Salinas v. Collier

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ISRAEL SALINAS, JR., Institutional ID No. 02181382, SID ID No. 09174265, Plaintiff, v. BRYAN COLLIER, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1:20-CV-00181-BU

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Abilene Division

June 20, 2024

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

JOHN R. PARKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff ISRAEL SALINAS JR., proceeding pro se, is an inmate currently incarcerated by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) at the Coffield Unit in Tennessee Colony, Texas. Dkt. No. 22-1 at 3. He brings this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that Robertson Unit officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs by depriving him of a “walker/rollator” in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Eighth Amendment. Dkt No. 22 at 4. He also brings various related claims arguing that officials were negligent in protecting him from, and enforcing policies against, acts of deliberate indifference. Id.

Salinas was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Dkt. No. 8. United Stated District Judge James Wesley Hendrix transferred this case to the undersigned for an initial case review under 28 U.S.C §§ 1915 and 1915A. Dkt No. 9. And because Salinas has not consented to the undersigned exercising the full jurisdiction of the Court the undersigned submits these proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations for the disposition of this case. Id.

After careful consideration of the claims in Salinas's Second Amended Complaint, and the amendments to those claims through his responses to the Court's two questionnaires, see Dkt. Nos. 22, 22-1, 25, 43, the undersigned recommends that Salinas's claims be dismissed.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

After filing his initial Complaint, Salinas was granted leave to proceed IFP, Dkt. No. 8, and the case was transferred to the undersigned the same day for initial case review. Dkt. No. 9. The Court ordered and received the TDCJ administrative records relevant to Salinas's claims, Dkt. Nos. 12, 14. Salinas was then allowed to file an amended complaint on January 5, 2021, Dkt. No. 15, and again on April 29, 2021. Dkt. No. 22.

The Court also ordered Salinas to respond to a questionnaire to help him develop the factual basis for his claims, Dkt. No. 23, but Salinas failed to respond. The Court then entered a Show Cause Order requiring Salinas to respond. Dkt. No. 24. Salinas then filed his responses. Dkt. No. 25. The Court later ordered Salinas to respond to a supplemental questionnaire, Dkt. No. 36, which he refused to do, and instead filed a motion to be excused from answering the questionnaire. See Dkt. Nos. 34, 36. The Court then stayed and administratively closed this case until it could secure Salinas's compliance with the Court's orders. See Dkt. Nos. 38, 39, 41. Salinas finally responded to the supplemental questionnaire, Dkt. No. 43, and the Court lifted the stay and reopened the case on January 18, 2023. Dkt. No. 46.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Salinas is a veteran with a 50% service-connected disability. Dkt. No. 25-1 at 2526. His disability relates to two previous surgeries to reconstruct his anterior cruciate ligament (ACL), including a bone graft taken from his right knee to repair his left knee. Dkt. No. 25 at 6. He states that, at some unspecified point, he was issued a walker/rollator “to use for prolonged and long distance walking and to use to sit due to instability in knees and to relieve stress and pain in L4-L5-S-1 from injuries.” Id. His diagnoses while at the Robertson Unit were morbid obesity (5'11” and 352 pounds), pressure ulcers, and hypertension.

Although Salinas purports to bring several different claims, they all relate back to the confiscation by prison officials of his walker on August 23, 2018. See generally Dkt. Nos. 22, 25, 43. Salinas alleges that the removal of his walker constituted deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and a violation of his rights under the ADA. See Dkt. 22. Specifically, he claims that Nurse Jackie Gregory “endangered his life and placed him in imminent danger and harm” by taking away his walker. Dkt. No. 22-1 at 4. Salinas also makes several claims against Sergeant Bradley Johnson, claiming that in addition to taking away his walker at Gregory's suggestion, Johnson also:

[D]id “impede”, “interfere with” and delay Plaintiffs' prescribed medical treatment after said treatment was already in place, and did continue to “Harass”, “taunt” as well as use profane language, discriminatory slurs and deny plaintiff scheduled meals, access to courts, religious services by his malicious misconduct and total disregard to plaintiff's serious medical needs.

Dkt. No. 22-1 at 3. The medical treatment referenced by Salinas appears to be the issuance of the walker because he states elsewhere that, “my only prescribed treatment is or was usage of medically prescribed treatment, walker/rollator.” Dkt. No. 25 at 2.

Additionally, Salinas brings a deliberate indifference claim against Dr. Robert O. Martin arising out of the same facts, stating that Martin refused to examine and treat him after his walker was taken away by Gregory and Johnson. Dkt. No. 22-1 at 5. He also brings an ill-defined claim against Leeroy Cano, Assistant Warden of the Robertson Unit, as well as multiple claims against TDCJ and its Executive Director, Bryan Collier. Dkt. No. 22 at 3; Dkt. No. 22-1 at 1-2, 6.

LEGAL STANDARDS

A court must dismiss a complaint filed by a prisoner against a government entity or employee if the court determines the complaint is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. § 1915A(b) (applying section to any suit by a prisoner against certain governmental entities, regardless of whether the prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis).

A frivolous complaint lacks any arguable basis, either in fact or in law, for the wrong alleged. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A complaint lacks an arguable basis in fact if it rests upon clearly baseless factual contentions, and similarly lacks an arguable basis in law if it contains indisputably meritless legal theories. See id. at 327; Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 373 (5th Cir. 2005).

Dismissal for failure to state a claim-whether under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), Section 1915A(b)(1), or Rule 12(b)(6)-“turns on the sufficiency of the ‘factual allegations' in the complaint.” Smith v. Bank of Am., N.A., 615 Fed.Appx. 830, 833 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (quoting Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014) (per curiam)). Thus, if a plaintiff “plead[s] facts sufficient to show” that the claims asserted have “substantive plausibility” by stating “simply, concisely, and directly events” that they contend entitle them to relief, the claims should not be dismissed merely because the plaintiff fails to articulate the proper legal theory that otherwise makes those facts actionable in court. Johnson, 574 U.S. at 11-12 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)-(3), (d)(1), (e)).

Courts accept well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 2016). This means the factual allegations, while not required to be detailed, must amount to more than mere labels, conclusions, or a statement of the legal elements of a claim. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)); see also Chhim, 836 F.3d at 469.

For claims to be substantively plausible, a plaintiff need not establish that the pleaded facts probably occurred as alleged, but the facts must allow the court “to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 634 F.3d 787, 796 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79). Even pro se plaintiffs must plead facts that raise the right to relief above a speculative level. Chhim, 836 F.3d at 469 (citing Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002)). And when plaintiffs “have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

When evaluating a complaint under these standards, courts liberally construe the pleadings of pro se plaintiffs, holding their complaints to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). But “liberal construction does not require that the Court . . . create causes of action where there are none.” Smith v. CVS Caremark Corp., No. 3:12-cv-2465-B, 2013 WL 2291886, at *8 (N.D. Tex. May 23, 2013). “To demand otherwise would require the ‘courts to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff'” and would “‘transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.'” Jones v. Mangrum, No. 3:16-cv-3137, 2017 WL 712755, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 23, 2017) (quoting Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985)).

Ultimately, “‘[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief' is ‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.'” Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 899 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).

ANALYSIS

Salinas sues the prison officials in their official and personal capacities. See Dkt. No 22-1. He also sues TDCJ. Id. The only relief he seeks is monetary,^[1]specifically, $80,000 from each individual defendan...