Salmon v. Tafelski

235 N.E.3d 867

Linda SALMON, Appellant-Defendant,

v.Rita M. TAFELSKI, Appellee-Plaintiff.

Court of Appeals Case No. 23A-CT-2173

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Filed May 17, 2024

Appeal from the Lake Superior Court, The Honorable John M. Sedia, Judge, Trial Court Cause No. 45D01-1304-CT-29

Attorneys for Appellant: David J. Beach, Stephen A. Tyler, Eichhorn & Eichhorn, LLP, Hammond, Indiana

Attorneys for Appellee: Bryan L. Ciyou, Ciyou & Associates, P.C., Indianapolis, Indiana, Anne Medlin Lowe, Fugate Gangstad Lowe LLC, Carmel, Indiana

Najam, Senior Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] Linda Salmon brings this interlocutory appeal from the denial of her motion for summary judgment on Rita Tafelski’s complaint for tortious interference with Tafelski’s inheritance from her mother’s estate. Tafelski’s mother died intestate. Tafelski alleged that Salmon had exerted undue influence and engaged in fraud causing the decedent to make inter vivos transfers of property that benefited Salmon and would otherwise have been included in the decedent’s estate and ultimately in Tafelski’s inheritance. The trial court held that Tafelski could maintain an independent action for tortious interference with her inheritance outside the estate. We conclude, however, that in asserting her claims Tafelski failed to pursue remedies pursuant to our probate code and that Salmon is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We reverse and remand with instructions that Salmon’s motion for summary judgment be granted.

Issue

[2] Both the threshold and dispositive issue in this case is whether the heir of a decedent who died intestate has authority to maintain an independent claim for tortious interference with an inheritance outside the probate estate where a remedy is available and adequate under the probate code.

[3] First, regarding Tafelski’s claim that Indiana law does not require that a tortious interference claimant exhaust her remedies under the probate code before asserting an independent tort claim, we hold that a tort claimant may not maintain an independent claim where a remedy under the probate code is available and would provide adequate relief.

[4] Second, concerning Tafelski’s claim that there is no adequate remedy available to her under the probate code, we hold that she had, but failed to exercise, the adequate remedies available to her under the probate code.

[5] Third, with regard to Salmon’s claim that Tafelski does not have standing to bring her action for tortious interference with an inheritance, conversion, fraud, constructive trust, breach of fiduciary duty, and intermeddling, we hold that Tafelski does have standing to maintain her cause of action, which is subject to her pursuit of a claim under the probate code where such a claim is available and sustainable.

Facts and Procedural History

[6] Rita Tafelski is the daughter and sole heir of Suzanne Neitzel, who died intestate on April 14, 2012. Linda Salmon is Neitzel’s sister, and following Neitzel’s death, Salmon was appointed personal representative of her estate.

[7] Prior to her death, Neitzel’s health had been failing for some time, and in 2010, Neitzel gave her power of attorney to Salmon. She also changed two of her bank accounts to joint accounts with Salmon with right of survivorship. And, according to Tafelski, Neitzel transferred to Salmon her shares in two family trucking companies in exchange for $100.00. Consequently, none of these assets were included in Neitzel’s probate estate.

[8] In April 2013, Tafelski filed the instant lawsuit against Salmon for tortious interference with an inheritance, conversion, fraud, constructive trust, breach of fiduciary duty, and intermeddling (hereinafter collectively "tortious interference with an inheritance"). Tafelski alleged that Salmon had exerted undue influence Over Neitzel and engaged in fraud when Neitzel established joint bank accounts with Salmon and transferred her shares of stock to Salmon. Tafelski maintained that the assets involved in these inter vivos transfers would have been included in Neitzel’s estate were it not for Salmon’s misconduct. Tafelski claimed that Salmon’s conduct amounted to a tortious interference with her inheritance. This civil action was consolidated with the Neitzel estate for purposes of discovery and pre-trial proceedings.

[9] In January 2014, Tafelski sought to remove Salmon as personal representative. Salmon voluntarily resigned, and Tafelski was appointed as successor personal representative. Thereafter, Salmon filed her final accounting showing she had distributed to Tafelski all the assets of the estate, which totaled over $1 million. The accounting also showed that the funds from the two joint bank accounts totaled $126,645 and had been transferred to Salmon as surviving joint tenant.

