the preamble of the ordinance, O'Fallon noted that its police department expends resources to process "arrested persons and the vehicles that they were operating at the time of arrest." Therefore, the preamble continues, the police department "has determined that it is in the best interest of the community that an administrative fee be charged the owner's [sic ] of vehicles impounded as a result of certain arrests." O'Fallon expressly stated in the preamble that "the administrative fees are based upon the amount of resources expended by the members of the O'Fallon Police Department and designated to help the police department recoup costs associated with processing certain arrests ." (Emphasis added.)

¶ 8 As stated, the ordinance authorizes the city to seize and impound vehicles that are used in connection with any of the violations calling for a Level I administrative fee. The vehicle owner is liable for the $500 administrative fee in addition to any towing and storage fees. The vehicle's owner can request a hearing to challenge whether the requisite violation occurred. If the hearing officer determines by a preponderance of the evidence that the vehicle was used in a violation, the hearing officer is required to enter an order finding the vehicle's owner liable to the city for the administrative fee. If, however, the hearing officer does not determine by a preponderance of the evidence that the motor vehicle was used in a violation, the hearing officer must enter an order for the return of the motor vehicle.

¶ 9 Prior to a hearing, the vehicle owner can post a $500 bond for the release of the vehicle, but the owner is "still liable to the towing agent for any applicable towing fees." The bond is forfeited to O'Fallon if the administrative fee is imposed. However, if after a hearing, a violation is not proven by a preponderance of the evidence, the bond will be returned to the person posting the bond. In addition, the ordinance provides that if the circuit court enters a judgment of not guilty on the underlying violation that could have resulted in the impoundment of the vehicle, the person who paid the $500 has 30 days to present a certified copy of the judgment to the police department to receive a refund.

¶ 10 On October 8, 2011, the plaintiff was arrested by the O'Fallon Police Department for a Level I violation, his vehicle was towed and impounded pursuant to O'Fallon's ordinance, and he paid the $500 administrative fee. In his class action complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the $500 fee violated his substantive due process rights because the amount of the fee was not rationally related to the cost of towing services or any other services provided by O'Fallon. The plaintiff alleged that "[t]here is no rational justification for imposing $500 administrative fee upon a motorist to merely issue that person a receipt stating they have paid $500."

¶ 11 The plaintiff brought this class action proceeding on behalf of himself and similarly situated individuals consisting of all persons who were cited and arrested for any of the Level I violations that resulted in the payment of the $500 administrative fee set out in O'Fallon's ordinance. The plaintiff's original class action complaint alleged only a facial constitutional challenge, not an as-applied constitutional challenge. However, the plaintiff's first and second amended class action complaints included both facial and as-applied constitutional challenges to the ordinance.

¶ 12 O'Fallon filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that its ordinance provided for a civil fine to punish and deter crime and that the fine passed constitutional muster because the fine was not grossly disproportionate to the underlying violation calling for the fine. In response, the plaintiff argued that O'Fallon's ordinance imposed a fee to recoup costs, not a fine to penalize the vehicle owners, and that there were pending factual issues concerning whether the fee was reasonably related to any costs the city was attempting to recoup by imposing the fine.

¶ 13 On November 5, 2019, the circuit court entered an order granting O'Fallon's motion for summary judgment. The circuit court concluded that O'Fallon "clearly and unmistakably intended the ordinance in question to impose a ‘fee’ and not a fine." Nonetheless, the circuit court also concluded that "the controlling authority" required the court "to disregard the plain language of the ordinance and recharacterize the ordinance as one imposing a fine and not a fee." On that basis, the circuit court granted O'Fallon's motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff now appeals the circuit court's judgment.

¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 15 Because this case comes before us on appeal from a summary judgment, our review is de novo . Beaman v. Freesmeyer , 2019 IL 122654, ¶ 22, 433 Ill.Dec. 130, 131 N.E.3d 488. Summary judgment should be granted only where the pleadings, depositions, admissions on file, and affidavits, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2018). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, we must construe the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits strictly against the movant and liberally in favor of the opponent. Beaman , 2019 IL 122654, ¶ 22, 433 Ill.Dec. 130, 131 N.E.3d 488.

¶ 16 Here, the plaintiff's class action complaint presents a substantive due process challenge to O'Fallon's ordinance. Generally, legislation and ordinances do not violate substantive due process if they bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. Jackson v. City of Chicago , 2012 IL App (1st) 111044, ¶ 34, 363 Ill.Dec. 351, 975 N.E.2d 153. However, before applying the rational basis test to an ordinance imposing a monetary charge, the court must first determine whether the monetary charge was intended as a fine or a fee. People v. Gildart , 377 Ill. App. 3d 39, 41, 316 Ill.Dec. 343, 879 N.E.2d 410 (2007). This distinction is important because fines and fees serve different purposes and are scrutinized under differing constitutional standards.

¶ 17 A "fine" is a pecuniary punishment payable to the public treasury that is imposed as part of a sentence on a person convicted of a criminal offense. People v. Graves , 235 Ill. 2d 244, 250, 335 Ill.Dec. 881, 919 N.E.2d 906 (2009). As a form of punishment, due process requires that a fine be rationally related to the offense on which the defendant is sentenced. People v. Jones , 223 Ill. 2d 569, 605, 308 Ill.Dec. 402, 861 N.E.2d 967 (20...