Salazar v. Dist. of D.C.

729 F.Supp.2d 257

Oscar SALAZAR, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 93-452 (GK).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Aug. 5, 2010.

April Isabel Land, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM, Bruce J. Terris, Kathleen Lillian Millian, Terris, Pravlik & Millian, LLP, Paula D. Scott, Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, Lynn E. Cunningham, Dubois, WY, Robert I. Berlow, Crownsville, MD, for Plaintiffs.

Alan S. Block, Bonner, Kiernan, Treback & Crociata, Charles Luverne Reischel, Nancy S. Schultz, Arabella W. Teal, Marceline D. Alexander, Office of Corporation Counsel, Ellen A. Efros, Robert C. Utiger, Office of the Attorney General, Peggy Massey, Department of Human Services Office of General Counsel, Wanda Tucker, Department of Health, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GLADYS KESSLER, District Judge.

Plaintiffs are a class of poor children who are eligible for Medicaid services in the District of Columbia. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, they initiated this action almost two decades ago in order to ensure that Defendants provide those services. During the course of this long and difficult litigation, parties were able to resolve their dispute in the form of a Consent Decree agreed to in 1999. For the past ten years, the Court has overseen Defendants' compliance with the terms of that Consent Decree.

This matter is now before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Terminate Consent Decree and Subsequent Remedial Orders and to Dismiss the Case ("Defs.' Mot.") [Dkt. Nos. 1456, 1481]. Upon consideration of the Motion, Opposition, Reply, numerous supplemental briefs and surreplies, and the entire record herein, and for the reasons stated below, Defendants' Motion is denied as to the private right of action issue.

I. BACKGROUND

Prior opinions have described in some detail the lengthy and complicated history of this case. See, e.g., Salazar v. District of Columbia, 123 F.Supp.2d 8 (D.D.C.2000); Salazar v. District of Columbia, 954 F.Supp. 278 (D.D.C.1996) (" Salazar I "). The key pieces of the narrative are set forth herein.

In their Complaint, Plaintiffs brought seven claims against the District of Columbia.¹ Complaint ¶¶ 103-25. One of Plaintiffs' most far-reaching claims was that Defendants had failed to furnish "early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment" ("EPSDT") services, as mandatedby the Medicaid program, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(43). Complaint ¶¶ 120-22. Such a failure, they claim, is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

In 1994, Judge Norma Holloway Johnson, to whom the case was originally assigned, ruled that Plaintiffs were permitted to bring six of the seven Medicaid claims under § 1983. See Wellington v. District of Columbia, 851 F.Supp. 1, 3-6 (D.D.C.1994).² The Court held that " Section 1983 provides a private remedy for all of the Title XIX provisions except those in [P]laintiffs' third claim. All of [P]laintiffs['] Title XIX claims except Claim III are sufficient to withstand the motion to dismiss." Id. at 6.

On July 1, 1994, the case was transferred to this Court [Dkt. No. 74]. After extensive pre-trial litigation, a seven-day bench trial was held in 1996, to resolve the dispute over Plaintiffs' EPSDT claim, as well as three additional claims. At the conclusion of the trial, a lengthy opinion set forth the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Plaintiffs prevailed, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on each of the four claims that went to trial. ³ After the Court entered remedial orders to effectuate this ruling, Defendants appealed the judgment.

While the case was proceeding before our Court of Appeals, parties engaged in settlement negotiations. On September 23, 1998, those negotiations produced a proposed Settlement Order [Dkt. No. 624]. The next day, parties asked the Court of Appeals to remove the case from its calendar and requested remand back to this Court. On January 22, 1999, the Settlement Order was approved by the Court. Order Modifying the Amended Remedial Order of May 6, 1997 and Vacating the Order of March 27, 1997 ("Settlement Order") [Dkt. No. 663]. Since that time, this agreement has governed the case. There have been various consensual amendments made to the Settlement Order, as well as Court Orders resolving disputes over Defendants' compliance with the Order's requirements.

In March of 2009, the District of Columbia filed the instant Motion. ⁴ In it, Defendants argue, inter alia, that Plaintiffs have no private right of action to enforce the EPSDT provisions under § 1983, and, even if they do, Defendants have achieved compliance with federal law governing provision of such services. Defs.' Mot. at 1-2. On May 26, 2009, the Court concluded, at the suggestion of Defendants, that "the most efficient way to resolve the Defendant[s'] pending Motion" would be to first consider the discrete legal question of whether or not Plaintiffs have a private right of action to enforce the EPSDT provisions. Order (May 26, 2009) [Dkt. No. 1489]. Accordingly, briefing was conducted on only this legal issue, and was completed on September 18, 2009.