[10] Throughout the next several years, the parties filed numerous discovery and dispositive motions in these highly contentious proceedings. In June 2020, Salmon moved to dismiss the estate action pursuant to Trial Rule 41(E). The probate court found that Tafelski had taken no significant action on behalf of the estate for more than six years and granted the dismissal.¹ Tafelski appealed the dismissal to this Court, and we affirmed in a memorandum decision. Matter of Est. of Neitzel, No. 21A-ES-1485, 2022 WL 1134628 (Ind. Ct. App. April 13, 2022) (mem.), trans, denied sub nom. Tafelski v. Salmon, 196 N.E.3d 686 (Ind.).²

[11] This separate action was then transferred back to the trial court’s docket. Salmon subsequently moved for summary judgment and asserted that Tafelski had failed to designate evidence that would support her claims, that she lacked standing to maintain an independent action, and that only the personal representative of the decedent’s estate would be a proper party plaintiff. The court denied Salmon’s motion and held that Tafelski could maintain an independent action for tortious interference with her inheritance. The trial court certified its order for interlocutory appeal, and Salmon now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[1, 2] [12] Summary judgment is proper if the evidence shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C); Pike Twp. Educ. Found, Inc. v. Rubenstein, 831 N.E.2d 1239, 1241 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Where, as here, the relevant facts are not in dispute, we are presented with a pure question of law for which summary judgment disposition is particularly appropriate. Pike Twp. Educ. Found., 831 N.E.2d at 1241. We review pure questions of law de novo. Id.

[13] At the heart of this case is Tafelski’s claim for tortious interference with an inheritance. This Court first recognized the tort of intentional interference with an inheritance in Minton v. Sackett, 671 N.E.2d 160 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). In doing so, we stated that such a cause of action arises when " ‘[o]ne who by fraud or other tortious means intentionally prevents another from receiving from a third person an inheritance or gift that he would otherwise have received is subject to liability to others for the loss of the inheritance or gift.’" Id at 162 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 774B (1979)). We further held that this tort is not permitted "where the remedy of a will contest is available and would provide the injured party with adequate relief." Minton, 671 N.E.2d at 162. And we concluded that the remedies available under the will contest adequately provided for the damages sought by the plaintiff. Id at 163.

[14] More recently in Keith v. Dooley, 802 N.E.2d 54 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied, we relied on our decision in Minton to affirm the dismissal of an action for interference with an inheritance. We did so because the tort action and a will contest were pending at the same time, the remedies sought in each action were substantially the same, and both actions involved substantially the same parties and subject matter. Id at 58.

[15] Later, in Moriarty v. Moriarty, 150 N.E.3d 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied, the daughters of the decedent initiated a will contest which also alleged in a separate count that their father’s wife had tortiously interfered with their inheritance. The trial court found that the remedy available under the will contest would not provide adequate relief with respect to those assets which passed outside the decedent’s estate and that the daughters had stated a valid claim for tortious interference with their inheritance. Id at 625. The court tried both the will contest and the intentional interference claim together and granted relief for the daughters on both counts, and we affirmed.

[16] In the present case, citing Minton and Keith, the trial court determined, in effect, that those cases, which both involved will contests, were not controlling because Neitzel died intestate and, therefore, that Tafelski had "no ability … to contest a will." Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 35 (Order Denying Motion for Summary Judgment). Thus, the court held that it is permissible for Tafelski to bring an independent action for tortious interference with an inheritance. Id.

[3, 4] [17] On appeal, Salmon contends Tafelski is not permitted to maintain an independent claim for tortious interference with an inheritance outside the probate estate.³ Salmon also maintains there are avenues available within the probate code for Tafelski to address her allegations, but she failed to pursue them. Tafelski counters that her independent tort action is permissible and not subject to probate code restrictions.

[18] We first address the trial court’s interpretation of our holding in Minton to support its determination that Tafelski could proceed with her independent tort action. The probate code is the predicate for our opinion in Minton. Because Minton died testate, we turned to the portion of the code dealing with wills and observed that "a will contest is the exclusive means of challenging the...