II. ANALYSIS

Defendants argue that Rule 60(b) provides grounds for vacating the decision.Their chief argument is that a 2002 Supreme Court decision, Gonzaga v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 122 S.Ct. 2268, 153 L.Ed.2d 309 (2002), represents an intervening change in law that alters the legal landscape on which the Settlement Order rests. Such a significant change, they maintain, makes Rule 60(b) an appropriate vehicle for re-arguing whether Plaintiffs have a private right of action to enforce the EPSDT provisions of Medicaid, a point previously decided in favor of Plaintiffs. See Wellington, 851 F.Supp. at 6.

Rule 60(b) permits a party to seek relief from a "final judgment, order, or proceeding" for various reasons. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Defendants seek relief under 60(b)(5) and (6). Defs.' Mot. at 5. Rule 60(b)(5) allows a court to grant relief where "the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable." Rule 60(b)(6) is a catch-all provision that permits a court to grant relief for "any other reason that justifies relief." The party seeking modification of a consent decree bears the burden of showing that "a significant change in circumstances" warrants relief. Rufo v. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 383, 112 S.Ct. 748, 116 L.Ed.2d 867 (1992).

"Modification is an extraordinary remedy, as would be any device which allows a party-even a municipality-to escape commitments voluntarily made and solemnized by a court decree." Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 861 F.2d 295, 298 (D.C.Cir.1988) (discussing Rule 60(b)(5)). The district court has discretion to grant or deny a motion brought under Rule 60(b). See id.; see also United Mine Workers of Am.1974 Pension v. Pittston Co., 984 F.2d 469, 476 (D.C.Cir.1993).

A. Defendants Are Time-Barred from Seeking Rule 60(b) Relief.

A party seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(5) or (6) must do so "within a reasonable time." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). This standard must be applied to the specific facts of each case, after considering "whether the party opposing the motion has been prejudiced by the delay in seeking relief and ... whether the moving party had some good reason for his failure to take appropriate action sooner." 11 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2866 (2d ed. 2009); see also Expeditions Unlimited Aquatic Enterprises, Inc. v. Smithsonian Inst., 500 F.2d 808, 810 (D.C.Cir.1974); Evans v. Fenty, 701 F.Supp.2d 126, 157 (D.D.C.2010) ("Factors to consider include 'the length of the delay, the explanations for the delay, the prejudice to the opposing party caused by the delay and the circumstances warranting relief.' ") (citations omitted). In this case, Defendants filed their Motion in March of 2009. The Supreme Court issued its opinion in Gonzaga-the asserted basis for Defendants' private right of action argument-in June of 2002. Nearly seven years separate the two dates.

Defendants argue that ongoing enforcement of the decree in the intervening time has minimized actual prejudice to the Plaintiffs. Defs.' Reply to Pls.' Partial Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. at 6-7 ("Defs.' Reply") [Dkt. No. 1503]; cf. Order (May 26, 2009) (finding no prejudice to Plaintiff in bifurcating consideration of Defendants' Motion to Terminate because "all parts of the consent decree [would] remain in order"). That may well be true to some extent. However, underlying the limitation on Rule 60(b) relief are the important interests of finality and repose. See Randall v. Merrill Lynch, 820 F.2d 1317 (D.C.Cir.1987) (noting that 60(b) is "a toolwhich trial courts are to use sparingly," as it is the "mechanism by which courts temper the finality of judgments with the necessity to distribute justice"); Summers v. Howard Univ., 374 F.3d 1188, 1193 (D.C.Cir.2004) ("Under Rule 60(b), a court must balance the interest in justice with the interest in protecting the finality of judgments."). Allowing Defendants to file a motion that strikes at the legal foundation of a ten-year-old decree, based on an issue decided seven years ago, surely prejudices Plaintiffs' interests in finality and repose.

Courts in this Circuit have found far shorter delays to be unreasonable. See, e.g., Gilmore v. Hinman, 191 F.2d 652, 652-53 (D.C.Cir.1951) (concluding that a 60(b) motion filed 16 months after final judgment was not filed within a reasonable time); Karim-Panahi v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., Civ. No. 08-7093, 2008 WL 5640693, at *1 (D.C.Cir.2008) (finding no abuse of discretion where district court denied motion as untimely because filed after 18 months and without justification); see also Emily Q. v. Shrewy, 203 Fed.Appx. 35 (9th Cir.2006) (affirming ...